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THE EFFECT OF OLIGOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 
ON ECONOMIC WELFARE IN THE FINNISH FOOD 
MANUFACTURING 
JUHA MARTTILA 
Abstract. The study presents oligopoly models to investigate the welfare losses of 
imperfect competition so that the implications of different kind of restrictions to 
foreign trade are included in the models. The approach is based on the conjectural 
variations and the leadership position of the domestic firms against foreign firms on the 
Finnish market. The derived models are applied to the Finnish food manufacturing 
industries and the welfare losses due to oligopolistic market power are estimated. 
Furthermore, the effects of the EU membership on meat and cheese markets, assuming 
oligopolistic behaviour in the manufacturing sector, are evaluated using a calibrated 
partial equilibrium model. 
The results suggest that the deadweight losses due to oligopolistic competion may 
be considerable even under Cournot equilibrium. Losses increase as the absolute value 
of the price elasticity of demand declines and as the conjectural variations elasticities 
increase. If firms are able to collude, monopoly power is a substantial problem in terms 
of allocative inefficiency. Welfare gains could be expected from public policies that 
are able to restrict collusive practices and, especially, to lower entry barriers. Accord-
ing to the results, the effects of the EU membership on the food economy depend 
heavily on the nature of strategic interactions between firms and the structural features 
of the specific market. Increased competition in the Finnish food manufacturing leads 
to a considerable redistribution of welfare between consumers and domestic food 
manufacturers. The overall net effect is welfare improving. 
Index words: imperfect competition, oligopoly, welfare loss estimates, integration, 
food manufacturing 
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1. Introduction 
The relative importance of the food processing industries in the Finnish' food 
chain has increased in the past few decades. Food processing industries consti-
tute a major market for the domestic farm sector and, hence, the effects of 
agricultural and trade policies on consumers and overall welfare spread through-
out the food processing. Contrary to the atomistic structure of farming, food 
processing industries usually contain only a few main rivals. A market with a 
number of competitors, but not so many as each of them may be considered a 
price-taker, is oligopolistic in nature. Because oligopolistic markets are charac-
terized by the interdependence among firms, the modern study of oligopolies is 
based on the game theory. The theory of oligopoly provides useful analytical 
framework for analyzing competition within the Finnish food manufacturing 
industries. 
How much profit margin to add to the costs is one of the most important 
decisions for an oligopolistic firm. Two important factors influencing the deci-
sion are the strength of the total industry demand and the distribution of demand 
across the competing firms. Given the preference ordering of consumers, the 
first is mainly determined by the purchasing power of the buyers. The second 
will be determined mainly by the market structure of the industry, such as 
concentration, product differentiation, or the extent of imports. Different oligopoly 
models can be used to explain the relationship between market structure and 
profit margins. Eventually, the determination of the prices and margins of the 
industry depends on the form of competition, which can vary from tight price 
competition to collusive pricing. If price deviates from marginal cost due to 
market power, misallocation of resources will take place, and this will result in 
welfare losses. Because of the concentrated market structure of the Finnish food 
manufacturing and previously strict public regulation of food imports, it is 
possible that the impacts of imperfect competition on the economic efficiency 
of the food sector are considerable. 
1.1. Background of the study 
Models of oligopoly that permit empirical evaluation of welfare are usually 
based on Bain' s (ref. MARTIN 1993) work on structure-performance relation-
ships. The form of the relation is determined by the oligopolistic conduct. Since 
Bain's empirical work, the structure-conduct-performance (S-C-P) paradigm 
has provided the basic framework to study market performance in terms of 
market characteristics and firm behaviour. 
The main outlines of the S-C-P paradigm are presented in Figure 1.1. The 
determinants of the market structure are influenced by various elements connected 
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BASIC CONDITIONS 
SUPPLY 	 DEMAND 
Raw materials 	 Price elasticity 
Technology Rate of growth 
Product durability 	Substitutes 
Value/weight Marketing type 
Business attitudes 	Purchase method 
Unionization 	 Cyclical characters 	.2 
MARKET STRUCTURE 
Number of sellers and buyers 
Product differentiation 
Barriers to entry 
Cost structures 
Vertical integration 
Conglomerateness  
with supply and demand (basic conditions). The conduct of firms refers to their 
competitive strategies. Conduct is influenced by the market structure, for example, 
so that price coordination among sellers is easier the more concentrated the 
market or the higher the barriers to entry. The performance of an industry 
depends on its conduct. Furthermore, especially in the food sector, several 
public policies affect the S-C-P causation. For example, competition policy and 
the regulation of foreign trade may affect the market structure and conduct. An 
important feature of the post-Bain literature is that the backward pointing 
arrows indicate the interdependence of basic conditions, structure, and conduct. 
There are reverse causations from conduct to structure and basic conditions, as 
< 	 
CONDUCT 
Pricing behaviour 
Product strategy 
Research and innovation 
Advertising 
Legal tactics 
PERFORMANCE 
Production and allocative efficiency 
Progress 
Full employment 
Equity  
PUBLIC POLICY 
Regulations 
Taxes and subsidies 
Trade policy 
Agricultural policy 
_ 
Figure 1.1. The structure-conduct-performance model. Source: based on SCHERER 
(1980) and SCHERER and Ross (1990). 
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well as from structure to basic conditions. For example, the level of advertising 
expenditure influences the degree of product differention and the demand 
conditions. 
Studies of industrial organization (1.0.) also employ different versions of 
the S-C-P framework than presented in Figure 1.1. For example, market struc-
ture can he treated as an exogenous element or the direction of causation can he 
reversed from performance to conduct and further to structure. SHEPHERD (1990) 
presents a review of the history and different schools of the field. The applica-
tion of the game theory to oligopoly models in the 1970s provided a framework 
for the analysis of competition and determination of market performance. This 
game theoretical I.O. (new 1.0.) has been mainly directed to purely theoretical 
aspects of economics, but recent work also involves empirical industry studies. 
A typical methodology of the new I.O. is to separate the analysis of short-run 
equilibrium when market structure is fixed from the analysis of long-run equi-
librium when conduct has effects on the market structure. The main interest is 
directed to modelling conduct as the outcome of individually rational decisions. 
Many of the new theoretical models formalize these intuitive arguments which 
can be found in the traditional S-C-P literature. 
Oligopoly is probably the most common form of competition. Firms in 
oligopolistic industries make their strategic decisions based on assumptions 
about the reactions of rival firms. Because individual Finnish food processing 
firms often hold considerable market shares, it can he assumed that the Finnish 
food markets are characterized by oligopoly. According to the common view of 
industrial organization, the conduct of firms is largely determined by the market 
structure. Therefore, the market equilibriums of concentrated markets will prob-
ably differ from those under perfect competition in which firms act as passive 
price-takers. Structure and conduct have impacts on the market performance, 
such as the firms' profits, consumer prices, production efficiency, and competi-
tivenes s . 
From the point of view of consumer welfare, oligopoly prices that are above 
marginal costs cause loss in utility. At the same time, producers may obtain 
additional revenues compared to perfect competition. Markets are allocatively 
inefficient if oligopolistic pricing behaviour leads to a net welfare loss (deadweight 
loss). The most common approach to measuring the welfare effects of oligopolistic 
competition is the partial equilibrium analysis with the concepts of producer 
and consumer surplus. Producer surplus can he measured in terms of profits, 
and Marshallian consumer surplus is a common method to obtain a money 
measure of consumer welfare. However, it must he noted that Marshallian 
surplus is only an approximation of more exact measures of welfare changes, 
such as compensating and equivalent variation. Compensating variation is the 
change in income that a consumer requires after a change in prices to allow him 
to reattain his former level of welfare. Equivalent variation is the change in 
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income needed at the original prices to allow a consumer to reach the welfare 
level he would have achieved after the change in prices. Their sign will be the 
same, but their magnitudes will generally differ because the marginal utility of 
money changes along the demand curve. Marshallian surplus is a precise meas-
ure of welfare change when compensating variation equals equivalent variation. 
Controversy surrounding the level of welfare losses due to imperfect compe-
tition has persisted since HARBERGER (1954) first produced estimates of wel-
fare loss in U.S. manufacturing. His monopoly model resulted in a very low 
loss estimate of 0.08 percent of the GNP and, for instance, GISSER'S (1986) 
estimates derived from a price leadership model supported these results. How-
ever, a significant part of literature (e.g. COWLING and MUELLER 1978, OLSON 
and BUMPASS 1986) has reported larger losses in the range of 4 to 7 percent of 
the GNP. The magnitude of welfare losses varies between industries and de-
pends on the firms' possibilities to use market power. The differences of esti-
mates depend, for instance, on the procedure to model competition, the estima-
tion of the price elasticity of demand, the length of the time period covered, and 
the determination of the competitive profit rate. 
Most earlier studies on the effects of oligopolistic competition on the food 
sector have concemed the U.S. economy. The magnitude of estimated welfare 
losses for food manufacturing has ranged widely. PETERSON and CONNOR (1995) 
have analyzed eight different models to evaluate cross-industry deadweight 
losses for U.S. food manufacturing. They compare the rankings of industries 
according to the estimated welfare losses. They found out that, although the 
levels of the deadweight loss estimates differ substantially, from 0.1 to 5.15 
percent as a value of shipments, the differences of model assumptions and 
measurement methods have relatively small effects on the industry rankings of 
the estimated deadweight losses. The welfare losses are usually the greatest in 
the case of high-value-added products. 
In Finland a pioneer work in the area of S-C-P research is the study of 
WAHLROOS (1980). He noted that demand growth, advertising intensity, risk, 
and the degree of foreign competition explain the profitability differences within 
industries. VIRTANEN (1987) found out that concentration is also an essential 
determinant of profitability. The relationship is positive when profitability is 
measured as profit margins, but it turns to he negative when capital productivity 
is used as profitability measure. One reason for this is that the market power 
may lead to overinvestments and to inefficiency in the use of capital. Further-
more, an intra-industry study of WILLNER and STÅHL (1992) evaluates welfare 
losses of Finnish four-digit industries using concentration data from 1982. They 
found out that there is a number of industries in which high concentration may 
lead to substantial welfare losses. 
Application of imperfect competition to food processing industries has been 
infrequent in Finland. VOLK (1993) applied Cournot behaviour to raw material 
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supply when studying the interdependences between a cooperative and its mem-
bers. In the study of ISOSAARI (1993), the welfare effects of sugar policy 
alternatives in the monopolistic markets are evaluated. Market imperfections 
can be observed to have influence on the choice of policy instruments. Further-
more, HOLM (1994) applied strategic trade theory when analyzing the effect of 
intemational agricultural policy harmonization and trade liberalization. He also 
evaluated the welfare impacts of the Nordic countries' EU membership on the 
agricultural sector by using a vertically integrated monopoly model. 
The strength of foreign competition influences domestic structure-conduct-
performance relationships. In Finland a high domestic price level of agricultural 
products has been maintained through the administrative foreign trade system 
consisting of both import protection and subsidized exports of surplus produc-
tion. Imports have been regulated, for instance, by means of tariffs, imports 
levies, and quantitative import restrictions. In the Finnish food manufacturing, 
the effects of protection on efficiency may appear as oligopolistic coordination 
of the protected firms or too small plant scale within an industry. 
The integration of previously segmented food markets is an essential part of 
Finland' s accession to the European Union (EU) at the beginning of 1995. 
Joining the EU leads to lower trade costs and lower prices of agricultural 
products. This reduces the average production costs of food manufacturers. 
Removing institutional barriers to trade has effects on economic welfare through 
increased foreign competition within the food sector. A potentially important 
effect of the EU membership is that the integration may reduce the market 
power that firms have in their domestic markets. Thus, it can be assumed that 
the estimates of the economic effects of the EU membership on Finnish food 
economy, assuming perfect competition, would probably underestimate the 
welfare improvements resulting from integration. 
1.2. Research objectives 
Due to the high level of industrial concentration and the small market size, 
welfare losses associated with imperfect competition may be large in the Finn-
ish food processing industries. The high degree of border protection before the 
accession to the EU may have increased the level of allocative inefficiency. 
However, research conceming imperfect competition in the Finnish food manu-
facturing and its quantitative effects on welfare has been quite limited in the 
field of agricultural economics. What is the magnitude of the possible welfare 
losses of oligopolistic competition in the Finnish food manufacturing has re-
mained a question without quantitative answers. 
A potential reason for the lack of research in this field is that the oligopoly 
models usually yield a large spectrum of possible market equilibriums. The 
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general theory of oligopoly is lacking at present. The results depend on the 
context in which the theory is set and, thus, different oligopoly models describe 
what might happen in some particular situations. It is essential to know how 
oligopolistic competition influences market performance according to different 
oligopoly models. 
Integration of the national markets to the larger European single markets 
reduces the market power that domestic firms have in the domestic markets and 
may generate welfare gains. This is a result of the abolition of trade barriers, 
which increases foreign competition, but may also lead to increasing competi-
tion between domestic firms. Furthermore, membership in the EU leads to 
lower production costs in food manufacturing. The degree of transmission from 
cost reduction to product prices and the effect on consumer welfare depend on 
the degree of market imperfection. A problem is to what extent possible welfare 
changes are due to the different impacts of integration, and what the magnitude 
of changes is. 
The purpose of the present study is to provide answers to the problems 
presented above. The objectives of this study are the following: 
to study the effects of market structure and conduct on perform-
ance by using the game theoretical model formulations; 
to derive measures of welfare losses associated with oligopolistic 
market power for a number of equilibrium types; 
to estimate welfare losses of oligopolies for the Finnish food 
manufacturing by employing alternative oligopoly models; 
to predict how the membership in the EU affects the oligopoly 
equilibriums, consumer surplus, and firms' profits in the Finn-
ish food manufacturing. 
This study presents a way to link industry performance and structure in 
oligopoly. The empirical analysis is based on explicit models in which welfare 
losses associated with the oligopolistic equilibrium are computed directly in-
stead of relying on a proxy like the price-cost margin. Because there are 
important variations in the strength of foreign competition, the aim is to de-
velop a framework of high flexibility to permit the impact of trade on conduct 
and performance to vary across food processing industries. 
When studying welfare losses due to oligopolistic competition, it can he 
assumed that the conduct of industries with regulated imports and those with 
free trade differ significantly from each other. In the first group, firms may have 
a high degree of market power due to the high protection measures, while in the 
second group foreign competition affects conduct and performance. As a result, 
the performance of protected industries is more significantly determined by the 
domestic market stucture variables. 
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Market integration is a considerable policy change that leads to increased 
foreign competition, a more fragmented market structure in terms of the in-
creased number of potential competitors, and a decrease in the domestic firms' 
potential market power. The game firms play is altered. The purpose of this 
study is to develop a theoretical model that captures oligopolistic interactions of 
the food processing industries, to simulate the consequences of the integration, 
and to compute the relevant welfare effects. The purpose is to analyze the 
effects of integration that are induced by changes in the competitive environ-
ment. 
1.3. Pian of the study 
This study consists of a descriptive analysis of the Finnish food manufacturing 
(Chapter 2), a theoretical study of the structure-performance relationships (Chap-
ters 3 and 4), an empirical investigation of the welfare effects of oligopolistic 
competition and market integration (Chapters 5 and 6), and sections that draw 
conclusions from the maun findings (Chapter 7) and summarize the entire study 
(Chapter 8). The considerable emphasis on theoretical analysis is based on the 
fact that most equilibriums of imperfect competition are greatly dependent on 
the model selection, and the form of oligopolistic competition is decisive when 
effects on welfare are studied. 
The S-C-P framework of the Finnish food manufacturing is described in 
Chapter 2 by reviewing previous studies and collecting statistical data. First, the 
role of food processing industries in Finnish economy is presented briefly. 
Different dimensions of the market structure and conduct provide the basis for 
the model selection in the following chapters. In this context, the linkages 
between the strategies of food manufacturing and public policies are described. 
A description of market performance concentrates on the profitability and finan-
cial performance of the Finnish food processing industries. 
The main interest of Chapter 3 is to study the effects of market structure and 
conduct on performance. Firms' strategic behaviour is modelled as noncoopera-
tive games, and a conjectural variations model of an oligopoly is used to 
investigate the short-run relationship between structure and market power. The 
stability conditions of collusive behaviour are also analyzed by using the theory 
of repeated games. However, if there exists some kind of strategic asymmetry 
between firms, the relationship between structure and market power may be 
different than when compared with the simultaneous moves approach. Relevant 
concentration indices are derived both in the case of symmetric simultaneous 
moves oligopoly and in asymmetric oligopoly. A dominant firm model and a 
hierarchical Stackelberg model are presented as special cases. Because the 
integration theory is largely based on the modern trade theory, a short section is 
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used to investigate how optimal trade policies change with the nature of 
oligopolistic competition. The basic idea is that the governmene s policy can 
influence firms' behaviour and, in some cases, interventionist policies may 
increase national welfare. However, results depend again heavily on the nature 
of oligopolistic competition, and some other, e.g. country-specific, factors. 
Different trade policy arrangements of the Finnish food sector form the basis 
for the model selection in Chapter 4. The objective is to derive applicable 
models to estimate welfare losses due to the oligopolistic competition so that 
the implications of import quotas and import levies are included in the models. 
The intention is to derive models that allow for empirical findings without 
detailed firm-level information about sales, costs, and profits. Therefore the 
welfare loss estimates produced bylthese models can be described as potential 
welfare losses that are realized if firms operate optimally, i.e. they really utilize 
the market power due to the concentration, foreign trade arrangements, and 
demand characteristics. First, Chapter 4.1 presents a model in which quantita-
tive import restrictions are adopted. Foreign firms are supposed to take prices as 
given in their individual export decisions within the permitted quota. In the 
second model (Chapter 4.2), quantitative import restrictions do not exist, but 
the govemment can impose an import levy or a subsidy per unit of home 
production. The Stackelberg model, in which domestic firms are assumed to be 
in the leadership position, is used in this context. Brief discussion on potential 
extensions of the models is also presented. 
The models to evaluate welfare losses of oligopolies are applied to Finnish 
food, drink, and tobacco industries in Chapter 5. Welfare loss estimates are 
based on 1993 statistics on domestic production, foreign trade, and the level of 
concentration. Estimated welfare losses for an industry depend largely on the 
price elasticity of demand and the form of oligopolistic competition and, there-
fore, a sensitivity analysis is needed to evaluate the range of variation Finally, 
this chapter contains a procedure to link the price elasticity of demand and the 
degree of competition by using the industry level profitability measures for 
some industries. 
In Chapter 6 the effects of the EU integration of the Finnish food manufac-
turing on consumer welfare and domestic firms' profits are investigated. As in 
the earlier chapters, the modelling framework follows a general conjectural 
variations approach. However, domestic and foreign products are assumed to be 
imperfect substitutes. The empirical analyses concentrate on bovine meat and 
cheese markets. Integration reduces trade barriers, increases foreign competition 
and, thus, reduces domestic firms' market power within the previously pro-
tected industries. 
Examination of the results and conclusions, based on the research results and 
the theory, are presented in Chapter 7. Chapter 8 contains a summary of the 
entire study as well as some suggestions for future research. 
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2. The Finnish food manufacturing industry 
Food manufacturing industries produce mainly intermediate food materials and 
edible food for the use of households, restaurants, and other sectors. It com-
prises the production of foodstuffs, beverages, tobacco, and animal feeds in 
which processors use labour, capital, and energy to transform raw animal, 
vegetable, and marine commoditities into a processed form. An increasing share 
of production is used for non-food purposes e.g. in biotechnology. In this study 
the definition of food processing is based on the 1988 version of the Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) system. It distinguished 25 food processing in-
dustries at the four-digit level. 
The aim of this chapter is to identify the characteristics of the Finnish food 
manufacturing industries. This descriptive analysis is carried out by collecting 
data on the economic and structural characteristics of food industries and re-
viewing previous studies. Later on, the information presented provides the 
foundations for the model derivations. The theoretical analysis and empirical 
research of imperfect competition in the following chapters are based on the 
evidence of market concentration and oligopolistic competition. 
The first section describes the size and the role of food manufacturing 
industries in the Finnish economy. The food industry is of great importance, 
because among ali industries it is ranked third according to sales and value 
added. The rest of this chapter is divided into three parts following the struc-
ture-conduct-performance (S-C-P) framework, which is a procedure to explain 
the degree to which industries approached the competitive ideal in terms of 
market characteristics and firm behaviour. In Chapter 2.2 the structure of food 
manufacturing is described. Traditionally, the three dimensions of market struc-
ture are the number and size distribution of companies, the degree of product 
differentiation, and the ease with which a new firm can enter an industry 
(CONNOR and WILLS 1988). The conduct of firms is usually explained to be 
largely determined by the structure of the markets. For example, higher concen-
tration encourages a greater degree of collusion. The relationship between struc-
ture and conduct in Finnish food processing is discussed in Chapter 2.3. The 
basic determinants of markets, like demand and supply conditions, vertical 
integration, and public policies, also influence a firm' s conduct. However, the 
reverse causation also occurs. A firm' s conduct will affect the market structure, 
demand conditions, etc. Strategic behaviour can appear, for instance, in the 
investment of resources for the purpose of limiting rivals' choises or in cutting 
price, even if this means short-run losses, to force rivals out of the market (see 
e.g. GILBERT 1989, ORDOVER and SALONER 1989). Furthermore, advertising can 
be a source of product differentiation and thus shift a firm' s demand curve. 
Finally, the issues of industry performance are treated in Chapter 2.4. Economic 
performance has many dimensions, such as efficiency in resource allocation, 
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innovations, and fairness in distribution. Good performance is usually associ-
ated with a competitive structure and behaviour, but much of the controversy 
among economists is due to different measures of performance and their inter-
pretation. However, a widely followed line of research has focused on profits as 
a key performance variable (SHEPHERD 1990). This section also concentrates on 
the analysis of profitability and financial performance in the Finnish food 
processing industries. A more formal presentation of the relationship between 
profitability and overall economic performance follows later on in the theoreti-
cal part of the study. 
2.1. Food industry in the Finnish economy 
According to the Census of Manufacturing, total shipments of food manufactur-
ing plants totalled FIM 52.5 billion and value added FIM 13.4 billion in 1993. 
It ranked third after metal and forest industries. The value of food processing 
output as a percentage of ali manufacturing was 18.1 percent. The share of value 
added remained lower, accounting for 13.4 percent of the value added in ali 
manufacturing. 
Within the food processing industry, dairy products manufacture clearly 
accounts for the largest share, if total shipments are used as a measure (see 
Table 2.1). Meat processing, slaughtering, and feed manufacture have the sec-
ond largest scope of operations. Nevertheless, dairy products ranks only third in 
terms of value added, accounting for 12 percent in 1993. The other major 
product groups are meat processing (14.8%), fresh bakery products (13.3%), 
malt beverages and soft drinks (10.9%), and chocolate and confectionaries 
(6.2%). The highest value added per shipments ratio has been obtained in 
beverages and in the manufacture of fresh bread and pastries. 
The relative weight of the food processing in ali manufacturing, measured by 
total shipments, decreased slightly from 1983 to 1993 (Table 2.1). However, in 
terms of value added, the share of the food processing industry has increased. A 
well-known fact is that business cycless in the economy have smaller effects on 
the output of food processing as compared to the main part of other manufactur-
ing industries. The industry groups that expanded the most rapidly during the 
10-year period were starch manufacture, fruit and vegetable processing, choco-
late and confectionary manufacture, meat processing, and manufacture of bever-
ages. Furthermore, the group of other food products obtained a very high 
growth rate. The deflation procedure, however, aggregates different groups, and 
it is also unable to correct for product quality changes. In the case of industries 
with new product introductions and large quality changes, the growth rates 
overstate the rate of physical volume growth. 
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Table 2.1. Shipments and value added in the Finnish food processing industries 
in 1983 and 1993. 
Industry 
Shipments 
19831) 	1993 
Value added 
19831) 	1993 
1111 Slaughtering 6.811 	4.807 1.034 	640 
1112 Meat processing 6.707 	9.368 1.330 	1.982 
1113 Fruit and vegetable processing 712 	1.959 280 	625 
1114 Fish processing 313 	353 118 	99 
1115-6 Manufacture of margarine,oils, 
and fats 1.464 	1.785 346 	314 
1121 Dairy products manufacture 13.136 	12.240 1.988 	1.575 
1122 Ice-cream manufacture 492 	763 197 	335 
113 Grain mill products manufacture 1.836 	1.357 436 	244 
1141 Fresh bread and pastries manufacture 3.821 	3.659 2.087 	1.782 
1142 Crispbread manufacture 192 	- 88 
1143 Biscuits manufacture 388 	613 193 	222 
1144 Macaroni manufacture 71 22 	_ 
1151-2 Sugar manufacture and refining 1.784 	1.567 452 	419 
1153 Chocolate and confectionary 
manufacture 1.028 	2.030 398 	837 
1154 Coffee roasting 1.030 	1.151 234 	312 
1159 Manufacture of other food products 395 	1.518 130 	478 
1161-2 Manufacture of alcohol - 	1.294 - 	647 
1163 Malt manufacture 452 	448 122 	111 
1164 Manufacture of malt beverages, 
soft drinks 1.953 	2.599 1.346 	1.460 
117 Tobacco products manufacture 1.084 	1.022 573 	534 
118 Starch manufacture 327 	708 120 	192 
119 Feed manufacture 4.865 	2.856 685 	521 
TOTAL 48.606 52.523 12.178.. 13.420 
of ali manufacturing 19.1 % 18.1 % 12.6 % 13.4 % 
1) Deflated to 1993 prices by the wholesale price index based on commodity groups. 
(-) Data not available. 
In the past three decades, the share of food manufacturing in the GDP has 
declined from four to three percent, indicating that its role in the national 
economy has declined roughly at the same rate as that of total manufacturing. 
However, the decrease has been small compared to the trend in the relative 
importance of agricultural production. This can be seen in Figure 2.1, which 
presents the share of agriculture and food processing industries in the GDP. At 
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Figure 2.1. The share of agriculture and food processing industries in the GDP. 
the beginning of the 1960s the share of agriculture in the GDP was almost 10 
percent, but in 1993 it was less than three percent. Thus, the significance of 
food processing in the food chain has increased considerably. Because raw 
materials used in food manufacturing are largely of domestic origin (85% 
according to AALTONEN 1993), these figures indicate both the product quality 
change of processed food and the change in the input structure of agricultural 
production. 
Food processing industries employed about 43.500 persons in 1993, ac-
counting for 13 percent of the total employment in manufacturing and slightly 
over 2 percent in the whole economy. Both fresh bakery products and meat 
industries employ a fourth of the total personnel of food manufacturing. The 
total wages and social security expenses of the food processing industries were 
FIM 6.9 billion (about half of value added) in 1993. Although the average 
annual decrease in the number of employees has been above two percent in the 
last decade, MALIRANTA (1994) estimates that the productivity of labour in the 
Finnish food manufacturing is lower than that of foreign competitors. 
Investments in the food manufacturing increased in the 1980s and even at the 
beginning of the 1990s despite the sharp decrease of investment in the national 
economy (see HERNESNIEMI et al. 1995). During the period from 1988 to1993, 
the share of the food processing industry in the investments of the whole 
manufacturing was about 12 percent. In 1992 the share was more than 19 
percent, but in 1993 the share fell to 12 percent, accounting for 2.2 percent of 
the investments of the whole economy. Labour has been substituted by capital, 
and the capital intensity has increased in the food processing. 
Finnish food processing industries are highly oriented to satisfy domestic 
demand. About 60 percent of the food processing industry was included in the 
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Figure 2.2. Exports and imports of processed food in 1993. 
closed sector of the economy before the EU membership in 1995 (HYvöNEN 
and VOLK 1995). Imports were limited by means of quantitative restrictions, 
tariffs, and import levies. Exports required export subsidies because of the high 
price level of agricultural raw materials. Generally, the main function of foreign 
trade has been to balance the variations in demand and supply, i.e. to export 
overproduction in order to keep the domestic prices at the set level 
(KETTUNEN 1995). Within the regulated sector, the exports of processed food 
consisted mainly of dairy products, meat products, as well as fruit and vegetable 
products (Figure 2.2). Fruit and vegetable products were the most important 
regulated import articles. 
According to the free trade agreements, i.e. the EFTA and EC, a consider-
able share of food processing industries has produced free trade products from 
the beginning of 1970s. Chocolate and confectionaries, alcohol beverages, bis-
cuits, baby foods, and sucrochemical products were the most important ex-
ported products in 1993. Of the free trade imports, fish products ranked first 
before alcohol beverages and chocolate and confectionary products. The propor-
tion of intra-industry trade, i.e. foreign trade that consists of simultaneous 
imports and exports of products belonging to the same industry, was large, 
indicating the general phenomenon in the economy (see PARJANNE 1992). In 
1993 the total value of Finnish food manufacturing imports amounted to FIM 3.4 
billion, which is equivalent to 3.3 percent of the total imports. Exports were 
FIM 3.1 billion, accounting for 2.3 percent of the total value of exports. 
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Table 2.2. The volume of food processing industries by provinces in 1993. 
Source: Yearbook of Industrial Statistics. Volume 1. 
Province 
Personnel 
total 
Gross value 
FIM mill. 
Value added 
FIM mill. 
% of ali 
manufacturing 
Uudenmaan 11,485 11,286 3,022 13.6 
Turun- ja Porin 8,914 10,099 3,293 18.8 
Ahvenanmaan 322 351 189 59.0 
Hämeen 7,255 7,636 2,163 13.1 
Kymen 2,501 2,944 767 7.5 
Mikkelin 985 674 202 8.0 
Pohjois-Karjalan 755 1,003 228 11.6 
Kuopion 2,126 3,251 524 14.1 
Keski-Suomen 1,429 1,619 327 5.7 
Vaasan 4,306 6,587 1,433 17.5 
Oulun 2,718 3,032 809 10.6 
Lapin 723 994 462 12.4 
Total 43,519 49,477 13,420 13.4 
Food manufacturing industries have more important consequences for the 
rest of the economy than their GDP or employment shares show. According to 
the inverse matrix of the input-output table in 1992, one unit of production in 
the manufacture of food products and beverages requires 2.7 imput units, of 
which 1.2 units come from the other sectors of Finnish economy. The strongest 
dependency naturally exists between food manufacturing and agricultural pro-
duction, but food manufacturing also has considerable indirect effects on the 
other sectors, like the manufacture of metal products and machinery. 
The relative economic importance of food processing industry, as well as 
agriculture, varies at the regional level. While the role of agriculture is the 
highest in Central Finland, the food manufacturing industry is concentrated to 
Southern and Southwestern Finland, where the relative importance of food 
processing is also higher than on the average (Table 2.2). Thus, a large amount 
of agricultural primary products is exported from Central and Eastern Finland to 
he processed elsewhere. 
The tables above show the significance of the food processing industry 
within the food economy, ali manufacturing, and the whole economy. It is an 
essential part of the modern food chain. Thus, the questions concerning supply 
and pricing behaviour of the food industry, as well as the public policy interven-
tions may have considerable impacts on the functioning and efficiency of the 
national economy. 
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2.2. The structure of the food manufacturing 
According to SCHERER (1980), the main elements of the market structure are the 
number and concentration of sellers and buyers, the degree of product differen- 
tiation, barriers to the entry of new firms, the ratio of fixed to total costs, the 
degree of vertical integration, and the amount of diversification or conglomera-
tion in a firm's product Iines. Due to the different theoretical approaches and 
differences among industries, it is difficult to rank these characteristics in 
importance. CAVES (1982) argues that the important elements of structure are 
those that can and do make a major difference for market performance. 
The structure of industry is often used as a proxy indicator of the presence of 
market power. However, there is no single measure of market structure that 
could perfectly indicate the ability of firms to set prices over marginal costs. For 
instance, the indicators of market concentration are relevant (not sufficient) 
measures of market power for industries producing homogenous products. Later 
in Chapter 3, the theoretical relationship between concentration and perform-
ance is derived. If products are strongly differentiated, market power can be 
assumed to be more a firm-specific phenomenon. The potential or actual power 
of firms to influence market performance is a mix of the elements of the market 
structure. 
In empirical studies, the structure of an industry is often presented as the 
number of firms or, more specifically, as the size distribution of the competing 
firms. The central role of market concentration is based on its theoretical 
strength, because the degree of oligopoly is identifiable with the extent to which 
the individual market is dominated by its largest sellers. Furthermore, the 
degree of market concentration is easier to observe and measure than, for 
example, the degree of product differentiation. In the following, concentration 
will be treated as the main indicator of market structure, but some attention is 
also directed to the other elements of structure. The possible relationships 
between different elements of market structure are also considered. 
Conceptually, two dimensions of concentration can be separated: the number 
of firms and inequalities in the size. In the formal oligopoly theory, the number 
of firms (n) often determines where an industry falls in the spectrum between 
monopoly (n = 1) and pure competition (n = 00). However, real-world industries 
are never composed of identical firms, and thus statistical measures of disper-
sion are needed. The concentration of sales can also be described by the cumula-
tive distribution of sales. This can be done, for example, by using the Lorenz 
curve, which plots the cumulative percentage of sales against the cumulative 
percentage of firms. It is, however, a pure inequality measure which does not 
measure the effect of the number of firms. Because the complete size distribu-
tions are often unavailable, some summary indices that collect both dimensions 
of concentration to a single number have been developed (see e.g. KWOKA 
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1981). The most widely used indices are the seller concentration ratio and the 
Heifindahl index of concentration (or the Herfindahl-Hirschman index). 
The seller concentration ratio measures the degree of market domination by 
the largest firms. The m-firm concentration ratio (CRm) is the combined market 
share of the largest m firms. Table 2.3 presents the three-firm concentration 
ratios for the Finnish food processing industries in 1993 and 1986. Unfortu-
nately, the period of comparison is quite short due to the restrictions of the 
industrial statistics. Total firm numbers are also shown. 
Of' the 20 industries for which data is available, the number of food process-
ing firms has increased in 10 industries and decreased in 8 industries from 1986 
to 1993. In slaughtering and tobacco products manufacture, the number of firms 
has remained the same. If a longer time period is taken into account, the total 
number of firms has decreased remarkably (see e.g. ALA-PEIJARI 1987). Differ-
ences in the number of firms across the industries are great. The production of 
bread and cakes consists of 870 firms, whereas only one firm manufactures 
sugar and crispbread. 
Table 2.3. Total firm numbers and three-firm concentration ratios (CR3) of the 
Finnish food processing industries in 1986 and 1993. 
Industry Number of firms CR3 
1986 1993 1986 1993 
Slaughtering 26 26 74.7 71.7 
Meat processing 110 127 54.7 60.5 
Fruit and vegetable processing 84 133 71.3 51.2 
Fish processing 70 108 25.0 30.2 
Manufacture of margarine, oils and fats 8 7 86.7 91.9 
Dairy products manufacture 99 67 47.9 65.4 
Ice-cream manufacture 5 4 99.5 99.4 
Grain mill products manufacture 101 83 63.8 82.1 
Fresh bread and pastries manufacture 786 870 38.1 29.9 
Crispbread manufacture 4 1 94.7 100 
Biscuits manufacture 12 16 90.1 90.0 
Sugar manufacture and refining 2 1 100 100 
Chocolate and confectionary manufacture 25 37 98.5 85.5 
Coffee roasting 2 5 100 99.1 
Manufacture of other food products 44 49 72.0 47.0 
Malt manufacture 5 3 99.9 100 
Manufacture of malt beverages and soft drinks 15 27 91.4 99.1 
Tobacco products manufacture 3 3 100 100 
Starch manufacture 3 5 100 85.0 
Feed manufacture 65 60 81.4 68.6 
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The market share of the three largest firms has increased in eight cases, 
decreased in ten, and remained the same in two from 1986 to 1993. The value of 
the concentration ratio has usually fallen when the number of firms has in-
creased, and vice versa. However, some notable exceptions exist. In meat 
processing, in the production of malt beverages and soft drinks, and in fish 
processing the number of firms has increased but, at the same time, the market 
position of leading firms has become stronger. Other industries that became 
noticeably more concentrated in terms of the concentration ratio are dairy 
products, manufacture of margarine and other vegetable and animal oils and 
fats, grain mill products manufacture, and crispbread manufacture. The largest 
declines in the three-firm ratio can be seen in the manufacture of fresh bread and 
pastries, chocolate and other confectionary products, feeds, and in the group of 
other food products. In 1993 the industry groups with increasing and declining 
three-firm concentration ratios both accounted for the value added of about 
FIM 5.9 billion. In the value of shipments, the share of industries with increas-
ing concentration ratio was noticeably larger. 
If the three-firm concentration ratios are weighted by the value added of each 
industry, the average ratio of the whole food manufacturing was 72.2 percent in 
1993. The concentration ratio varies widely within industries. The highest ratios 
are in crispbread, sugar, malt, and tobacco products manufacture, followed by 
ice-cream, coffee roasting, and beverages. The concentration ratio is low in the 
production of bread and cakes as well as in fish processing. 
The use of the three-firm concentration ratio involves at least two problems. 
First, it takes no account of the differences in size within the top three firms, but 
only compares the top three as a group with ali others. Consider the sugar and 
tobacco products industries in 1993 as an example. In both cases CR3=100, but 
the sugar industry is clearly more monopolistic. Second, it does not provide any 
information about the structure of the smaller firms in an industry. As a result, 
the ranking of industries may vary depending on the value of m which is 
arbitrarily chosen. Table 2.4 shows, however, that using the five- and ten-firm 
concentration ratios causes very small changes in the ranking of food industries. 
The share of the ten leading companies of industry shipments remains under 80 
percent only in fish products as well as in the production of bread and cakes. In 
15 of the 20 industries the ten-firm concentration ratio is at least 90 percent. The 
food processing industry can be described as oligopolistic. 
In addition to the different concentration ratios, the Herfindahl index of 
concentration (0<1-11) is also computed for the Finnish food processing indus-
tries. The index is defined as the sum of the squares of market shares of firms in 
the industry, i.e. H=Xsi2, where si is the market share of firm i. Althought the 
concentration ratio is often used as a proxy for the Herfindahl index, very 
different degrees of correlations between them can be found, depending heavily 
upon the samples of industries used in the analyses (SLEUWAEGEN and 
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Table 2.4. Five- and ten-firm concentration ratios and the Heifindahl indices of 
concentration for Finnish food processing industries in 1993. 
Industry CR5 CR10 H for the H for the 
largest 5 	industry 
Slaughtering 84.6 96.2 0.32 0.23 
Meat processing 71.3 81.8 0.26 0.14 
Fruit and vegetable processing 69.2 88.8 0.25 0.13 
Fish processing 42.7 61.5 0.22 0.05 
Manufacture of margarine and 
other oils and fats 99.9 100 0.33 0.33 
Dairy products manufacture 73.6 83.8 0.43 0.24 
Ice-cream manufacture 100 100 0.86 0.86 
Grain mill products manufacture 92.1 96.3 0.43 0.37 
Fresh bread and pastries manufacture 34.3 41.1 0.33 0.04 
Crispbread manufacture 100 100 1.00 1.00 
Biscuits manufacture 96.1 99.1 0.39 0.36 
Sugar manufacture and refining 100 100 1.00 1.00 
Chocolate and confectionary manufacture 96.3 98.7 0.30 0.28 
Coffee roasting 100 100 0.37 0.37 
Manufacture of other food products 66.8 90.6 0.23 0.11 
Malt manufacture 100 100 0.64 0.64 
Manufacture of malt beverages and 
soft drinks 99.6 99.8 0.40 0.40 
Tobacco products manufacture 100 100 0.49 0.49 
Starch manufacture 100 100 0.30 0.30 
Feed manufacture 81.7 91.0 0.27 0.18 
DEHANDSCHUTTER 1986). Especially in concentrated industries, like in the 
Finnish food manufacturing, the relationship cannot he linearly approximated. 
A practical problem with the Herfindahl index is that a complete index 
requires information on the sizes of ali firms in the industry. However, because 
the market shares of the largest firms are usually high in the Finnish food 
manufacturing, the effects of minor firms can he approximated without major 
losses of information. In Table 2.4 the Herfindahl index is first computed 
among the five largest firms of the industry. The index is then approximated for 
the whole industry by means of the formula: 
H = H5(CR5)2+(1/5)(CR1O-CR5)2+(1/(n-10))(1-CR10)2, 
where H5 is the Herfindahl index among the five largest firms, CRm is the 
concentration ratio of m firms, and n is the total number of firms in the industry. 
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This means that firms placed from 6 to 10 in the size ranking are assurned to be 
of the same size and, similarly, the smaller firms are assumed to be of an equal 
size. 
The lowest Herfindahl index is in fresh bread and pastries manufacture, 
followed by fish processing (Table 2.4). The highest values are naturally in the 
monopoly industries. The value added weighted Herfindahl index for food 
processing is 0.27. If the indices are weighted by the value of shipments, the 
average index is 0.25. 
The concentration data involves some problems in the classification of mar-
kets. In some cases the nationwide basis of the SIC does not take adequately 
into account the local nature of markets. Especially in the case of fresh bread, in 
which the national concentration measures show very low values, the geo-
graphic market size is often very small and, thus, local concentration may be 
high. The SIC four-digit industry category is also often too broad, including a 
variety of products that do not substitute for one another. For example, the SIC 
industry `dairy products' covers many distinct markets, like liquid milk, cheese, 
and butter. It also includes a portion of ice-cream production. Furthermore, the 
data does not take into account that firms may have the same owner. These 
factors make the values of concentration indices too low compared to the actual 
markets. However, there are potential factors that influence the real concentra-
tion in the opposite direction. First, different industries may include products 
that are close substitutes in consumption. Second, imports are not included in 
the data. In many Finnish food industries, imports were strictly restrained in 
1993, but for industries such as fish processing, biscuits manufacture, and 
chocolate and confectionary manufacture foreign imports are at least potentially 
important, causing true concentration of sales to be lower than the concentration 
of production. 
Theories on the determinants of concentration cover a wide range from the 
technology and entry barriers arguments of the traditional S-C-P approach to the 
new I.O., in which concentration is jointly determined along with performance. 
DAVIES et al. (1992) argue that different approaches have developed largely 
independently of each other, and there is nothing that could be labelled an 
integrated theory of the determinants of concentration at present. However, the 
theories show that concentration mainly reflects other elements of the market 
structure, such as barriers to entry and product differentiation. 
Entry barriers can be classified into exogenous (structural) barriers and those 
which have been manipulated by incumbents, i.e. strategic barriers to entry. In 
1956 Bain (ref. MARTIN 1993) emphasized absolute cost advantages of incum-
bent firms compared with entrants, economies of scale, and product differentia-
tion as the main determinants of entry conditions. Such entry barriers may be 
either structural or strategic. 
Incumbents have an absolute cost advantage over entrants if, for instance, 
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patents restrict access to the most efficient production techniques, if they con-
trol the most efficient sources of supply of factors of production, or if financial 
markets impose a higher cost of capital on entrants than incumbents. Further-
more, incumbents' vertical integration or dealing contracts with retailers reduce 
the size of potential entrant's market. As researth suggests, the actual long-run 
average costs usually fall at first, i.e. economies of scale arise, and then remain 
constant over a very large range of outputs (CAvEs 1982). Thus, entrants must 
come into the market in a large scale. Approaches explaining the relationship 
between entry and economies of scale are typically linked to strategic behaviour 
in which an incumbent firm expands its capacity in order to deter future entry 
(e.g. DIXIT 1980, SCHMALENSEE 1981). Analogously, product differentiation 
'may also be a barrier to entry. LYONS (1991) determines product differentiation 
as a situation where two or more products are perceived by consumers to be 
close but imperfect substitutes. Incumbents with differentiated products can 
have several advantages over entrants. For instance, buyers might have strong 
preferences for established brands and entrants must spend more than incum-
bents to reach the final consumer. BAGWELL (1990) shows a situation in which 
uncertainty about product quality acts as a barrier to entry, and imperfect 
information precludes entry by a firm producing a high-quality product. 
CONNOR and WILLS (1988) argue that product differentiation is the most 
forbidding barrier to entry in the manufacturers' brand channels of the U.S. food 
processing industries. Product differentiation is often divided in horizontal and 
vertical differention. In the food sector, horizontal differentiation may arise e.g. 
from new product development supported by R&D activity. The first-mover 
advantage of pioneering brands is an example of vertical differentiation. Within 
the Finnish meat, beverages, and ice-cream industries, HYVÖNEN (1992) identi-
fies the superior experience and skills of incumbents as the most important 
entry barrier. Limited access to sales outlets, the restrictions on imports, more 
advanced production technology of incumbents, and product differentiation are 
also seen as important entry barriers. Only ten percent of firms estimated that 
economies of scale and limited financial resources of entrants constitute strong 
entry barriers. Economies of scale can, however, be substantial in many other 
food processing industries. If markets are local, economies of scale are likely to 
create entry barriers. Because the market size is very small in Finland, the cost-
efficient plant size can account for a large share of the total markets. 
The cost structure of the Finnish food processing industries (Table 2.5) 
reveals that access to raw materials is a key determinant of succesful entry. The 
share of raw materials in the food processing is considerably higher than in ali 
manufacturing on the average. Within food manufacturing the shares are the 
highest in slaughtering, grain mill products, and feed manufacture, and the 
lowest in the manufacture of malt beverages and soft drinks, as well as in fresh 
bread and pastries manufacture. 
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Table 2.5. Acquisition costs of inputs in the Finnish food processing in 1993, 
percentage of shipments. 
Cost item (see explanations below the table) 
Industry 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 
Slaughtering 77.7 0.3 4.2 3.4 0.6 6.6 7.3 
Meat processing 63.0 2.6 4.0 7.8 0.9 14.1 7.6 
Fruit and vegetable processing 38.6 12.0 2.5 12.8 1.8 15.6 16.8 
Fish processing 53.7 2.9 7.7 5.1 1.7 13.8 15.0 
Manufacture of margarine,oils 
and fats 46.3 4.7 8.4 16.6 1.5 9.6 12.9 
Dairy products manufacture 63.0 4.8 11.3 6.9 1.1 6.8 6.1 
Ice-cream manufacture 34.2 10.4 1.3 12.4 1.0 11.6 29.1 
Grain mill products manufacture 72.9 2.7 1.7 6.4 1.1 6.4 8.8 
Fresh bread and pastries manufacture 27.5 2.7 6.1 12.6 2.5 31.4 17.2 
Biscuits manufacture 34.7 7.8 4.7 16.9 1.2 20.5 14.2 
Sugar manufacture and refining 63.3 1.7 5.4 5.3 2.4 9.0 12.9 
Chocolate and confectionary 
manufacture 33.5 8.7 3.1 13.9 1.4 19.8 19.6 
Coffee roasting 52.3 4.8 3.6 15.7 0.7 8.0 14.8 
Manufacture of other food products 35.0 8.9 13.4 11.0 1.9 14.3 15.5 
Malt manufacture 50.0 0.9 5.1 6.2 2.9 7.1 28.0 
Manufacture of malt beverages and 
soft drinks 17.5 5.7 1.0 18.7 1.7 17.1 38.4 
Tobacco products manufacture 29.0 5.8 2.8 10.6 0.8 16.0 34.9 
Starch manufacture 55.5 0.2 3.2 9.6 3.2 12.5 15.8 
Feed manufacture 67.8 1.4 2.7 6.6 1.8 6.4 13.3 
Food manufacturing, total 53.9 4.3 5.9 9.1 1.4 12.5 12.9 
Ali manufacturing 45.5 1.6 3.0 12.0 3.2 18.5 16.2 
1. Raw materials 2. Packing 3. Other commoditities 4. Services (include payments for tempo-
rary repair work, rents, and other services) 5. Energy 6. Wages 7. Others (the value of ship-
ments minus costs presented. Covers capital costs, profits, etc.) 
Packing materials also play an important role in the food processing. In the 
production of fruit and vegetable products and ice-cream, they account for more 
than 10 percent of the value of total shipments. This provides one form of 
product differentiation. Labour costs vary a lot between industries, i.e. the share 
of these is more than 30 percent in fresh bread and pastries manufacture and 
only 6.4 percent in feed and grain mill products manufacture. The last column 
in Table 2.5 is value added minus labour costs, and this shoud be enough to 
cover at least capital costs. This residual is lower in food processing than in 
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other forms manufacturing partly because, according to LIIKETALOUSTIETEEL-
LINEN TUTKIMUSLAITOS (1992), food processing industries are, on the average, 
less capital intensive. 
Although food markets are quite concentrated in most of the western coun-
tries (e.g. LINDA 1992), Finnish statistics show an exceptionally high degree of 
concentration in many cases. One obvious explanation is the often empirically 
observed negative relationship between market size and concentration. SUTTON 
(1991) shows, however, that this relationship does not hold across industries 
generally. It holds for homogenous products industries and usually for differen-
tiated products, but it is not valid for industries in which endogenous sunk costs 
are present, i.e. in which fixed outlays in advertising or R&D can be used to 
enhance consumers' willingness-to-pay. In this latter case, increase in the mar-
ket size does not lead to convergence to a fragmented structure. This approach 
follows the tradition of vertical product differentiation (SHAKED and SUTTON 
1987), and combines price competition, scale economies, R&D, and advertising 
intensity as the determinants of the equilibrium pattern of industrial structure. 
Other measures of market structure include the existence and market shares 
of leading firms and brands. RASIMUS et al. (1991) found out that a leading firm 
(brand) often holds 40-100 percent of a market in Finnish food manufacturing. 
This is significant because competition is likely to be more coordinated when 
there is a market leader ready to make the first move. 
Advertising to consumers is the principal tool used to create a level of 
differentiation. CONNOR and WILLS (1988) deal with this as a structural dimen-
sion of markets, because intensity of advertising tends to be about the same 
between competing firms, and intensity is also quite stable for long periods. 
Thus, the level of advertising is useful (and often the only) indicator of the 
extent of product differentiation in an industry. However, advertising is one of 
the main factors of conduct, and it will be discussed in the next chapter. 
2.3. Competition and strategies in the food manufacturing 
Firms' conduct consist of their decisions, for instance, on pricing, output levels, 
selling expenses, and research expenditures. The market structure influences the 
behaviour of the firms as they decide how strongly to compete or collude with 
each other. For example, higher concentration encourages a greater degree of 
collusion. However, the causation does not flow only from structure to conduct 
(Figure 2.3). Strategic behaviour may appear like in the investments of re-
sources or in predatory pricing for the purpose of limiting the entry of new 
firms. They are long-run strategic desicions of the firms. The situation can be 
thought of as a two-stage game. At stage one, technology determines the 
minimum efficient scale (setup costs) and a firm decides e.g. the level of R&D 
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Figure 2.3. The relationships between long-run and short-run conduct and 
structure. 
and the quality of products. At the second stage, these investments are treated as 
sunk costs when firms compete against each other. There also exists a reverse 
causation from short-run competition to the structure and further to long-run 
strategic desicions. 
Futhermore, a fundamental problem in the nature of conduct is the concep-
tual difference between strategies and actions. E.g. SHEPHERD (1990) notes that 
behaviour covers a range of firms' actions. Nevertheless, action is only an 
equilibrium of a set of firms' strategies, and strategy is a rule which specifies an 
action as a function of determinants such as market structure and demand 
conditions. The analysis should concentrate on firms' strategies but, unfortu-
nately, they are mostly unavailable or even unobservable. Thus, actions are 
usually used as indicators of strategies. 
In the case of Finnish food manufacturing, where most industries are very 
concentrated, the actions of the largest firms are probably interdependent. Com-
petition can he described as oligopolistic. Sometimes, market behaviour is 
linked to the concentration measures. For instance, SCHERER (1980) argues that 
if the four-firm concentration ratio is higher than 40 percent, markets can be 
classified to he oligopolistic. Within the Finnish food processing industries, 
only in fish processing and bread baking the three-firm concentration ratio was 
lower than 40 percent in 1993. Because these industries were also relatively 
close to this `critical' value, ali food processing industries, except monopolies, 
are oligopolistic. In making strategic decisions, firms take into account what 
kind of reactions the rival firms are likely to have. 
Concentration is only one determinant behind the toughness of competition. 
Concentration measures understate the potential for imperfectly competitive 
behaviour when the market classification includes non-substitutes, when mar-
kets are local, when products are differentiated, and when institutional arrange-
ments (e.g. import quotas and tariffs) limit competition (MAIER 1994). Further-
more, demand and cost conditions affect firms' behaviour. Because the demand 
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for food is quite price inelastic in Finland (LAURILA 1994) and the four-digit 
industry classification includes a lot of non-substitutes, it is likely that the 
market power of firms is understated on the basis of concentration. 
Pricing strategies and the choice of the output level can be determined in 
many ways in oligopoly. The most profitable way for firms can be joint profit 
maximization. In the extreme case, firms would have a formai agreement which 
includes common prices, quantities, and even territories for each seller or buyer. 
Most of these cartel agreements have been made illegal by competition laws. 
Finnish competition legislation was largely reformed in 1988. The legislation 
concentrates on removing cartels, preventing the abuse of determining the 
market position, and lowering entry barriers. Competition policy has, for in-
stance, led to the structural reform within the cooperative field of milk process-
ing industry. Similarly, in slaughtering and meat processing cooperation be-
tween the largest companies has changed towards tight price competition in the 
beginning of the 1990s. 
Outside the explicit cartel, oligopolistic pricing and production decisions can 
be seen as a game with moves and countermoves. There are many models of 
oligopolistic behaviour, and 'right' models.  differ from one market to another. 
One special case arises in respect of first-mover advantages, i.e. to what extent 
strategic asymmetries between early entrants and firms that enter later affect 
competition. A possible result of asymmetries is a price leadership in which 
changes in actions are first decided by the leader and then the followers make 
the same change. The leader is normally an early entrant in the industry. Price 
leadership is probably a quite common form of competition in the Finnish food 
manufacturing. For example, it can be assumed that Valio has a price leadership 
position at least in the trade of fresh milk and cheeses. In the margarine market, 
Unilever enjoyed a strong first-mover advantage in many European markets 
(SUTTON 1990), where it still has a leadership position and from where it has 
captured a strong position in Finland, too. In chocolate and confectionary 
manufacture, Fazer had the first-mover advantage and it still has the market 
leader position (MIKKOLA and VOLK 1994). 
The strategies of the Finnish food processing firms are largely home market 
oriented e.g. due to the regulation of foreign trade and distant location. Trade in 
basic food stuffs has mainly consisted of subsidized exports of overproduction. 
Firm strategies are affected by agricultural policy, and export subsidies have 
clearly benefitted both agricultural producers and the food industry (HYVÖNEN 
and KOLA 1995). 
Some exceptions are, for instance, confectionaries, crackers, beer, and 
sucrochemical products, which are increasingly export oriented sectors. Intema-
tionally operating firms can have several strategies. Because the growth poten-
tial of the domestic market is low, they increase exports in order to meet growth 
objectives. Exports can be viewed as a low-risk means of entering new markets 
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or as a way to serve foreign markets too small for profitable local production. 
Direct investments, licensing, or joint ventures are also possible strategies in 
entering new markets. At the same time as imports to Finland have also in-
creased, foreign and multinational food finns use these strategies to an increas-
ing degree e.g. in beverages and dairy products when they enter Finnish mar-
kets. 
HYVÖNEN (1992) found five factors that characterize competitive strategies 
of Finnish meat processing, ice-cream, and beverages industries: 
Marketing differentiation strategy includes a broad product range 
as well as intensive product development and brand advertising. 
Firms are relatively old and large, they also produce distribu-
tors' brands, marketing organization is strong, and plenty of 
new products are developed. 
Distributor oriented strategy is characterized by strong market-
ing organization, accurate choice of market segments, emphasis 
on trade marketing, manufacturing of distributors' brands, and 
economies of scale. 
Strategy based on high quality and cost efficiency attributes a 
great deal of importance to good corporate image and tight 
quality and cost control. Firms are usually small, and they adopt 
cautious strategies in sales expansion. 
Production oriented strategy concentrates on cost efficiency 
based on economies of scale and new technology. Good avail-
ability of raw materials is the main strength. This large-scale 
manufacturing consists of some dominant firms. These firms 
also emphasize the coverage of distribution channels and good 
financial liquidity, but invest relatively little in product devel-
opment. 
Price oriented strategy group does not produce well-known 
brands, but concentrates on competitive pricing and low pro-
duction costs. 
Largest firms usually tend to follow differengation strategy with a broad 
product range, price competitivenes due to economies of scale, and bargaining 
power in the food chain (HYVÖNEN and VOLK 1995). Because the retailing 
sector is highly concentrated, the four largest chains account for 95 percent of 
sales, and food manufacturers need continuous product development and high 
advertising expenditures for increasing their bargaining power. Figure 2.4 shows 
that the advertising intensity of food manufacturing is internationally very high 
in Finland. Empirical evidence (see MARTIN 1993) suggests that advertising 
intensity is greater at intermediate levels of market concentration than when 
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Figure 2.4. Advertising expenditures of manufacturers' brands in 1991. Source: 
RASIMUS et al. (1991). 
concentration is either very low or very high. In addition to the aim of increas-
ing bargaining power in the food chain, dominant firms can use advertising as a 
means of responding to the entry of new firms. 
Firm behaviour, especially marketing strategy, differs greatly between dif-
ferent customer groups or marketing channels. According the input-output ta-
bles, more than 30 percent of the gross value of processed food is used as 
ingredients in other food processing industries, and about 7 percent goes as 
inputs to other domestic sectors. These are usually the least differentiated 
channels in food processing, characterized by hard price competition or vertical 
integration. Low differentiation is also characteristic to the sales of unbranded 
goods to distributors. Quality standards are set and advertising and other sales 
promotion of distributors' brands is done by retailers or wholesalers. Manufac-
turers must be price-competitive and reliable in this market channel. The share 
of distributors' brands has grown rapidly in many European markets (RAsimus 
et al. 1991), but this development has been relatively slow in Finland. A possi-
ble strategy for the manufacturer is to introduce its own low-price brand that 
competes with distributors' brands. Correspondingly, the food-service market-
ing channels to restaurants and other establishments consist mainly of undiffer-
entiated products. Thus, the sales of manufacturers' brands offer the greatest 
opportunities for advertising and product differentiation to food processors. 
The competition strategies of some Finnish food processing industries have 
been analyzed in Pellervo Economic Research Institute by using the diamond 
model created by M.E. Porter as a framework for the analysis. For example, in 
confectionary industry large firms have strong brands and luxury products are 
often sold through their own channels, but competition is relatively tight due to 
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the existence of close substitutes (MIKKOLA and VOLK 1994). In baby foods 
firms invest in strong brands and high quality products, because their interna-
tional price competitiveness is poor (KETTULA 1994). In the study of 
ISOSAARI (1994), Finnish vegetable oil and margarine industry is found to be 
characterized by the aim of the largest company (Unilever) to receive a domi-
nant position by means of economies of scale and international product devel-
opment. The rival firm (Raisio) is entering new markets in the Baltic countries. 
On the Finnish cheese markets, the market leader (Valio) has a broad range of 
products, while its competitors have specialized in few market segments 
(LAMMINMÄKI 1995). 
Cooperative firms owned by agricultural producers still have a dominant role 
in the acquisition of raw materials in milk (90%), meat (65%), and eggs (40%), 
although processing and marketing is usually organized as stock companies 
(AALTONEN 1995). Joint action of farmers in terms of cooperatives is based on 
the creation of members' market power, exploitation of size economies, risk 
pooling, and decrease in the uncertainty about sales and price fluctuations due 
to the larger size of the economic entity (SExToN 1995, OLLILA 1989). Tradi-
tional principles of cooperatives may differ significantly from that of investor-
owned firms, because cooperatives are dealing directly with their owners and 
profits are distributed according to patronages. Open membership and obliga-
tion to buy products offered by the members are characteristics of Finnish 
producer cooperatives. A thorough analysis on production, pricing, and invest-
ment behaviour of cooperatives is provided by VOLK (1993). 
Finland' s membership in the EU will have effects on the conduct of many 
Finnish food processing industries due to the elimination of border protection 
and more severe competition. For example, KOLA (1992) states that firms' new 
strategies are either growth and concentration or specialization on regional or 
local markets such that vertical and horizontal integration are utilized in order to 
improve efficiency and the competitive position of the firms. The consequences 
of integration appear both in the short-run price competition between firms and 
in the long-run strategic decisions that have feedback effects on industrial 
structure. 
2.4. Market performance in the food manufacturing 
Market performance has several dimensions, such as efficiency in resource 
allocation, technological progress, and equity in distribution. Efficiency refers 
to aspects of technological and allocative efficiency as well as avoiding resource 
waste like unemployment. More advanced technology creates economic growth 
and innovations bring new products. Equity is more an ethical matter, depend-
ing on the society' s values and standards. Due to the different dimensions of 
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performance, it is difficult to decide how to rank them in importance. At the 
industry level, CONNOR (1990) emphasizes profitability and prices as measures 
of allocative efficiency, and summarizes that food prices and profitability are 
usually found to be positively related to market concentration and product 
differentiation in the literature. In contrast to the negative relationship between 
concentration and efficiency of recource allocation, technological progress and 
concentration can he related positively. Innovative firms gain cost advantages 
and greater efficiency, which increase their market shares and industry concen-
tration. For example, CARLSSON (1972) estimated that productive efficiency of 
Swedish manufacturing was the greatest in more concentrated industries and in 
industries with lower protection from tariffs. 
Measures of profitability are commonly used in the empirical context when 
the implications of concentration and market power on performance are studied. 
However, high profits may also he due to efficiency differentials or demand 
conditions. Correspondingly, concentration and less competitive markets can 
lead to X-inefficiency or weak managerial behaviour. Profitability analysis is 
also sensitive to the choice of the profit measure. Therefore, different ratio 
measures are presented in this chapter to characterize the profitability of the 
Finnish food manufacturing. Furthermore, the financial performance of food, 
beverage, and tocacco industries are measured in terms of leverage, liquidity, 
and efficiency. 
Figure 2.5. Operating margin as a percentage of turnover in the food manufac-
turing and ali manufacturing in 1980-1993. Sources: LIIKETALOUSTIETEELLINEN 
TUTKIMUSLAITOS (1992) and STATISTICS FINLAND. 
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The operating margin as a percentage of turnover has steadily increased in 
the Finnish food manufacturing from the end of the 1980s (Figure 2.5). The 
need for operating margin differs significantly within different industries due to 
the differences in cost structures. Because food processing industry has been 
less capital intensive than manufacturing on the average, it is expected that the 
relative operating margin of food processing has remained at a lower level. An 
increasing trend in the relative operating margin of food processing correlates 
with the increasing capital intensity, as well as with the better net results during 
the last years (Figure 2.6). From 1990 to 1993 the years of economic depression 
affected dramatically the Finnish manufacturing, whereas in the food process-
ing, especially beverages, record results were achieved. Over a longer time 
period, the net result percentage has usually remained lower in food processing 
compared to ali manufacturing on the average. Annual changes have been 
smaller in the food manufacturing. According to the study of LIIKETALOUS-
TIETEELLINEN TUTKIMUSLAITOS (1992), good results of ali manufacturing in 
1988 are partly due to the changes of statistical principles. Furthermore, it must 
be noted that the balancing of accounts data from Statistics Finland is based on 
a sample in the case of small and medium sized enterprises. 
Different profitability measures may rank industries in a different manner In 
Table 2.6 some average profitability ratios are presented for seven food manu-
facturing industries that include an adequate number of firms for publishing the 
results. It can be seen that probitabily varies a great deal between food process- 
Figure 2.6. Net result as a percentage of tumover in the food manufacturing 
and ali manufacturing in 1980-1993. Sources: LIIKETALOUSTIETEELLINEN 
TUTKIMUSLAITOS (1992) and STATISTICS FINLAND. 
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Table 2.6. Profitability measures of certain food manufacturing industries from 
1990 to 1993 on the average. 
Industry 
Operating I) 
margin % 
Totall) 
result % 
Netl) 	Return on 
result % investment % 
Slaughtering 4.19 0.26 -1.93 5.78 
Meat processing 5.37 -0.23 -0.36 7.24 
Fruit and vegetable processing2) 10.61 4.44 1.72 8.34 
Dairy products manufacture 4.22 0.32 0.20 8.85 
Fresh bread and pastries manufacture 7.05 0.63 -1.28 5.91 
Malt beverages and soft drinks 10.75 1.75 1.25 7.89 
Feed manufacture 7.26 1.27 -0.87 7.84 
Food processing 6.55 1.18 0.70 8.35 
Beverages and tobacco 21.53 18.13 14.73 17.70 
Ali manufacturing 9.68 0.25 0.13 7.30 
1) As a percentage of turnover 2) Only in 1990 [Total result = operating margin + financial 
income and expenses ./. adjusted taxes ./. depreciation + other extraordinary income and 
expenses. Net result = profit after financial items + adjusted taxes. Return on investment = 
profit after financial items + interest expenses + other expenses on liabilities / liabilities 
subject to interest + shareholders' equity + reserves + valuation items] 
ing industries. Fruit and vegetable processing is not comparable with other 
industries because it only includes the results of one year. In 1990 the profitabil-
ity of this industry was considerably better than in other food processing indus-
tries. 
Operating margin percentage is the highest in malt beverages and soft drinks, 
in which the share of long-term expenses is also the highest. Slaughtering and 
dairy products industries account for the lowest margins of this short-run profit-
ability measure. Similarly, total and net result percentages are high in malt 
beverages and soft drink industries, even if they are considerably lower com-
pared to the average of beverages and tobacco industries, in which the state 
monopoly dominates in the production of alcoholic drinks. In terms of the total 
result, only meat processing shows weaker profitability than ali Finnish manu-
facturing on the average, but when measured by net result, slaughtering, bakery 
products, feeds, and meat processing receive lower and even negative values. 
Total and net result ratios are more long-run measures than operating margin. 
They take depreciations, financial incomes and expenses, as well as taxes into 
account. Total rqsult also covers other casual incomes and expenses. Especially 
in bread baking, the net result is negative every year, and, consequently, equity 
and solidity are weakened. 
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Table 2.7. Financial solidity and liquidity of certain food manufacturing indus-
tries from 1990 to 1993 on the average. 
Industry 
Totall) 
liabilities 
Debt 
ratio 
Equity 
ratio 
Current 
ratio 
Slaughtering 45.04 3.72 21.98 1.69 
Meat processing 38.32 2.77 26.97 1.59 
Fruit and vegetable processing') 62.74 1.26 44.15 1.69 
Dairy products manufacture 34.95 1.90 34.95 1.49 
Fresh bread and pastries manufacture 54.32 1.89 34.79 1.46 
Malt beverages and soft drinks 100.26 2.42 30.69 1.21 
Feed manufacture 84.21 1.54 41.60 1.29 
Food processing 51.38 1.62 38.10 1.55 
Beverages and tobacco 102.18 1.67 36.40 1.50 
Ali manufacturing 92.28 1.97 33.70 1.65 
1) As a percentage of tumover 2) Only in 1990 [Debt ratio = Liabilities ./. advance payments / 
shareholders' equity + reserves + valuation items. Equity ratio = shareholders' equity + 
reserves + valuation items / total liabilities and shareholders' equity ./. advance payments. 
Current ratio = Financial assets + inventories / current liabilities] 
In the long-run, the most useful profitability measure is the return on invest-
ment ratio, because it takes into account the amount of capital invested. This 
ratio also varies significantly within the food processing industries so that dairy 
products rank first and slaughtering last. The average of food processing (excl. 
beverages and tobacco) is higher than that of ali manufacturing. Beverages and 
tobacco industries show very high ratios. The return on investment ratio must 
he compared to the interest on liabilities. If the ratio seems to he high, but the 
net result is negative, operating profits are totally transferred to the financial 
sources of liabilities. 
Financial analysis conveys information on certain facts about firms' finan-
cial structure, liquidity, as well as profitability from the investor' s point of 
view. Table 2.7 presents some ratio measures of the financial performance of 
Finnish food manufacturing. Beer and soft drinks industries accounted for the 
highest profits, but they also have the heaviest burden of debt with respect to 
turnover. One measure of financial solidity is the debt ratio, which compares 
liabilities to equity. A firm's financial structure is usually considered good if the 
debt ratio falls below two, and weak if the ratio exceeds four (AHO and 
RANTANEN 1994). It can be seen that slaughtering is very close to this upper 
critical point, but usually food processing industries have a quite good financial 
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structure. Equity ratio is practically an identical measure with debt ratio, but it 
is shown for illustrative purposes Finally, current ratio measures liquidity and 
solvency, i.e. firm' s possibilities to manage its payments in the near future. It 
measures the ratio between liquid assets and current liabilities. This ratio is 
lower in food manufacturing compared to ali manufacturing. Values are rela-
tively low in feed as well as malt beverage and soft drink manufacturing. 
The performance of cooperatives is generally believed to differ from that of 
investor-owned firms due to differences in goals and strategies. However, em-
pirical findings are ambiguous. Some studies show significant differences, but 
some studies find the performance of cooperatives, in terms of profitability, 
productivity, and financial situation, comparable to that of investor-owned firms 
(GENTZOGLANIS 1995). In Finland dairy products manufacture and slaughtering 
are dominated by cooperative firms to the greatest extent. The average profit-
ability measures of these two industries are usually lower than in food process-
ing on the average. An exception is the return on investment ratio in dairy 
processing. Indebtedness of dairy products manufacture and slaughtering is low 
when compared to turnover, but high in terms of debt or equity ratios. In dairy 
processing the degree of liquidity is lower, and in slaughtering it is higher than 
in food processing on the average. 
Profitability measures show that food processing industries have succeeded 
more steadily than ali manufacturing on the average over the business cycle 
from 1980 to 1993. Price stability can also he seen as one dimension of 
economic efficiency. According to the wholesale price index, the price of food 
has followed approximately the same rate with the total index during the period 
from 1980 to 1993. With the exception of coffee and cocoa products, annual 
price fluctuations of processed food and drinks have been relatively small, 
following the general price development. Prices can he also seen as indicators 
of operational efficiency, i.e. productivity and utilization of scale economies. In 
the study of KUPIAINEN (1994), Finnish price level of foodstuffs is found to he 
about the same with other Nordic countries, but higher compared to the EU 
countries. However, the direct price comparison provides very little information 
on the internal efficiency of food manufacturing due to the differences, for 
example, in taxation, prices of raw materials, state subsidies, and trade policy. 
Operational efficiency of food processing in Finland and some other EU 
countries has been compared by RASMUS and KORHONEN (1992). They found 
out that the efficiency and international competitiveness of the Finnish food 
manufacturing had improved during the past few years, but the average cost 
level of production was still very high when compared internationally. Agricul-
tural policy and border protection caused higher costs of raw materials. From 
the viewpoint of efficiency and competitiveness, it is more important that in the 
Finnish food processing industries the capital, labour, and various other cost 
items, such as marketing costs, are higher. This is mainly due to weak effi- 
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ciency in the utilization of capacity. This kind of X-inefficiency can be related 
to the market power of monopolies, dominant firms, and oligopolists. 
Different oligopoly models relate performance to industry concentration and 
firm behaviour. A common theoretical measure of pricing efficiency is the 
Lenier index, which is the mark-up of price over marginal cost. Concentration 
and oligopolistic competition lead to a higher Lerner index and lower pricing 
efficiency, i.e. cause welfare losses in the economy because prices are above 
and production is below competitive levels. Oligopoly pricing is more likely 
when markets are very concentrated but, at the same time, increase in concentra-
tion may lead to cost reductions through the exploitation of economies of scale. 
However, weakening competition may also lead to X-inefficiency. This dynam-
ics of competition is usually ignored when the implications of concentaration on 
industry performance are studied and, thus, this kind of analyses operate in the 
short-run. Furthermore, as the description of the food processing industry indi-
cates, it can he assumed that the form of competition varies significantly within 
food industries. Markets are characterized by monopolistic, or more generally, 
oligopolistic behaviour, which makes the price-taking hypothesis inappropriate. 
However, the degree of competition is not known. The analysis of market 
performance and the realized or potential degree of market power requires a 
general framework to model oligopolistic competition. 
41 
3. Competition in concentrated markets 
- A review with applications of linear demand 
A general proposition of the structuralist view in industrial organization re-
search is that industry concentration is an essential determinant of the market 
power (DoNsimom et al. (1984) provide a discussion of this view). This frame-
work is widely used since it posits a systematic association between profitabil-
ity and the combined effect of concentration and various exogenous structural 
characteristics of an industry. 
However, the traditional structure-conduct-performance paradigm, in which 
exogenous market structure deterruipes conduct and the two together determine 
performance, has been subjected to considerable criticism both by empirical 
researchers and by contributors to the game theoretical literature. For example, 
while it may he possible to estimate a positive relationship between industry 
concentration and profitability, it is not possible to say very much about long-
run causation. The weakness of the traditional view is that it does not take into 
account the links between the determinants of concentration and profitability 
(SAwYER 1982). Thus, many studies (e.g. JACQUEMIN et al. 1980 and GEROSKI 
1982) have argued that joint determination rather than a causal relation exists 
between concentration and profitability. Within game theoretical literature, the 
response has been the formulation of multistage games in which, for instance, 
a firm' s decision is presented as taking place in two stages (see SUTTON 1990). 
At the first stage, potential entrants decide whether or not to enter. At the 
second stage, those firms that have entered set their respective prices. This 
structure of the model leads to endogeneity of structure. The greater the degree 
of price competition at the second stage, the fewer the number of firms choos-
ing to enter. The solution method is based on the backwards induction, and 
most analyses begin with assumptions conceming behaviour or conduct at the 
second stage. The two stage game formulation offers a way of analyzing the 
two-way link between structure and conduct. 
This chapter concentrates on the subgame of stage 2. It provides the theo-
retical basis for the model constructions and empirical analyses of the latter 
parts of this study. The analysis is one of partial equilibrium, operating at the 
level of a single industry and concentrating on the output market. The main 
interest is in the study of the effects of market structure and conduct on 
performance. It is shown that most results, for example between structure and 
profitability, are largely dependent on the model selection, i.e. the form of the 
game. In modelling a game, there usually is considerable scope for designing 
the structure of moves or the degree of price competition as well as the prob-
lem of multiple equilibria. 
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An oligopolistic market structure indicates that firms do not act as passive 
price-takers. At least one of the firms is large enough to operate at a downward 
sloping demand curve. Demand faced by this firm is determined through the 
actions of competitors. Correspondingly, the optimal decisions of actual or 
potential competitors follow assumed or realized behaviour of this individual 
firm. A decision-maker incorporates these mutual actions in the set of strate-
gies. In Chapter 3.1 a conjectural variations model of an oligopoly is used to 
investigate the short-run relationship between structure (concentration) and mar-
ket power (profitability). It is shown that this relationship is heavily dependent 
upon the value of the conjectural variations parameter. The notion of the tough-
ness of price competition can be used to distinguish different forms of competi-
tion between Bertrand competition and joint profit maximization. At the indus-
try level, market power is a notion which depends not only on the average 
extent of power exercised by ali firms but also on the distribution of power 
within the industry. The first step in computing the appropriate concentration 
index is to take into account the distributional elements within the industry. As 
concentration is one of the structural features which determine profitability, 
this relationship can be seen as an estimate of the conduct of the industry. 
In this study the strategic behaviour is modelled as noncooperative games. 
Someone might criticize the approach by appealing to the obvious collusive 
arrangements in certain markets. However, even collusion is consistent with 
noncooperative behaviour, because we can see it as an equilibrium which 
results from individual rationalism. Models of this kind are provided in Sec-
tion 3.2. According to AUMANN (1987, p. 39), a cooperative game needs a 
mechanism that can enforce agreements, i.e. players can make binding commit-
ments. For example, in some cases, cartels can be legal and registered. In such 
a situation the agreements are enforceable and stable if cheating parties can be 
sued. Similarly, collusive outcomes in noncooperative games are also sup-
ported by the threat of retaliation by other industry members. Players can 
cooperate, but this setting may collapse if an individual firm has an incentive 
to play different strategies and defect from an agreement. This is the type of 
collusion to be dealt with in Chapter 3.2, and the theory of repeated games 
(supergames) is used to model such situations. 
It is sometimes argued that the different concentration indices provide the 
same information and it is unimportant which particular index is chosen. This 
claim has usually been based on the finding that concentration indices are 
highly correlated and tend to yield similar rankings of industries. However, 
BOYES and SMITH (1979) show empirically that different measures of concen- 
tration can yield significantly different implications. In Chapter 3.3 the pres-
ence of strategic asymmetry in the firms' relations to each other is allowed in 
various ways. First, a dominant firm model is investigated, and the conclusion 
is that different sets of concentration indices correspond to different solution 
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concepts of optimizing firms. Second, it is shown that strategic asymmetry 
between firms can result in very different outcomes, compared to the simulta-
neous moves approach, when the relationship between structure and profitabil-
ity is analyzed. 
The background of the empirical part of this study is closely connected to 
the trade theory. Therefore, Chapter 3.4 reviews the applications of the strate-
gic trade theory. The emphasis is on oligopolistic markets with governments 
and private firms as participants. Chapter 3.5 summarizes the maun results, 
which form the theoretical framework of this study. 
3.1. Conjectural variations approach of static games 
The aim of this chapter is to derive a formal one-shot model which establishes 
a theoretical connection between concentration and market power. For this 
purpose, the market power or the degree of oligopoly is equated with the price-
cost margins. Because this connection tends to depend on the precise form of 
the game or on the toughness of price competition, a framework which allows 
for non-competitive behaviour of the industry without imposing a priori mar-
ket behaviour of a certain kind is used. To motivate the theoretical link be-
tween structure and performance, the standard conjectural variations model is 
applied, because it provides a framework for several forms of oligopolistic 
behaviour. Furthermore, this general model allows for both extreme cases: 
competitive market structure and monopoly pricing. This large spectrum of 
outcomes is an advantage since little of this spectrum can be ruled out by the 
formal dynamic game theory due to the folk theorem (QuiRmBAcH 1988). The 
folk theorem holds that all outcomes from the collusive outcome to the com-
petitive outcome are outcomes of a Nash equilibrium depending on the value of 
the discount factor (KREPs 1990, p. 525). 
First, it is necessary to determine what is the firm's strategy space. Tradi-
tionally, the strategic variables used to model competition are prices or quanti-
ties, of which the latter can be interpreted as production capacity when quanti-
ties can only be adjusted slowly. Product differentiation and investments in 
research and development or advertising are, among other things, other aspects 
of strategic competition. Second, definition of simultaneous moves is needed. 
Presumably firms do not actually make decisions at exactly the same time. 
However, if each firm chooses a strategy given its beliefs about other firms' 
choises and without observing these, then the game can be viewed as simulta-
neous regardless of the actual timing of moves. 
Consider non-cooperative competition in the output market with the firms 
producing a homogenous good and in which the strategies of each firm consist 
of quantity choices (on the role of strategy space see e.g. KREPS and 
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SCHEINKMAN 1983, BOYER and MOREAUX 1987, MCCORRISTON and SHELDON 
1992). The number of firms in an industry is n and Q is industry output. The 
quantity produced by firm i (i=1,2,...n) is labelled qi. Firm i faces the inverse 
demand function 
= 	 (3.1) 
in which a function 	 is nonincreasing and concave on the interval 
where it has a positive value. Without determining any specific functional 
form, it is assumed that the form of the demand curve is a result of utility 
maximization of a representative consumer. 
In addition to the oligopolistic industry, the economy contains a perfectly 
competitive sector producing inputs. Due to marginal cost pricing, the input 
price vector, w, is exogenously given to firm i. Thus, an oligopolistic firm has 
the following profit maximization problem: 
Max r1 = Pi (Q)q, —ci (qi ,w) 
Subject to: q i = f(q,,...,q,,...,q„)Vj =1,...,n;j (3.2) 
The cost function is ci (.) for ali i = 1,...,n with marginal costs 	(qi) > 0. The 
constraint represents the interdependence of oligopolistic firms. There are n-1 
functions determining the response of other n-1 firms against the change in the 
output of firm i. n-1 functions represent the interdependence of firms, indicat-
ing that any change in the output level of firm i may induce a response of each 
of the other n-1 firms. These responses can be summed up, and the constraint is 
construed as the conjecture of firm i about the output of ali rivals (ai = 
} / dqi). 
Let us assume that quantity is the strategic variable that is chosen simulta-
neously by firms. The problem of profit maximization specifies the profit to 
firm i as a function of the strategies chosen by it and by the other firms. The 
equilibrium concept employed is that of Nash equilibrium. Following the defi-
nition of GIBBONS (1992), a set of strategic actions (qi*,...,qi*,...,q.*) is,a Nash 
equilibrium if for each firm i and for every feasible strategy q, qi* is firm's 
best response to the strategies specified for the n-1 other firms: 
(3.3) 
In a Nash equilibrium neither firm can change its strategy to increase its 
profits, Tc, given the actions of the other firms. Maximizing profits with respect 
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to quantity and utilizing the definition of Nash equilibrium and oci, the equilib-
rium values of qi can be written by the n first-order conditions: 
, P(Q)+ P'(Q)q 	aci(q,w) ,(1+a,)= 	Vi =1,...,n. 
dq, 
As a consequence of the first order conditions, it is possible to show some 
commonly used models as special cases (DixiT 1984). Cournot outcome is the 
case oci  = 0, i.e. an individual firm believes that its output change does not lead 
to output changes of other firms. In Bertrand competition, conjectures become 
oci = -1, when firms are price-takers. Finally, market share collusion is the case 
oci = 	/ qi), when ali firms expand output by the same proportion and 
industry behaves as a cartel. If si is determined as a firm s market share from 
industry output and 1/1111 is the inverse of the absolute value of the demand 
elasticity, the first order conditions can be rewritten: 
	
P(Q)[
s. 	 dc.(q. w) 1— 	(1+ o c i )1= 	V i =1, ,n. 
IijI 	 dq, 
In an empirical context (e.g. APPLEBAUM 1982, LOPEZ 1984, STÄLHAMMAR 
1991) conjecture is often described as the elasticity of industry supply with 
respect to qi. A conjectural variations term 13 is defined in the elasticity form 
developed by CLARKE and DAVIES (1982). 13 is defined as the elasticity of 
rivals' output changes with respect to firm i's output change. This means 
(dqi/qi) = dqi/qj for ali 	and for ali j or, alternatively, it implies that d( icji)/ 
dqi = 13 ((Q/qi) - 1). A constant means that ali firms expect the same propor-
tional output response from other firms. Small firms expect smaller output 
response and smaller price change than large firms as a result of an increase in 
their output. Thus, as long as 13<1, small firms will have higher marginal 
revenue and operate with higher marginal cost than large firms. This is con-
sistent with STIGLER' s (1964) model, which makes it possible for small firms 
to have a lower risk of punishment in the implicit collusion. 
Henceforth in this study, the conjectures about firms' reactions will be 
presented in the elasticity form. When the elasticity representation of conjec-
ture is used, the first order conditions of Nash equilibrium can be derived to the 
form (derivation is performed in detail in Appendix 3): 
P(Q)+ P' (Q)q,
q. 
=
dc,(Q,w) 
	Vi =1,...,n. 
qi 
(3.6) 
(3.4) 
(3.5) 
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The conjecture term 13 can be interpreted as an index of industry collusion, with 
higher 13 representing greater collusion. The equation can be rewritten in terms 
of the price cost margin: 
P(Q)— MC, 1 	= 	[13+s (1-131V i=1,...,n, (3.7) 
where MCI is the marginal cost for firm i. The left term is the Lerner index of 
firm i's monopoly power (Li). The problem is now to define an aggregate 
monopoly power in the whole industry from the distribution of Lerner indices 
of the firms composing this industry. A non-cooperative solution framework 
creates a theoretical basis for the specification of some concentration indices 
and for the relation of these into a measurement of monopoly power. Although 
the central role of concentration indices in the traditional 'industrial organiza-
tion has been based on the S-C-P paradigm, the concentration indices are, 
however, still commonly used as the empirical counterpart of the degree of 
oligopoly in the models derived from the strategic competition (DAVIES 
et al. 1992). The derivation of indices is based on the axiomatic basis of 
ENCAOUA and JACQUEMIN (1980), which combines the theoretical links be-
tween the properties of measuring concentration and the degree of market 
power prevailing in an industry. Accordingly, the aggregate market power (the 
Lerner index) in an industry consisting of n firms, noted L, should possess 
three properties: 
The value of L must be between the two extreme values of the 
distribution 	If 	the optimal allocation of 
the market shares is such that the marginal costs of the differ-
ent producers are equal. 
The value of L must take into account the existence of produc-
ers that are price-takers so that their monopoly power is null. 
In the case of a merger of two or more firms, the aggregate 
monopoly power would not decrease. 
The model is consistent with these conditions. Conditions one and• two are 
clearly fulfilled, because after multiplying throughout by (qi/Q) and summing 
across the industry: 
	 _ 1 [igii6 z1 (si )2 (1— fi)1 • 	 (3.8) 
PQ 	ini Q 
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The third condition is a consequence of the definition of 13, since the conjecture 
is an increasing function of a firm's size. The aggregate Lerner index is ob-
tained by rewriting Equation 3.8 as: 
1 r  
L= —[fi + H(1— 13)], 
1771 (3.9) 
where H = (si)2 is the Herfindahl index of concentration. The range of varia-
tion of the index is [1/n,1] and the value of 1/H can be interpreted as the 
number of firms of an equal size, the distribution of which results in the same 
concentration index as that given by H. 
In the Coumot competition each firm assumes that the rivals' output is held 
constant and p = o. The aggregate Lerner index approaches zero when the 
Herfindahl index of concentration approaches infinity. With p equal to null, the 
industry is free of collusive practices. However, the aggregate Lerner index and 
concentration are positively related. One possible interpretation is that some 
industries become concentrated because one or more firms have a strong effi-
ciency advantage over their competitors. This greater efficiency leads to the 
concentration of a large part of the market to the hands of the leading firms and 
also to greater profitability (CLARKE et al. 1984). This result can be linked to 
the contestable market theory of BAUMOL (1982). 
With 13=1, the model gives the monopoly result, i.e. that the price-marginal 
cost margin is equal to the reciprocal of the demand elasticity. If 0<13<1, the 
higher Lerner index is due to partly collusive behaviour. The elasticity formu-
lation of f3 makes it possible that smaller firms can expect a smaller price 
change as a result of, for instance, a 10 percent increase in their output than 
larger firms. 
When competition is tougher than Cournot, we have p<o. In this case each 
firm expects that if it reduces output others will expand output. The lower limit 
for 13 gives the Lerner index of zero in Equation 3.9, from which it follows that 
the lower limit is 13 = -H/(1-H). For instance in duopoly (n=2) with equal 
marginal costs, both firms must have the same market share in equilibrium 
(H=1/2) and the lower limit for p is -1. Both firms expect that if they reduce 
output the other will expand output by an equal percentage. 
Even though the connection between concentration and the mark-up is gen-
erally accepted, the assumed nature of conduct as exogenous is inadequate. The 
central hypothesis of the STIGLER's (1964) oligopoly model suggests an in-
verse relation between the degree of concentration and the cost of controlling a 
collusion arrangement. Stigler' s model is based on the likelihood that, where 
sellers are few, it is easier to detect and punish any firm that cheats by setting 
the price below the agreed level. The modelling of p leads to the causality 
d13/dH > 0, and higher concentration leads to higher industry profits because it 
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a) 
	q*. 
R. 
Ri 
facilitates collusion. This implies the endogeneity of conduct. Generally, the 
first order conditions are derived to the equilibrium relation between structure 
and performance, which can he assumed to yield indirect information about 
conduct. E.g. the papers by IWATA (1974), BRESNAHAN (1981a) and SUMNER 
(1981) attempt to estimate the nature of competition from intra-industry data of 
prices, profits, and output. 
The Nash equilibrium, qi* for ali i, implicitly determines qi in terms of the 
quantity produced by the other firms. The reaction function can he thought of 
as firm i's reaction to the rest of the industry. Let a subscript j note the rest of 
the industry or the other firm in the duopoly case. The reaction functions, R, 
determine how firms set quantities in the simultaneous move game: 
q:` = Ri (q;) and 	= Ri (q: ). 	 (3.10) 
The derivation of reaction functions and stability conditions are shown e.g. by 
VARIAN (1992, pp. 286-288) for Cournot duopoly, DIXIT (1986) for conjec-
tural variations oligopoly, and QUIRMBACH (1988) for conjectural elasticities 
oligopoly. Figure 3.1 illustrates the reaction functions in duopoly (Ri for firm i 
for R. 	firm j) with linear demand and identical marginal costs for the two 
firms. The set of possible equilibria is the range from competitive output 
([3 = -1 and L = 0) to monopoly (p = 1 and L = 1/14). 
In the Nash equilibrium, the reaction functions cross in quantity space. The 
intersecting point determines equilibrium outputs qi* and qi*. If p = -1, each 
firm maximizes its profits by producing half of the competitive output 
(Figure 3.1a). This case is possible in the long run only if there are no fixed 
costs. The existence of fixed costs results in the lower boundary for 13 to be 
Figure 3.1. Duopoly reaction functions in the quantity space: a) 	= -1; b) 
f3 = 0; c) = 1. Source: MARTIN (1993). 
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higher than -1. If 13 = 0, the result is the Cournot equilibrium (Figure 3.1b). 
Total supply is lower than in the competitive equilibrium (3.a). If (3 = 1, total 
output is restricted to the monopoly level and reaction functions coincide. In 
Figure 3.1c it is assumed that the `negotiation' powers of two firms are identi-
cal and both firms produce half of the monopoly output. 
The dynamic interpretation of the model is a typical cobweb adjustment 
process. Consider, for example, the Cournot case. Beginning with an out-of-
the-equilibrium situation, let firm i take the quantity produced by other firms 
as given and move to its profit-maximizing output determined by the reaction 
function. Then firm j will move to q = Ri, firm i will move to qi=Ri, and so on. 
At every step, each firm has maximized its profit. If the reaction functions and 
actual behaviour of the firms equal the conjectures, these conjectures are said 
to be consistent (BRESNAHAN 1981b). Thus the solution will be unique even in 
the static one-shot aspect. 
In contrast to the consistency, if the firms are assumed to hold conjectures 
which turn out to be different from the optimal reactions of the competitors, the 
conjectures are inconsistent. The concept of consistency is criticized, for exam-
ple, by BOYER and MOREAUX (1983) in the sense that practically any situation 
can be understood as a locally consistent conjectural equilibrium. They derive 
an algorithm to compute, given any sustainable market situation of a duopoly, 
conjectural variations functions which make this market situation a locally 
consistent conjectural equilibrium. ULPH (1983) argues that the multiplicity of 
consistent equilibrium does not mean that the concept of consistent conjectures 
is inadequate, but that the definition of consistency is too weak to effectively 
limit the set of equilibrium. He found out that the fundamental problem is that 
the appropriate consistency tests are impossible to construct because they need 
additional rationality criteria requiring the correctness of conjectures about the 
consequences of output changes from points other than the equilibrium relative 
to the given beliefs. 
It can be asked how obvious a solution the conjectural variations equilibrium 
really is, and whether it can only be by chance that the conjecture is consistent 
in the static framework. In spite of the weaknesses in the modelling of dynamic 
features of strategic competition in a static or ad hoc dynamic framework, 
TIROLE (1990) points out the usability of conjectural variations models in 
empirical estimations of the degree of competition in an industry. However, 
e.g. FRIEDMAN (1977, 1983) criticizes the conjectural variations analysis because 
the models are not actually dynamic, the firms are assumed to maximize one-
period profits rather than the discounted stream of profits, and the firms have 
expectations about how their rivals will behave that need not be correct. 
MAKOWSK.I (1987) also criticizes the approach and asks for more sophisticated 
dynamic game solutions of strategic interactions in which the actions at each 
point in time are modelled explicitly. The relationship between dynamic 
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oligopolistic competition and static conjectural variations equilibrium is analyzed 
by DOCKNER (1992). He shows that it is possible to interpret a conjectural 
variations equilibrium as the outcome of dynamic strategic interactions. In real 
life, the decision-makers are likely to operate repeatedly, and this creates the 
basis for long-run interactions within a set of firms. 
3.2. Repeated games and cartel stability 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the relationship between concentra-
tion and cartel stability. As the previous chapter, this part will examine the case 
of a symmetric noncooperative oligopoly in which the only interdependence 
between the firms is the recognition of the same industry demand. The differ-
ence is that the game is repeated over time periods. The game can be called a 
supergame, where the stage game is played over and over again by two or 
more players (KREPs 1990, p. 506). In each period, the firms choose their 
strategic variables simultaneously. 
In the static conjectural variations framework, industry profits are maxi-
mized when an industry acts collusively. An industry produces monopoly out-
put and receives monopoly profits that can be allocated to the firms in accord-
ance with the market shares. For instance, a market can be segmented geo-
graphically and each firm is a monopolist within its area. Operating of one firm 
in another's territory can be quickly and surely detected, and leads to counter-
measures by the other firm. However, if there is a potentiality that one firm can 
increase its profits per period by producing a larger quantity than the collusive 
equilibrium without detection, the collusive equilibrium is no longer the Nash 
equilibrium. In static games, tacit collusion (no explicit contracts) is actually 
not possible since firms always have an incentive to cheat on the agreement. If 
oligopolists wish to maintain a collusion, they need to devise some kind of 
penalty which would more than offset the gain from cheating. 
In the following model, the stucture of the industry is assumed to be stable 
over time. Output is the strategic variable and firms are not able to achieve 
product differentation or to divide their markets regionally. Information about 
the industry's environment is public. Furthermore, firms are assumed to be 
able to monitor the output Ievels of other firms. The information is almost 
perfect in the sense that, at time t, firms only know the outcomes at t-1 and 
before. The stage game is repeated infinitely. A strategy for firm i is an infinite 
sequence qi = (qi1,qi2, ...), where qll is the initial output and qit+1 determines the 
output at time t+1 as a function of the actions chosen by ali players in ali 
preceeding periods q (Q1,Q2,...,Qt). Playing the stage game repeatedly pro-
duces a stream of profits for each player, which can be discounted to the first 
period by the factor 5 E (0,1). 
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A subgame is a piece of the supergame that starts at a point in which the 
history of the game is common knowledge and that includes ali the stage 
games that follow this point. Due to the assumptions, the stage game at time t 
starts a new subgame. A subgame perfect equilibrium (SELTEN 1975) requires 
that, following any t-1 period of the history of the play, the strategy profile 
gives firms instructions that constitute a Nash equilibrium of the subgame 
beginning in period t. 
Because an individual firm is likely to have an incentive to deviate from the 
collusive output choice in the stage game, that kind of equilibrium does not 
fulfill the Nash condition of subgames and the collusion cannot be a subgame 
perfect equilibrium. Therefore, the repeated collusion equilibrium must be sup-
ported by punishment strategies. A punishment at some point in the game 
specifies a strategy for each firm from that point on. To be credible, a punish-
ment must itself be a perfect equilibrium of that subgame. The more severe the 
credible punishment, the more likely it is that the collusive outcome path can 
be supported. The collusion equilibrium can be enforced, for instance, by 
trigger strategies of the following type (e.g. DAVIDSON and DENECK_ERE 1984): 
each firm produces its share of the industry monopoly output (qi*=siQ*) and 
charges the monopoly price until some firm cheats. When such a defection 
occurs, ali firms revert to the Cournot-Nash output (qic) and maintain that level 
from that on. The credibility means that if each firm is using this trigger 
strategy and if q, ts siQ* at time t for some i = 1,...,n; s = 1,...,t-1, then it is 
optimal for each firm to produce qic, given that ali other firms are also produc-
ing the Cournot-Nash output. This eliminates the possibility of empty threats. 
If firm i cheats at period t, it chooses quantity (note qich) to maximize 
profits, given that ali other firms produce their share of the industry monopoly 
output. The immediate one period gain from cheating is nich - 7C1*. From the 
period t+1 firm i will receive Cournot-Nash profits. Cheating is profitable if 
gains exceed the future losses due to the trigger strategy of other firms. Thus, if 
the following condition holds, no firm will cheat and the trigger strategy is a 
noncooperative equilibrium: 
(3.11) 
It is easy to see that the closer ö is to 1, the more obviously the industry can 
maintain a collusion. How self-enforcing the equilibrium is also depends on the 
demand conditions, cost functions, and industry structure (parameters of the 
profit function). To illustrate this, consider the linear inverse demand function 
to be P = a-bQ. This kind of linear demand structure has been studied e.g. by 
BOUER and MOREAUX (1986), and VIVES (1988). In the symmetric oligopoly 
structure each firm produces at a constant marginal and average costs of c, with 
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c<a. The Cournot-Nash and collusive equilibrium values for industry price and 
per firm quantity and profit for ali i=1,...,n in the quantity setting stage game 
are: 
q, = 	; P = 	;7 r 
a—c 	, a+nc , = 	(a—c)2 i 	 i  
b(n +1) 	n+1 	b(n +1) 2 ; 
. 	a— c 	a+c . (a—c)2 
q'  
. = ; p 	 ;1r i = 	 2bn 	2 4bn 
(3.12) 
Note that price c and zero profits are limits of the Cournot game when the 
number of firms becomes large. PALFREY (1985) shows that the same limit in 
price also holds in the Cournot game of large markets when the firms have 
incomplete information about cost and demand parameters. He also uses linear 
demand and constant marginal costs in constructing the equilibrium. Further-
more, according to KREPs and SCHEINKMAN (1983), the Bertrand price compe-
tition can yield Cournot outcome in the two stage game in which capacities are 
set in the first stage and demand is then determined by price competition. 
Reversely, the collusive price does not depend on the number of firms. 
If firm i takes the quantity produced by ali other firms to he q*, it can 
maximize its profits at period t by producing quantity qiCh. The maximization 
problem of firm i is 
Max 	a—c a 	 (n 1) bq,1q, q,{[ 	2n (3.13) 
When firm i cheats, it produces the following quantity and receives the follow-
ing price and profits for the period t: 
Ch 	(n +1)(a  — c) pCh = a(n +1) + c(3n —1 ) ch (n+ 1) 2 (a — c) 2 = , = 	 . (3.14) 4bn 	 4n 	 16bn2 
The collusion output is the best strategy for ali i, if the present value of the 
periodic future losses exceeds the gains from cheating. From Equation 3.11 it 
can he solved (see Appendix 3) that losses dominate if and only if 
8> (n+1)2  
4n+(n+1)2 (3.15) 
This result supports an intuitive relationship between high concentration and 
collusion (see e.g. TIROLE 1990, pp. 247-248), and the view that concentration 
53 
indices, despite the ad hoc nature, can be useful in assessing the state of 
competitiveness in markets. When n decreases, the condition on 5 becomes 
weaker and the collusion is more likely. However, by adding the capacity 
constraints of firms to the model (BRocK and SCHEINKMAN 1985), it is possi-
ble to show that an increase in the number of firms can result in more stable 
collusion in certain circumstances. An increase in n can lead to an increase in 
the maximum sustainable price due to the increase in the threat power of the 
cartel caused by the increased excess capacity. The credible trigger strategy 
against a cheater is more severe in the industry in which total capacity is 
clearly above the capacity needed in monopoly output. 
The fear of retaliation may lead to different outcomes, as it is shown by the 
folk theorem. RUBINSTEIN (1979) shows that any individually rational outcome 
can arise as a subgame perfect equilibrium in infinitely repeated games with no 
discounting. FUDENBERG and MASKIN (1986) demonstrate that this result sur-
vives the introduction of a discount factor which is slightly below one. Any 
strategy giving each firm at least its security profit level can be seen as indi-
vidually rational. A security level is determined through the minimax strategy, 
in which every firm uses a strategy that minimizes their competitors' maximum 
profits after any cheating. The folk theorem shows that essentially ali distribu-
tions of profits (e.g. between zero and cartel profit in the Bertrand game) in a 
repeated one-shot game can be equilibrium of the repeated game. Quite often, 
it would be realistic to enrich the structure of the supergame by allowing for 
imperfect information. Above, it was assumed that, at the beginning of each 
period, firms observe the quantity produced by other firms. The trouble with 
this formulation is that incentives for maintaining the collusive equilibrium are 
often so strong that deterrent mechanisms are never observed. When imperfect 
information is included in the model, optimal incentive structures may involve 
periods which would be characterized as price wars. SLADE (1990) classifies 
price war models into imperfect monitoring, learning, and cyelical theories. 
In the model of GREEN and PORTER (1984), which is perhaps the most 
frequently referred model in the class of imperfect monitoring, firms monitor 
the market price that imperfectly reflects the output levels of other firms, and 
whether the cartel is in a collusive or in a reversionary state. The observed 
price at time t is Pt = Otp(Qt), in which Ot is a demand shock random variable 
having continuous density function with E(0)=1. The collusion contra Cournot 
trigger strategy is adopted. GREEN and PORTER (1984) conclude that, when the 
industry is stable over time, no firm defects from the cartel if no firm has more 
private market information than its competitors. However, it is rational for 
every firm to produce temporarily Cournot output when the price level de-
crease sharply, although ali firms know that this is not a result of overproduc-
tion by competitors. If a firm continues to produce collusive output, it will 
revise its beliefs about how much other firms have produced. Then the original 
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equilibrium strategy ceases to be individually optimal for firms, and price wars 
can be involuntarily caused by demand shocks. The theory views price wars as 
necessary to maintain incentives to collude with imperfect information. The 
theoretical model has been empirically tested by using time series data on the 
Joint Executive Committee railroad cartel (see e.g. ULEN 1983). PORTER (1983) 
uses this data in order to identify periods in which price wars occured, and 
PORTER (1985) tests predictions about the incidence and duration of price wars. 
The basic idea of imperfect monitoring is generally illustrated in Figure 3.2. 
Monopolistic output yields equilibrium value P* for industry price. Firm s 
share of the monopoly output is qi*. Finn' s problem is to find an optimal level 
of trigger price, say P'. If demand falls from P1(Q) to P2(Q) and qi* yields the 
price lower than P', firm i will produce Cournot output qic for the duration of a 
reversionary period regardless of what happens to prices during this time. If the 
trigger price is set to be lower, for instance P", change in the demand does not 
lead to the reversionary period. However, if firms do not revert to Cournot 
behaviour in response to low prices, the incentive properties would not hold the 
rest of the time and monopolistic behaviour would cease to be individually 
optimal for firms. 
With learning mode' ls, some of the structural parameters" of industry are 
unknown to the players. A price-war model of SLADE (1989) uses reaction 
functions in which prices and quantities, which can be observed, are noisy 
signals concerning industry conditions. The permanent shifts of unknown pa-
rameters imply that the old strategies are not an equilibrium of the new game. 
P*  
P' 
P" 
q: 
Figure 3.2. The trigger mechanism of imperfect monitoring. 
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Firms change prices, and this leads to a temporary price war. During the price 
war, firms learn about conditions in the industry, and the process converges to 
a new stable price vector. 
Cyclical models examine how the stability of a collusive arrangement de-
pends on the aggregate economic activity. The model of ROTEMBERG and 
SALONER (1986) looks at firms competing in prices, and considers the possible 
equilibrium that can be supported by reversion to the Bertrand outcome. An 
essential assumption is that demand, from the firms' viewpoint, is subject to 
identically and independently distributed random shocks, e.g. due to changes in 
consumers' preferences or incomes. The random component of demand is 
observable in advance in each period. A central result is that monopoly pricing 
may not always be sustainable, if potential punishments are short-lived or firms 
have small discount factors. The discounted value of future losses may not be 
sufficient to outweigh the short-term gains from deviation when the random 
component of demand is large. In order to lessen the incentive to deviate, the 
cartel must change prices when demand conditions change rapidly. Therefore, 
the collusive price P* varies over the business cycle. 
The stability of a collusive arrangement also depends on the existence of 
potential new entrants. A potential entrant to an oligopoly analyzes the industry 
demand, the current competitive or collusive conditions in the industry, and the 
prospects for rivalry or collusion after the entry. The game theory provides 
techniques for modelling the formation of beliefs of the entry decision as part 
of equilibrium. For example, MILGROM and ROBERTS (1982) demonstrated that 
the presence of informational asymmetries can lead a firm, or a cartel, operat-
ing in several markets to adopt a predatory strategy against entrants, even 
though such behaviour is irrational when viewed in the context of a single 
market. Their solution employs the concept of sequential equilibrium intro-
duced by KREPS and WILSON (1982). Incumbents may find it profitable to cre-
ate and maintain a reputation as firms that will fight entry in markets operating 
under conditions of asymmetric information. This will naturally affect the 
collusive profits, gains from cheating, and thus the stability of collusion. 
An implication of imperfect information and the folk theorem is that the 
observed conduct within a period does not necessarily provide very much 
information about the structure of the industry. An assumed infinite time hori-
zon may seem unrealistic, but the results also hold for games with a suffi-
ciently low probability of ending the game in any period. Despite the lack of 
empirical studies, the theory of repeated games can, however, deepen the basis 
for understanding many intuitive premises for tacit collusion, like the relation-
ships between cartel stability and market concentration as well as effective 
acquifing of information. 
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3.3. Asymmetric firm behaviour 
3.3.1. Concentration-profitability relationship in the price 
leadership model 
Until now, the relations between price-cost margins and concentration have 
been presented in a framework of pure oligopolists. In the price leadership 
model (or dominant firm model), an industry consists of a dominant group of 
firms and, in addition, there exists a price-taking group of firms. Firms in the 
first group have market power and firms in the second group are price-takers. 
This is a case of asymmetric oligopoly, where a dominant group of producers 
imposes a selling price to a competitive fringe. The behaviour of a fringe can 
be presented by a supply function. The k dominant firms of the industry set up 
a selling price, knowing the competitive fringe of the industry (n-k firms) will 
produce at a level such that its marginal cost of production will be equal to the 
price. 
The central element of the price leadership model is that of excess demand. 
Let Q = Q(P) be the global demand function of the industry and Qc = Qc(P) 
the supply function of the competitive fringe. It is assumed that the supply 
function is increasing. The demand function of the dominant group, or excess 
demand, can now be written QD = QD(P) = Q(P) - Qc(P). Following the presen-
tation of GISSER (1986), the identity can be written in the form: 
P 
dQD 	Q [p Q1 QC 	 [ p d  QC 
QD d p QD 	d p QD QC dp • (3.16) 
Denoting the elasticity of supply of the competitive fringe as E and the absolute 
value of elasticity of global demand as Irti, the absolute value of elasticity of 
excess demand, Irr, can be written as: 
1-1C 
117I D = 	
1.1 
1111+ 	 e • 
QL, (3.17) 
The function of excess demand is assumed to have an inverse form PD = P(QD). 
The profit function of a firm i of the dominant group (i=1,...,k) is 
="Q D )qi 	 (q w) ; QD 	 (3.18) 
i=1 
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where the price vector of the inputs, w, is assumed to be exogenous. First, 
consider the case in which competition inside the dominant group is assumed 
to follow the Cournot mode of behaviour. The equilibrium quantities are solu-
tions of the maximizing programs of individual profits of the k firms. Assum-
ing price-taking in input markets, the necessary condition of the Cournot-Nash 
equilibrium is that firm i's Lerner index is 
L = 	Vi=1,...,k, 
I11l+E(1—C D ) (3.19) 
where si = q/Q and CD is the aggregate share of dominant firms (derivation is 
presented in Appendix 3). The values of Lerner indices of competitive firms 
equal zero. The average market power in the dominant group can he achieved 
by multiplying each firm's Lerner index by the firm's market share in the 
dominant group and summing it across k firms. The aggregate market power of 
the industry, L, is then the Lerner index of the dominant group multiplied by 
the market share of the dominant firms. This can he written 
L= 	C D H D 
I 7.11- E(1-  C D ) ' (3.20) 
where HD is the Herfindahl index of concentration within the dominant group. 
The equation shows that an increase of the CD and increased concentration 
within the dominant group (higher HD) will cause a rise of the aggregate 
market power. Furthermore, a low price elasticity of total demand and a low 
price elasticity of the supply of the competitive fringe will increase the market 
power. In comparison to the previous conjectural variations model, it can he 
noted that the price-cost margin is influenced by a more complicated set of 
structural elements. 
The outcome is different in the dominant firm model with k-dominant firms 
acting jointly as a leader against a competitive fringe. The members of the 
dominant group select the market price and the quantity so that they maximize 
the sum of profits. This case also makes it possible to derive the relationship 
between profitability and concentration. The general result is first shown by 
SAVING (1970) and later on e.g. by GEROSKI (1981). 
In a cartel the determination of the market power of firm i is distinguished 
from the Cournot-Nash solution so that the market share of an individual firm 
in the Lerner Equation 3.19 is replaced by the aggregate market share of the 
dominant cartel. The competitive firms have no market power, even though 
their aggregate market share can he considerable. Multiplying 3.20 by CD, the 
Lerner index of market power for the whole industry is 
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CD2 L= 	 
I nl+E(1- C, ) (3.21) 
Thus, profitability is positively related to the market share of the dominant 
group. Besides, elastic demand makes the equilibrium more competitive, as 
does an elastic supply response of the competitive fringe. In any case, when the 
concentration ratio is employed as a concentration measure alone, the basic 
assumption about the conduct is very restrictive. The dominant firm model 
presents the concentration ratio as an appropriate measure of concentration, if 
the actual number of firms in the colluding group happens to be exactly the 
same as the k value chosen by authors who calculate the concentration ratio. 
Very likely the popularity of this measure in empirical studies is a consequence 
of the fact that it is the only measure of concentration published in many 
countries. E.g. the Finnish Census of Enterprises reports 3-, 5- and 10-firm 
ratios. Roughly speaking, the concentration ratio can be a reasonable measure 
in cases where large values indicate more dominance for the leading firms. 
3.3.2. Competition with sequential moves 
The standard Nash equilibrium assumes that firms move simultaneously. An 
alternative way to describe oligopolistic competition is to allow firms to move 
sequentially. In the Stackelberg model it can be assumed, for instance, that 
there is one leader firm on the market (VARIAN 1992, p. 296). The leader maxi-
mizes its profits by choosing the output level, recognizing its rivals' responses 
in the quantity leadership game. The other firms, followers, can then observe 
the leader' s output and choose their optimal levels of output. In the hierarchical 
Stackelberg model (ANDERSON and ENGERS 1992), the order of moves is fixed 
during the game. In this case, the optimal output decision of any firm depends 
on the reactions of ali subsequent movers. The equilibrium is the subgame 
perfect outcome that arises when firms choose their outputs according to some 
exogenously determined order of moves. 
The asymmetry in behaviour can be seen as a result of a historical source of 
differentiation among the firms. One source of differentiation is the sunk costs 
of capacity, that is capital which cannot be recovered once it has been invested. 
For example FUDENBERG and TIROLE (1985) argue that, although the timing of 
firms' capacity choices is endogenous and simultaneous choices are possible, 
asymmetric timing is likely to be the equilibrium outcome. Practically, it can 
be assumed that firms enter the market in sequence because some entrants 
become aware of a profitable market before others. Following this tradition, the 
oligopoly model would be extended to cover two phases: a phase in which 
entry and investments are committed, and a production phase (e.g. EATON and 
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WARE 1987). First, firms decide if they are going to participate in a certain 
industry, and later decide the specific way in which they are going to compete. 
In a multi-stage game, entry occurs in the long-run and quantity or pricing 
choices take place in the short-run. Thus, in the classification of the structure-
conduct-performance paradigm, the decisions affecting structure are chosen in 
earlier stages of the game, while the decisions on conduct are chosen in later 
stages. When the Stackelberg model is analyzed, it is implicitly assumed that 
the structure of the game is stable and competition actually occurs in the short-
run. 
In the most familiar Stackelberg model, one firm is a leader and n-1 are 
followers, when n is the number of firms of an industry. The leader recognizes 
its followers' response patterns, and uses this information to decide on a profit 
maximizing output level. The follower' s output level is the best response to the 
leader' s output and to the other followers' best-response functions. Instead the 
leader' s profit maximizing output level is a best response to the followers' 
best-response functions. 
To illustrate the Stackelberg model, consider a quantity setting duopoly. 
The profit maximizing procedure of both firms yields reaction functions R1(q) 
for firm i and R(q1) for firm j. Let us assume that firm i has a Stackelberg 
leadership position. It moves first, and when the follower (firm j) chooses its 
strategy it treats the leader' s choice as given. However, the leader knows 
follower' s reaction function and takes this into account in its decision. The 
Stackelberg equilibrium in the homogenous products Cournot case means that 
the leader will choose qi to maximize its profits, given that qj depends on q j via 
TR.. hus, the leader's profit function is 
(3.22) 
When maximizing profits, the leader can pick the point on firm j's reaction 
function that yields the highest profits. Compared to the symmetric Cournot 
equilibrium (see Figure 3.1b), the equilibrium is no longer the intersection 
point of reaction functions. Now the leader produces more and the follower less 
than in the Cournot case. There is a first mover advantage, i.e. the leader 
receives greater profits. 
To analyze the Stackelberg equilibrium more formally, consider the per-
fectly hierarchical Stackelberg model with n firms, in which each firm acts as 
if it were a monopolist facing the residual demand curve remaining from the 
preceding movers. The order of moves is exogenously determined. A subgame 
perfect equilibrium arises when firms choose their output sequentially in the 
game where each firm' s output is independent of the number of firms that 
follow it in the hierarchy, and each firm i (i=1,...,n) maximizes its profits by 
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setting optimal q  in the following system: 
Maxq  z= P(An +qn )qn —c„(q,,,w) „ 
Maxg , 7C n-1 = P( An-I qn-1)qn-1 — C n-1 (qn-l' w)  
(3.23) 
max 
qi I 
p( )q 	(qi ' W  
where Ai is the total output of firm i's preceding firms in the hierarchy.The 
model is special because (qpni) for i<k does not appear directly in the marginal 
conditions dated k and later. This makes it feasible to use the backward recur-
sive solution strategy used in dynamic programming. Whatever the preceding 
firms have produced, the last firm in the sequence, firm n, maximizes its 
profits at the residual demand curve. The choice function qn=qn*(A.) is derived 
as the solution to the first-order equation, assuming the second-order condi-
tions of the demand and cost functions hold. The value function for firm n 
= P[A, 	— c„(q,w) 	 (3.24) 
is the maximum value of the objective function at every level of quantity 
produced by other firms. There is no incentive to depart from the original pian. 
According to the envelope theorem (SILBERBERG 1990, pp. 192-195), differen-
tiating the value function with respect to An gives 
dg*„ dP(An +q„) 
dA„ 	dAn 	qn ' (3.25) 
because firm n' s optimal choice already combines the consistent link between 
qi* and A. This means that only the direct influence of other firms' production 
over the demand determines the maximum value of firm n's profit. The calcu-
lation of each firm's equilibrium output follows the same method. Obviously, 
the first firm' s A1 is zero. 
If the inverse demand function is again assumed to he P=a-bQ, and each 
firm produces at a constant marginal and average costs of c (c<a), firm s 
equilibrium output is 
* a—bA —c a—c 
q. = 	 = 	 
2b 	2' b 
(3.26) 
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i.e. each firm produces half the output of its immediate predecessor. After 
summing each firm's optimal quantities across the industry and substituting the 
sum in the demand function, the total industry output and the Stackelberg 
equilibrium price are 
Q ns = a — c 	1) p ys = a—c +c 
b 	2" 	2" (3.27) 
Comparing the equilibrium price (PHs) to the Cournot price (Pc in 3.12) indi-
cates that the equilibrium price is always higher under Cournot if 2-n> 1, i.e. 
the number of firms n> 1. More asymmetric industry structure leads to a lower 
market price. Clearly the equilibrium total quantity is lower for the Cournot 
case. In Cournot competition, the conjectural variations term is zero, while in 
the hierarchical Stackelberg case ali firms, except the last, face the conjectural 
variations term less than zero that provides an extra incentive to increase 
production at the margin. For instance, if firm i in the hierarchy increases its 
quantity by dqi, its followers decrease their total production by dqi times (1-1/ 
However, ali Stackelberg firms do not produce more than Cournot ones. 
The first firm produces (n+1)/2 (>1) times, and the last firm produces (n+1)/ 
2n (<1) times the Cournot output. A firm that produces the Cournot quantity is 
ranked by i = ln(n+1)/1n2 in the hierarchy. 
Combining the quantity produced by firm i and the market price of the 
Stackelberg equilibrium yields the profit for firm i as 
HS 	 (a— c)2 = 	. 	V i =1,...,n, 
' 	b2'+" 
(3.28) 
where the profit is a decreasing function of the number of firms and the 
position of the firm in the hierarchy. Because the market price is lower than 
Cournot price, and firms moving before i = ln(n+1)/1n2 produce more than 
Cournot output, it is impossible to say directly whether firm i's profit is below 
or above the Cournot profit. However, a simple computation shows that the 
first firm (i=1) can receive TC1HS nic if and only if n 3. Ali other firms earn 
less than their Cournot courterparts regardless of n. 
Since even the first firm is likely to prefer ali firms to play a Cournot game, 
in which outputs are chosen without observing the output chosen by any other 
firms, the question is whether the hierarchical Stackelberg game is in principle 
feasible at ali. If the first firm knows that without revealing its output to other 
fillas the game is Cournot, this would be a rational strategy. 
In the subgame perfect equilibrium, however, every firm reveals its output 
to the followers. This is a direct result of the backward recursive structure of 
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the model and SELTEN'S (1975) definition of the subgame perfect equilibrium. 
If the structure of the game is fixed, every firm in the sequence, say firm 
takes the production of previous firms as given or makes estimates about it 
when it is not revealed. Then firm i operates at its residual demand curve and 
chooses whether or not to reveal its output to the next firm. To reveal is a 
better strategy, because without revealing the next firm i+1 can act as a Cournot 
rival and produce the same output, which means that the market price will 
decrease. This strategy is optimal for ali firms: in every subgame, the strategy 
has to be the best response against strategies chosen by other firms. Individual 
rationality yields a result that is not optimal for the industry as a whole. 
In the Stackelberg models the leaders encounter a reacting fringe. In the 
hierarchical case the order of movements is important, and games give the first 
movers advantages. The first moving firms are able to restrict the choices open 
to rivals, for example, by controlling an input base or a distribution network. 
Alternatatively, dominance can be difined as a particular sort of price leader-
ship in which the leader has control over the industry price and its own output, 
but not over rivals' output. In such a price leadership oligopoly model derived 
in Chapter 3.4.1, a dominant group of producers imposes a selling price to a 
competitive fringe of producers, each too small to exert a perceptible influence 
on price through individual output decisions. The dominant firm or group 
behaves passively in regard to the output of small firms, estimates the excess 
demand at each price, and competes strategically against other firms of the 
dominant group. However, the problem in calling such a price leader the 
dominant firm is that it is actually the follower who has the less constrained 
choice (GERoste and JACQUEMIN 1984). As long as the price leader enjoys no 
cost advantages, the output of the competitive fringe will asymptotically ap-
proach the total industry output, and the price leadership declines. Thus, in this 
sense, the leader can be seen to have greater dominance in the hierarchical 
Stackelberg model compared to the price leadership model. 
To see what happens to the previously shown relations between aggregate 
monopoly power and concentration indices in the case of Stackelberg oligopoly, 
the Herfindahl index of concentration with linear demand and constant mar-
ginal costs can be derived (see Appendix 3) to be 
H 	
1  j
2 
1 
1 
3 1-2 n 	2") 
(3.29) 
The Herfindahl index declines when the number of firms rises and asymptoti-
cally approaches value 1/3. In the Cournot case the index approaChes zero 
when the number of firms rises. Despite the lower average profit level than in 
the symmetric Cournot equilibrium, the value of the concentration index is 
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always higher in the hierarchical Stackelberg case. Such a market can be classi-
fied to be highly concentrated, although it results in lower profits and, from the 
viewpoint of social efficiency, Pareto dominates the Cournot equilibrium. Stra-
tegic asymmetry results in higher concentration but yields greater efficiency. 
The relationship between concentration and profitability is not straightforward. 
The form of competition is decisive. 
A similar implication, i.e. that measures of concentration may have little to 
do with indicating average profits, can also be shown in the model of leading 
and following groups in which firms play Cournot against firms of the own 
group. A model of beneficial concentration from society' s viewpoint is pre-
sented by DAUGHETY (1990). In this model the relation between average profit 
and the Herfindahl index can be negative, if there are `too' many firms in the 
leading group. Furthermore, similar relationship exists when the concentration 
ratio, i.e. the aggregate market share of the leading group, is used. DAUGHETY 
(1990) also demonstrates that mergers can lead to higher welfare in the case 
where two followers merge and the result is a firm that behaviourally is a 
leader. If the conduct is symmetric, actions that reduce the number of firms or 
increase concentration are socially harmful, but in the asymmetric situation the 
result can be welfare-enhancing. Therefore, one has to be very careful in using 
concentration indices to estimate, for instance, the market power of an indus-
try. Conduct must be taken into account, especially in comparing different 
industries and in the planning of antitrust policies. 
3.4. Some implications for the foreign trade 
In recent years, the adoptation of the industrial organization theory in the 
research of international trade has led to critiques of the standard neoclassical 
approach that free trade is the best policy regardless of the trade policies of 
competing countries. When the elements of imperfect competition and strate-
gic trade theory are used, protection can be justified under certain circum-
stances. A government can increase national welfare by shifting monopoly 
rents from foreign to domestic firms through export subsidies and import re-
strictions. Although there has been little discussion on the applicability of the 
new strategic trade theory to agricultural markets, MCCORRISTON and SHELDON 
(1992) argue that the main characteristics of the theory are relevant to agricul-
tural trade policy analysis. They also note that traditionally agricultural trade 
economists have assumed perfectly competitive markets or have been inter-
ested in the role of government trading organizations in intemational trade (e.g. 
ALAOUZE et al. 1978, KARP and PERLOFF 1989). However, food products are 
mainly manufactured and distributed by private firms operating in markets that 
can be described as imperfectly competitive. In this case, a government can 
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directly or indirectly influence the decision variables of the domestic and for-
eign firms and determine the outcome of the oligopolistic game. 
3.4.1. The role of export subsidies 
In this chapter the effects of export subsidies are briefly explored by reviewing 
some of the most important studies. A great part of literature (see, for example, 
BRECHER and FEENSTRA 1983, FEENSTRA 1986, as well as IT0H and KIYONO 
1987) focuses on cross-market effects of export subsidies. These models share 
the characteristic that the subsidy-induced terms-of-trade loss in one market is 
offset by a terms-of-trade gain in another, raising the possibility of national 
benefit from a policy of export subsidization. This chapter concentrates on the 
profit-shifting motive of export subsidies. The role of export subsidies, then, is 
to enhance the strategic position of domestic firms engaged in the competition 
for world markets with foreign rivals. 
Following the work of BRANDER and SPENCER (1985), where industry is 
modelled as a Cournot duopoly, a government can increase national welfare 
through export subsidies. The model includes one domestic firm and one for-
eign firm, who export to third markets. An essential element of the model is 
what BRANDER and KRUGMAN (1983) refer to as a `segmented markets' per-
ception. In the model of Brander and Spencer this means that firms can price 
discriminate between the home and foreign market (this is a very relevant 
assumption for agricultural and food markets), and each enjoys a monopoly in 
its home market. In the first part of their model they assume that there is no 
consumption in the producing countries because, if marginal cost is constant, 
the existence of domestic consumption does not affect the level of sales and the 
export subsidy levels. If the domestic govemment only plays Stackelberg against 
firms and sets the subsidy level using its understanding of how subsidies 
influence the output equilibrium, it has unilateral incentive to offer an export 
subsidy to the domestic firm. If govemments play Nash against other govern-
ments, noncooperative behaviour provides incentives for export subsidies in 
both exporting countries. In the cooperative framework, producing countries 
have incentives to get together to agree not to use subsidies, but they also have 
an incentive to cheat on any resulting agreements. 
In the case where all production is for export, the subsidy of home govern-
ment shifts out the reaction function of the domestic firm, increasing its ex-
ports, reducing foreign firm's exports, lowering the export price, but still in-
creasing domestic profits. The subsidy can increase domestic welfare and, 
therefore, export subsidies can appear to be attractive policies from a domestic 
perspective. By acting first, the govemment can actually move the domestic 
firm to the Stackelberg leader position in the output space. According to 
MCCORRISTON and SHELDON (1992), this can he shown as in Figure 3.3, where 
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RFD is the reaction function of the domestic firm and RFF is the reaction 
function of the foreign firm. The Cournot-Nash equilibrium without export 
subsidies is N. The subsidy shifts the domestic firm' s reaction function to the 
right to RFDi. The new Cournot-Nash equilibrium is at S, which is formally 
equivalent to the Stackelberg outcome. Due to symmetry, the two producing 
countries face similar incentives for export subsidies, and the foreign govern-
ment pays its firm an export subsidy shifting RFF out. The equilibrium is now 
at M, where both firms' outputs have expanded and profits as well as national 
welfares are lower compared to point N. 
Introducing both govemments into the analysis shows .that export subsidies 
are not effective policies from the point of view of producing countries. This 
follows from the noncooperative game that has the structure of a prisoners' 
dilemma. Cooperation between the governments to not use subsidies at ali 
would be Pareto-superior, but noncooperative behaviour provides incentives 
for subsidy policies. This means that intemational regulations which attempt to 
discourage subsidization, such as GATT regulations, are likely to require regu-
lar reinforcement if they are to survive. 
In the model it is assumed that consumption does not exist in producing 
countries, or firms can price discriminate between the home and foreign mar-
ket. If marginal cost is constant, an export subsidy does not affect the equilib-
rium level of price in the domestic market. However, if marginal cost is in-
creasing, the optimal noncooperative export subsidy would be lower or even 
negative. Conversely, it would be higher if marginal cost is decreasing. 
ei D 
Figure 3.3. The effects of export subsidies on the Cournot-Nash equilibrium 
outputs. Source: MCCORRISTON and SHELDON (1992). 
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What if the firms and governments cooperate to maximize joint profits as an 
implicit collusion? This kind of analysis is familiar from Chapter 3.2. BRANDER 
and SPENCER (1985) argue that the jointly optimal policy of exporting coun-
tries can be to tax exports. Optimal taxes would ensure that each firm would 
produce half of the output of a monopoly, acting as a joint monopoly against 
the rest of the world. 
The analysis outlined above is based on the assumption that quantity is the 
strategic variable of firms. However, the optimal policy intervention is highly 
sensitive to the choice of the strategic variable. EATON and GROSSMAN (1986) 
consider alternative forms of oligopolistic competition and show that in a 
Bertrand duopoly the rent-shifting motive for policy intervention presump-
tively indicates a production or a per unit export tax. The export tax results in a 
reduction in domestic firm's market share and raises prices. The gains from the 
policy arise due to the revenue gains from the export tax. With conjectural 
variations model, the transfer of rents to the domestic firm is impossible, and 
free trade is optimal. The conclusion of the effectiveness of subsidy policy is 
also modified and extended by DIXIT (1984). He considers a more general 
Cournot model where trade-offs with consumer surplus are analyzed. As a 
result, the optimal policy intervention turns from an export subsidy to an 
export tax as the number of firms increases. The basic model can also be 
extended to incorporate some general equilibrium effects. Until now, the model 
explicitly assumes that firms are too small to influence factor markets. In the 
model of DIXIT and GROSSMAN (1986) the general equilibrium effects on wel-
fare work through the factor market. If several industries are oligopolistic, a 
government subsidy to the exports of one such industry will work at least in 
part by reducing profits of the other industries. The problem is especially 
serious when these industries are tightly linked together by factor endowment 
constraints. Then the subsidizing industry is likely to generate net welfare 
losses or, generally, the optimal subsidy policies are less beneficial than a 
partial-equilibrium analysis would suggest. 
A quite different motive for export subsidies is provided if there are infor-
mational asymmetries among consumers. The notion that incomplete informa-
tion about product quality is a barrier to entry has been studied by e.g. 
SCHMALENSEE (1982) and FARRELL (1986). When applied to strategic trade 
theory, the basic idea in this approach is that imported goods may initially be 
of unknown quality to consumers and asymmetric information about quality 
leads to socially insufficient entry. Export subsidies enable high-quality pro-
ducers to begin exporting profitably and subsidies can increase social welfare. 
BAGWELL and STAIGER (1989) construct a two-country model in which the 
foreign firm has first an introductory phase and then an infinite mature phase 
after entefing the market. A foreign firm uses R&D investment to produce 
either low or high quality products. In the absence of export subsidies, high 
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quality firms may be unable to find buyers in the market because they cannot 
distinguish themselves from low quality firms. In the most effective case, the 
foreign government can increase welfare by undertaking an export subsidy 
programme which supports a separating equilibrium with only high quality 
firms exporting. An important characteristic of this export subsidy is that the 
passive importing country is not harmed or, more effectively, it can set up a 
tariff policy to extract the mature phase rents. Naturally, the problem is more 
complicated if the importing country has notable production in the industry. 
3.4.2. Tariffs and quotas as strategic trade instruments 
What the previous section shows is that noncooperative behaviour provides 
incentives for export subsidy policies. Similarly, an importing country also has 
an incentive to set a tariff on the imports of the imperfectly competitive good, 
so as to extract some of the rent earned by exporters. The optimal tariff for the 
case of a foreign Cournot oligopoly is analyzed e.g. by BRANDER and SPENCER 
(1984). Later, they expand the analysis to how export subsidies of producing 
countries might affect the optimal import tariff (BRANDER and SPENCER 1985). 
A general result is that the optimal tariff is positive if the rate of change of the 
consumer price with respect to the tariff is less than one. Also, the introduction 
of export subsidies increases the optimal import tariffi However, a restrictive 
element of these papers is that they are only examining the special case of 
oligopoly equilibrium. It is difficult to see from these results how optimal 
policies depend on the nature of competition. 
The study of CHENG (1988) investigates how optimal policies toward do-
mestic markets are affected by the nature of oligopolistic competition. He 
constructs an oligopoly model consisting of a domestic firm and a foreign firm. 
If goods are differentiated, demand is linear, and the cost advantage of the 
foreign firm is not too large, the optimal policy under either Cournot or Bertrand 
competition consists of a tariffi However, the policy is different under Cournot 
and Bertrand competition. In the case of perfect substitutes, the optimal tariff is 
zero under Bertrand competition. In the Cournot equilibrium, the tariff may be 
positive or negative depending on the shape of the demand function. In the 
collusive equilibrium, the sign of the optimal tariff is the same as under Cournot 
competition. However, collusion leads to an optimal tariff that is always higher 
compared to the optimal tariff in Cournot competition. Thus, optimal policies 
under different forms of oligopolistic competition can be quite different. 
It can also be asked whether such tariff policies are able to change the form 
of oligopolistic competition. The paper of DAVIDSON (1984) considers effect 
of tariffs on the ability of international oligopoly to act as a cartel. As a result, 
he shows that low tariffs lead to more stable cartels than before the imposition 
of the tariffs. However, when the tariff is high, the cartel is weakened. The 
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dirD  =P+qpr  P' (l+r)-c p = 0, (3.32) 
intuitive explanation is that when tariff is high, domestic firms' profits are 
higher in the static non-cooperative equilibrium and foreign firms cannot remu-
nerate domestic firms enough at the cartel point of the repeated game to keep 
them from cheating. On the other hand, for low values of the tariff, the foreign 
firms can redistribute cartel profits to the domestic firms in order to keep them 
from cheating. Furthermore, there exists some critical tariff rate that has no 
effect on the stability of the cartel. This critical rate is a decreasing function of 
the number of firms and the share of domestic production. 
The policy analysis can be extended to allow other policy instruments. A 
great deal of trade instruments in the agricultural sector consists of non-tariff 
barriers to trade, such as import quotas. For example, KRISHNA (1989) as well 
as MAJ and HWANG (1989) have investigated the equivalence between tariffs 
and quotas as alternative trade instruments in oligopolistic settings. The result 
of these studies is that market structure and the form of competition matter in 
determining whether tariffs and quotas are equivalent. 
Following MAJ and HWANG (1989), consider a duopoly model with a do-
mestic firm and a foreign firm. Assume that the second order and stability 
conditions are satisfied so that the first order conditions give the equilibrium 
values of qD* and qm*. At the equilibrium the ratio of imports to domestic 
production is 
qm n r=-> 
qD 
(3.30) 
Assume that the government imposes an import quota so that the ratio is r. 
Now foreign firm's reaction function becomes qm = rqD, and the domestic firm 
can maximize its profit subjeCt to this constraint. The ratio quota changes the 
game to a Stackelberg leader-follower one with the domestic firm acting as the 
leader. Thus, the domestic firm's profit becomes: 
= P(q p +rqm )q p —c,q,, 	 (3.31) 
where r denotes the ratio quota. The first order condition for profit maximization 
is 
where qDr is the equilibrium level of output produced by the domestic firm 
under the ratio quota for imports. Calculating the difference between the amount 
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aqD 
az vp  
=P+q,!  P—c D =0, (3.35) 
of production by the domestic firm under the ratio quota and under the equiva-
lent tariff yields 
qD (c( D —r)>  
qD—qD= 	 =v, ifr=oc D , l+r < 
(3.33) 
i.e. the difference is positive, zero, or negative when the ratio r is, respectively, 
greater, equal, or smaller than the domestic firm's conjectural variations pa-
rameter aD (=dqm/d%). Furthermore, since P' <0, the relationship between 
domestic equilibrium price under the ratio quota and under the tariff is 
> 	> 
P r P ,ifr=oc D . 	 (3.34) 
Thus, the domestic price under a ratio quota will he identical to that under the 
equivalent tariff only if the target ratio of imports to domestic production is 
exactly equal to the value of the domestic firm' s conjectural variation. The 
domestic price under a ratio quota is always higher when the conjecture is 
Cournot or more competitive. When conjecture is more collusive than a Cournot 
one, the relationship of prices depends on the ratio of imports to domestic 
production. A higher quota ratio gives the domestic firm a more inelastic 
demand, and a ratio quota that is smaller than the value of the conjectural 
variations parameter gives the domestic firm a more elastic demand. For this 
reason, it is profitable to raise the price and produce less or lower the price and 
produce more than with the equivalent tariff, respectively. 
Similarly, the relation between a ratio quota and a volume quota can be 
investigated. Assume that a volume quota is set at the equilibrium quantity 
imports under the tariff, and the foreign firm' s reaction function is qm = qm*. 
Now, the domestic firm acts as a monopoly knowing the imported quantity. 
The first order condition is 
where 	is the equilibrium output of the domestic firm under volume quota. 
Calculation shows that qD" -qDr is positive, i.e. the price under the volume 
quota is always lower than that under the ratio quota, regardless of the value of 
conjectural variations. Hence, these non-tariff barriers are not equivalent from 
the society's viewpoint. 
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The conjectural variations model of HWANG and MAJ (1989) focuses on the 
pure-strategy equilibrium. In the study of KRISHNA (1989) the non-equivalence 
of tariffs and volume quotas is analyzed with price as the strategy choice. In 
this case, there is no equilibrium in pure strategies. However, as KRISHNA (1989) 
shows, the unique mixed-strategy is one where the foreign firm always chooses 
to charge only one price and the domestic firm randomizes over two prices, 
which give it equal profit. If firms produce substitute goods, the imposition of 
the quota raises both firms' prices and profits compared to the free trade levels. 
The equilibrium prices are higher than under an equivalent tariff. Furthermore, 
REITZES and GRAWE (1994) show that imposing a quota that constraints im-
ports from exceeding a specified share of the domestic market leads to the 
mixed-strategy equilibrium in a Cournot duopoly. The equilibrium consists of 
a domestic firm that uses a pure strategy based on its type (either contract or 
expand output in response to the quota) and a foreign firm that, when making 
its output decision, only knows the probability that the domestic firm is of a 
given type. The effect on welfare depends on which strategy the domestic firm 
employs. Market-share quotas have less predictable effects on welfare than 
tariffs. If markets are oligopolistic, the change in firms' behaviour following 
the imposition of quantity restrictions can have important welfare effects, and 
the potential benefits of market interventions are highly dependent on the trade 
instruments used. 
3.5. Oligopoly models as the theoretical framework of this study 
The structuralist S-C-P paradigm posits a chain of causation running from 
structure to conduct to performance. The determination of structure is ex-
plained by reference to various exogenous barriers to entry. The next genera-
tion of empirical studies draws attention to the need to consider a possible 
reverse link from conduct or performance to structure. However, only the game 
theoretical formulation offers an analytical way of analyzing this two-way link. 
In this study the market structure is assumed to be exogenous. Even in the 
simple case of homogenous products, it was shown that the link between 
structure and performance is greatly dependent on the model selection. 
In the simultaneous moves case, a conjectural variations model can be used 
to investigate the short-run relationship between concentration and market power. 
This relationship depends on the degree of price competition. Furthermore, 
higher concentration is likely to lead to higher industry profits because it 
facilitates collusion. This supports the view that concentration indices can be 
useful in assessing the state of competitiveness in markets. The Herfindahl 
index is an appropriate measure of concentration in the conjectural variations 
model. When firms behave asymmetrically, different sets of concentration indices 
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correspond to different solution concepts of optimizing firms. How to measure 
concentration is an important issue, when the connection between concentration 
and the degree of oligopoly is studied. 
In the case of asymmetric behaviour, even the simple exogenous structure 
and homogenous products models reveal a basic problem of the S-C-P para-
digm: concentration measures may provide little insight into welfare, or the 
degree of market power. For example, a merger that reduces the number of 
firms and increases concentration can be welfare improving even if there are no 
cost advantages to the merger itself. In the hierarchical Stackelberg model the 
value of the Herfindahl index of concentration is higher than in the Cournot 
model despite the lower average profit level than in symmetric Cournot compe-
tition. 
Using the elements of imperfect competition and the strategic trade theory, 
the studies reviewed in this chapter show that a govemment can potentially 
increase national welfare by shifting monopoly rents from foreign to domestic 
firms through export subsidies and import tariffs. If governments play Nash 
against other governments, noncooperative behaviour provides incentives for 
subsidies or tariffs. The game has the structure of the prisoners' dilemma: 
cooperation between the governments to not use protective policies at all would 
be Pareto-superior, but noncooperative behaviour provides incentives for cheat-
ing. However, optimal policies under different forms of oligopolistic competi-
tion can be quite different. Besides, different trade barriers are not equivalent 
from society's viewpoint. This is an important factor when the effects of the 
membership of Finland in the EU are analyzed. 
Different formulations of strategic competition lead to a wide range of 
possible equilibriums. We do not have a general theory of oligopoly. Thus, the 
following analysis needs to take into account the market characteristics and the 
effects of institutions when modelling the causation from structure to perform-
ance. A common response of research is to focus analysis on some very spe-
cific market. The knowledge of market features might allow to restrict the 
range of candidate models. 
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4. Models to evaluate welfare losses due to oligopoly 
Using Marshallian analysis to measure welfare losses by consumer surplus is an 
attempt to have a money measure of the loss in utility when commodities are 
sold at prices other than the marginal cost. Oligopolistic competition results in 
the market price equalling the marginal costs in the homogenous goods Bertrand 
competition or, for instance, in the asymmetric price game in which the fol-
lower can always capture ali the market by undercutting slightly the price 
quoted by the leader (see GAL-OR 1985). However, as it has been shown, the 
market price usually exceeds marginal costs when the supply sector is character-
ized by oligopolistic competition and quantity is the decision variable of firms. 
In this case, part of consumers' loss is offset by the additional revenue that the 
producers obtain, but a portion of this loss, the deadweight loss, is not offset by 
any gain to any group in the economy. 
In this chapter the objective is to derive applicable models to estimate 
welfare losses due to the oligopolistic competition so that the special character-
istics of the foreign trade of food products in Finland, like import quotas and 
import levies, are included in the analysis. This kind of trade regulation usually 
causes a trade-off between consumer surplus and domestic firms' profits and 
lead to the question of optimal trade policy (see e.g. MCCORRISTON and SHELDON 
1994). Furthermore, our intention is to derive models that allow for empirical 
findings without detailed firm-level information about sales, costs, and profits. 
The estimation of welfare losses is based on the observed values of concentra-
tion, market shares, and demand elasticities. 
Quantity is assumed to be the decision variable of firms. The starting point is 
GISSER'S (1986) well-known price leadership model, in which a dominant 
group of producers imposes a selling price to a competitive fringe. MAIER (1993), 
for instance, uses this model to evaluate the implications of agricultural policy 
interventions. Both of them assume equal supply elasticity for the leaders and 
the price-taking fringe. WILLNER (1989) questions whether it is reasonable to 
assume that ali firms have identical technologies. He assumes a vertical mar-
ginal cost for fringe firms and horizontal marginal costs for the leading group. 
In this study the leading group is also assumed to have constant marginal costs, 
at least in the region of relevant output. Thus, it can be assumed that the price 
level of inputs is given and firms have constant returns-to-scale technology. 
However, the assumption of constant marginal and average costs also allows for 
U-shaped average costs at the plant level, since firms may avoid production 
diseconomies by operating a number of efficiently scaled plants. This can yield 
a horizontal firm-level average cost curve to the right of the minimum efficient 
scale level of one plant (see e.g. SHEPHERD 1990 for discussion on the determi-
nants of market structure). For instance, LYONS (1980) lists some of the empiri-
cal studies which tend to confirm the horizontal costs assumption. Furthermore, 
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including foreign trade and the small country hypothesis into the analysis leads 
to an identical situatiton as compared to the horizontal marginal cost assump-
tion. A horizontal marginal and average cost curve corresponds to exports to the 
markets where demand is perfectly elastic. A firm chooses an equilibrium in 
which the marginal revenue from domestic markets equals the marginal revenue 
of exports. 
Domestic firms are assumed to be in a position to use oligopolistic strate-
gies. Chapter 4.1 considers a model in which quantitative import restrictions, 
more precisely, volume quotas, are adopted. Foreign firms are supposed to take 
prices as given in their individual export decisions within the permitted quota. It 
is implicitly assumed that domestic firms have higher average costs than foreign 
competitors e.g. due to the higher 13rice of agricultural inputs. Thus, an import 
quota is fully utilized within a range from perfect competition to full collusion 
among domestic producers. The model to estimate welfare losses draws on 
GISSER (1986) and WILLNER (1989,).in this case. The contribution of this study 
is to model competition between domestic firms by using conjectural elasticities 
and to take into account the influence of government' s policy that allows for the 
collection of quota rents earned by importers. If, however, markets are totally 
possessed by domestic firms, welfare losses caused by imperfect competition 
can be estimated from an industry-wide oligopoly model (see DICKSON and 
Yu 1989). Otherwise, when the import quota is increased, the market power of 
domestic firms decreases. 1n the simulation procedure, the market share of 
domestic firms is an observed variable. When the government sets a volume 
quota, the market share of domestic firms eventually depends on the form of 
competition. As shown in Chapter 3.4, another way to restrict imports should be 
to fix the market shares, i.e. to set a ratio quota which is nonequivalent to the 
volume quota assumed here. The effect of a ratio quota is to raise domestic 
prices and increase welfare losses, relative to those that would have prevailed in 
the presence of a volume quota. 
In Chapter 4.2 it is assumed that quantitative import restrictions do not exist. 
However, because the average cost level of domestic firms is higher than 
foreign firms' costs due to the higher prices of agricultural raw materials, 
government imposes an import levy (tariff, tax) or a subsidy per unit of domes-
tic production. If this levy or subsidy equals the difference between domestic 
and foreign costs, the app1ication of the price leadership model to a small 
economy leads to the socially optimal output. However, international and espe-
cially European food markets are quite concentrated, and firms can be assumed 
to have some degree of market power. Therefore, a model that allows for 
imperfect competition among foreign producers is used to derive welfare losses. 
In this context, the Stackelberg model, in which domestic firms are assumed to 
be in the leadership position, is used. The domestic and foreign group choose 
quantities in a strict sequence, and foreign firms are fully informed of domestic 
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firms' previous choices before their export decisions. Competition inside the 
groups is modelled by employing conjectural variation elasticities. This asym-
metric solution is also compared to the situation in which competition between 
groups is modelled as the Cournot game. Later in Chapter 6 these applications 
are used when the effects of the integration into the EU are studied. It is 
assumed that market integration changes the structure of the game firms play. 
Imports from the EU can no longer be treated as a fringe, and domestic firms 
turn to operate on the wide European markets. 
Chapter 4.3 presents two potential extensions of the models. First, the ef-
fects of vertical relationships of the food chain on the possibility of the food 
processing industries to use their market power are discussed. Bargaining power 
between food manufacturing and downstream industries, as well as potential 
vertical contracts are factors that influence the level and spread of welfare 
implications in the food chain. Second, in many Finnish food industries, e.g. in 
dairy and meat sectors, cooperative firms owned by agricultural producers have 
a dominant position. The basic cooperative principles often include open mem-
bership, which means that anybody is allowed to join the cooperative, and the 
cooperative is obligated to buy ali the raw material the members decide to 
produce (VoLK 1993). Following SEXTON (1990), open membership coopera-
tives are pro-competive forces limiting their for-profit rivals' opportunities to 
exercise monopoly or monopsony power. A short section illustrates the poten-
tial effects of open membership cooperatives on the models to evaluate welfare 
losses due to oligopoly. 
4.1. Quantitative import restrictions 
The purpose of this chapter is to derive a method for finding out the potential 
welfare losses due to oligopolistic competition between domestic firms, when 
imports are restricted by means of import quotas. The analysis assumes perfect 
competition between importing firms in domestic markets. The objective is to 
show how the amount of allowed imports, concentration of domestic produc-
tion, and demand elasticity determine domestic firms' market power, i.e. the 
possibilities to set price above marginal costs, and what is the size of welfare 
losses associated with this market power when different oligopoly solutions 
between domestic firms are employed. 
Before outlining the theoretical model, the framework of the model is illus-
trated graphically. The model outlined in Figure 4.1 refers to GISSER's (1986) 
price leadership model. On the left, Q(P) represents the aggregate demand curve 
of the industry which is, for simplicity, assumed to be linear. The quota level 
for imports is given by Qm*. This results in the residual demand curve of 
domestic production to be QD, which is the remainder of the quota-constrained 
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market. In other words, the residual demand curve is the difference between 
total demand and imports. In this case, the residual demand is also linear. 
As a special case, assume that domestic firms maximize joint profits by 
producing monopoly output QDM at the point in which marginal revenue curve 
of monopoly MRm  cuts constant marginal costs of domestic firms denoted by 
cp. This yields a market price of Pm. On the other hand, if domestic firms 
behave competitively, they produce a quantity Qpc with a price Pc. These are 
the two extreme cases. If the leaders (domestic firms) play Cournot or some 
other intermediate form between full collusion and perfect competition, the 
quantity produced by them in the aggregate will he determined at a point 
between QDM and QDC (not shown in Figure 4.1), where a more elastic marginal 
revenue curve intersects with the aggregate marginal costs of the leaders. The 
equilibrium market price will then lie between the monopoly price and competi-
tive price. 
Let us assume that the constant marginal costs of importers are given by cm. 
This also denotes a supply curve for imports or a world market price level, if the 
small country assumption is adopted. If the domestic govemment is passive, i.e. 
it does not collect quota rents by using tariffs or by selling import quota 
licenses, the rationality condition for full utilization of the quota is that a 
domestic market price exceeds cm. Let us assume, further, that cm is lower than 
cp, corresponding to the situation of Finnish food markets before the EU-
membership. Then, the rationality condition always holds, because the competi-
tive output of domestic firms leads to a market price equaling ei) with total 
Price 	 Price 
A B 
QD=Q(P)-Q* m 
D 
Q(P) 
Qm QC 	Quantity  Qiii 	QE, Quantity 
Figure 4.1. A price leadership model and import quota. 
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demand Qc. Another extreme case, joint profit maximization, yields total quan-
tity Qm in Figurse 4.1. 
In the monopoly case, the domestic welfare loss due to the imperfect compe-
tition relative to the competitive level of consumption (Qc), assuming no quota 
rent redistribution, is A+C. The loss of consumer surplus is A+B+C, and 
domestic firms' profits are B. Area A+D is the profit eamed by foreign export- 
ers. 
Despite the degree of competition among domestic firms, importers obtain 
profits (quota rents) when the domestic government does not use other strategic 
trade instruments than import quotas, and importers' costs are lower than do-
mestic producers' costs. From the viewpoint of the society, it is optimal that the 
govemment uses import levies, tariffs, or, possibly, sells import licenses and 
collects the profits earned by foreign firms. More precisely, the purpose of a 
tariff is to recoup the quota rent captured by importers to domestic government. 
This is the rent redistribution argument of protection. Because importers are 
modelled to be price-takers and the quota is exogenous, this model does not 
include the additional rent creation argument studied by MCCORRISTON and 
SHELDON (1994), which is associated with the optimal setting of the import 
quota. 
It can be asked whether the government can retain ali of the quota rent from 
importers. The answer is yes only when the government can set, for instance, 
the import levy after observing the market price level. In this study three 
possible policy scenarios are examined. Assume the unit levy is t. First, it is 
assumed that t equals Pm-Pc in Figure 4.1. Then, the deadweight loss is area C. 
This method is close to common use of variable levies on imports to ensure that 
importers do not enter markets at prices that can undercut the domestic price 
level. In the following analysis this policy forms the basis of the model build-
ing, and other policy analyses are simple extensions of it. 
Note that the optimal import levy equals the difference between Pm and cm, 
resulting in welfare loss C-D. In this case the government retains ali of the 
quota rent. Because the aim of the analysis is to evaluate welfare losses relative 
to the competitive equilibrium of domestic firms (P=cD), the first policy sce-
nario corresponds to the optimal import levy from the society' s viewpoint. The 
second policy scenario assumes that t is cD-cm, i.e. it is the cost difference. 
Then, the domestic deadweight loss is A+C. The third and the most general 
procedure is to set an exogenous t=t* that causes the deadweight loss A+C-
t*Qm* in Figure 4.1. 
In order to generate predictions of deadweight losses due to collusion or any 
other mode of oligopolistic behaviour, the form of total demand has to be 
specified. Because different demand conditions yield different models, two 
specifications, constant-elasticy demand and linear demand curve, are treated as 
special cases. 
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4.1.1. Constant elasticity demand function 
First, consider the constant-elasticity industry demand. Although the elasticity 
along this demand curve is constant, the elasticity of the residual demand curve 
of domestic production is not constant. Let us assume that the aggregate indus-
try demand is given by 
Q= 	 (4.1) 
where ri is the price elasticity and G the demand shifter. Total import is 
restricted to be Qm*. This quantity is, for instance, based on the administrative 
quota that permits to import some fixed amount per year. Importers are price-
takers, i.e. they do not have market power on the domestic markets. The market 
price level is determined by domestic producers. Domestic firms are assumed to 
have constant marginal costs. The profit function for a domestic firm i is 
tr i =G (QD +Qm*Y1 q, 	 (4.2) 
The firms (i=1,2,...,n) choose quantities to maximize profits non-cooperatively, 
but they have conjectures about other firms' responses. The first order condition 
for maximization of Equation 4.2 is 
dP qi 1fiDQD-i  P+ 	+ 
dQD 	qi 
ci = 0, (4.3) 
  
in which QD is the output of firm i's ali domestic rivals and PD=(dqldqi)(qi/qi) 
for ali 	and for ali i, i.e. 	is the elasticity of rivals' output changes with 
respect to firm i's output change. The conjectural derivative can be interpreted 
as firm i's belief about the way firm j's output changes as firm i's output 
changes. Thus, the conjecture term PD can be interpreted as an index of industry 
collusion. If CD is determined as a market share of domestic firms and Iii  is the 
absolute value of the demand elasticity, the first order condition can be rewrit-
ten to be 
1 	 q. P--C D
P[ fi D +—(1-13,)—ci =0. 
1 111 	 QD 
(4.4) 
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After multiplying throughout by (q/QD) and summing each firm's optimal 
quantities across the industry, the aggregate condition for Nash equilibrium is 
C P 
P 	D 	 [fi D ±HD (1-  I3 D 1-C, =0, 
1711 
where HD  is the Herfindahl index of concentration among domestic firms and cD 
denotes the average of ali ci weighted by the market shares of domestic firms. 
The second term determines the ability of domestic firms to set price above 
marginal costs. As it can be seen from Equation 4.5, the market power of 
domestic firms is a function of the value of conjectural variations parameter, the 
degree of concentration, the market share of domestic firms, and the elasticity 
of industry demand. 
Using Equation 4.5 the equilibrium price, P°, and total quantity of oligopoly, 
, are obtained to be 
D po _ 	inic 	; Q°= Gu,°) 
ini—c„[,(3„ +HD (1-13D )] 
The competitive price is et). If the competitive output is noted to be Qc and an 
optimal import levy (scenario 1) is assumed, the deadweight loss can be com-
puted as follows: 
Qc
o DWL = P(Q)dQ — c D (Qc — Q° ). Q (4.7) 
Integrating and substituting the equilibrium values of the competitive and 
oligopoly equilibrium yields the deadweight loss due to the oligopolistic com-
petition to be 
DWL = Gc D1-1711  
17/1 1 	r --CD[PD +HD (1—i3D )1 
	
1. 	1111 
• 
1 
1--CD [fi D +HD (1— $D)] 
. 	tni 
• 
1771 
1771-1 
(4.8) 
1111-1 
—1+ 
(4.5) 
(4.6) 
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The deadweight loss can he computed through this expression using statistics 
on costs and the full structure of the demand function. However, the data 
requirement can he diminished by deriving the equation to the more useful 
form. Equation 4.8 includes the unknown parameters of demand function (G) 
and marginal cost (cD). They can he eliminated, if the deadweight loss is 
divided by total sales in an industry. Total sales are 
 
1771-1 
1 	r 1--C,[fiD +HD (1—i3 D )1 
1 771 
} 
 
P°  Q° = G c (4.9) 
  
and the deadweight loss per total sales is 
DWL 1 
	 01-4 +0 	1711  
P° Q°  1111-1 '  
where: 
o =1-- CD [fi D + HD (1— 13 ,)]. 
1771 
(4.10) 
This formula offers a very straightforward way to measure the possibility of 
firms to set price above marginal costs, and to what extent this reduces welfare. 
The relative deadweight loss (RDWL) is decreasing function with respect to the 
absolute value of the price elasticity of demand. In contrast, the relationship 
between RDWL and the market share of domestic firms, the Herfindahl index, 
as well as the degree of competition is always positive. 
As a reference, it can he noted that DICKSON and Yu (1989) present a method 
in which the competitive price and output are set at $1 per unit and 100 units. 
This means the demand shifter G in Equation 4.1 is set at 100. Substituting for 
oligopoly quantity in Equation 4.7 results in welfare losses based on the as-
sumption that competitive sales are $100. 
Table 4.1. A comparison between different import levies. 
Import levy 	Relative deadweight loss 	 Relative output loss 
t = P°-PC 
t = CD-CM 
t = t* 
RDWL/ = 1/(1111-1)01-1111 +0-1r11/(I111-1) 	 -1 
RDWL2 = RDWLi + (1-CD)(1-0) 
RDWL3 = RDWLI + (1-CD)[1-0-(t/P)] 
where 0 = 1-(1/lril)CD [13D+HD( 1 - f3D)1, 
t/P = the ratio between unit import levy and market price 
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GcD -1111 - G D Qc Qo 0 	= 0 -171' — 1, 
j -1711 
Qo -1111 
G
f c D (4.11) 
Consumer surplus is an exact measure of welfare change only in special 
circumstances. The compensating and the equivalent variation measures include 
consumer surplus as a special case. Therefore, like WILLNER (1989) argues, 
estimation of the influence of diminishing marginal utility on the evaluation of 
the loss includes many tentative elements. Since fewer assumptions are needed 
to approximate output changes, the relative output loss (ROL) due to the 
oligopolistic competition is also offered. In the model the loss of output com-
pared to competitive output can be derived to be 
where 0 follows from Equation 4.10 comprising the structural parameters of the 
model. II can be noted that ROL may receive considerably greater values than 
RDWL, especially when demand is very elastic. When the model is derived in 
the case of optimal import levy (policy 1), only the concentration measure 
(Herfindahl index), the share of domestic production, and the estimate of de-
mand elasticity are needed to predict welfare (output) losses for different kinds 
of competition (measured by 13D). 
As a reference, the corresponding equations are derived for the other policy 
experiments, although the empirical part of the study will concentrate on policy 
1 only. If the second policy experiment (t=cD-cm) is considered, requirements 
for data are similar. The additional loss in domestic welfare is (1-CD)(P°-cD)Q°. 
After dividing by the value of sales and substituting for the equilibrium price, 
the cost parameter can be eliminated. The deadweight loss is always higher 
compared to the first policy Finally, if the import levy is set to be exogenous 
t*, the government can collect an extra share of the quota rent [(1-CD)Q°t], and 
increase domestic welfare. Table 4.1 summarizes these results for all three 
policy scenarios. Note that the models are not solvable under unitary elasticity 
and, furthermore, there exists a condition Cii) 1111/[13D+HD(1-13D)] for the exist-
ence of equilibrium. 
4.1.2. Linear demand function 
So far, demand has been assumed to have constant elasticity with respect to 
price. WILLNER and STÅHL (1992) argue that competitive quantity is then likely 
to be overestimated and the model predicts too large deadweight losses. BRACK 
(1987), for instance, proposes that linearity can give better predictions than 
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constant elasticity in oligopoly models.Therefore, the model is also derived 
assuming linear demand (P=a-b(QD+Qm*)), and the predictions can be pre-
sented as the interval between the values obtained. When demand is linear, the 
profit function for a domestic firm i is: 
=[a—b(QD +QL 	 (4.12) 
where ci stands for the average and marginal costs of the firm i. The first order 
condition for profit maximization can be derived to be 
P—(a—P)C, fi D +.12L-(1— 13 D ) —c, = 0. 	 (4.13) 
QD 
Let cD denote again the average of ali ci weighted by the market shares. Thus, 
under linear demand and constant marginal costs the equilibrium price and 
quantity are 
0 	0C,[fil)  +HD(1-$13)]±CD  p 
1+ C, [fiD + 	(1— fi 
Q
0 
=
a-P 
 0 	 (4.14) 
Employing the optimal policy in which the govemment collects ali quota rents 
earned by importers (t=130-Pc), the value of deadweight loss can be solved 
(Appendix 3) by using Equation 4.7: 
a—c  {1 — 
	
aCD [13,+H D (1— fi p )]+cp 
DWL= 	D (acD )—{ a 
b 	2 	 1+CD[PD +HD (1—fi D )] 
2 
1{ 	aCD [P D +H D (1 — fi D M+C D 
+— a 
2b 	1+CA3, +H D (1— )3 D M 
(4.15) 
Further, let iI  denote the absolute value of the demand elasticity at the equilib-
rium point P°. After dividing by the value of total sales, the unknown elements 
a and cD can be eliminated (Appendix 3) by using the fact that 11-11=P/(a-P) under 
linear demand: 
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(a—c,)2 
{ aC,[13 D +H D ( 1— P D )]±cD a 
1+C D [P D +H,(1-13 D )] 
2(a—cD ) 
aCD [13 D +H D (1-13 D )]+cp 
1+CD [13 D +HD (1-13D )] 
DWL 1 
P°Q° 21771 
+1 
2 
=  1  {{1+CD [fi, +HD (1--fiD )]}2 -2{1+CD[130 +HD (1-13D )]}+1} 21771 
12 
=-
1
CD2[PD ±HD(1-fiD)] 21771 
Analogously, the relative loss of output is 
QC nO 
	= cp [fiD +11D (1- 	)], 
Q° 
(4.16) 
(4.17) 
i.e. it is determined by the structural elements of the model only. The elasticity 
of demand does not affect the value of output loss. The model can predict the 
output loss to be relatively high even when the deadweight loss is quite small, 
especially if demand is very elastic with respect to price. 
Table 4.2 includes the predictions of losses also for other policy scenarios. If 
the import levy is set to be the cost difference (policy two), the linear model 
does not allow as straightforward a way to eliminate parameters as the constant-
elasticity model does. Therefore, we need to approximate deadweight losses by 
using an empirically observable profit/sales ratio (denote ic/S) for domestic 
firms. This is a performance indicator that characterizes the negative equilib-
rium relationship between welfare and price-cost margins. Because the post 
import levy costs for importers are cD, the profit/sales ratio implicates the quota 
Table 4.2. A comparison between different import levies. 
Import levy 	Relative deadweight loss 	 Relative output loss 
t pO_pC 
t = C -C D M 
t = t* 
RDWLi = 1/(21n I)CD2 [I3D+HD( i-f3D)] 2 	CD [I3D+HD ( 1 -13D)1 
RDWL2 = RDWLI + (1-CD)(7c/S) 
RDWL3 = RDWLi + (l-CD)[(u/S)-(t/P)] 
where: t/P = the ratio between unit import levy and market price, 
= the average profit/sales -ratio for domestic firms 
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rent of importers, i.e. Tc/S = (P°-cD)/P°. The relative deadweight loss is always 
higher compared to the first policy. When the import levy is exogenous t* 
(policy three), the ratio between unit levy and market price is needed as in the 
constant-elasticy model. All cases result in the same relative output loss. 
4.2. International oligopoly 
The procedure of setting importers to act as passive price-takers can be justified 
on the basis of their restricted import volumes. Removing quantitative import 
restrictions in the previous price leadership model leads to the socially optimal 
output (DWL=0), if foreign firms do not face cost disadvantages compared to 
domestic firms. However, if quantitative import restrictions do not exist, it can 
be asked why importers would not use their potential market power, especially 
because it is often argued that international food markets are also imperfectly 
competitive (see e.g. MCCORRISTON et al. 1993). From one aspect, a key ele-
ment of international markets for agricultural primary products is the existence 
of state trading organizations and marketing boards. From another aspect, an 
increasing proportion of trade is in processed products, and these products are 
mainly manufactured by private firms operating on markets that can be de-
scribed as imperfectly competitive (McCoRRisToN and SHELDON 1992). 
In this chapter domestic firms are assumed to be in Stackelberg leadership 
position against importing firms. It is assumed that groups choose quantities in 
a strict sequence and that a foreign group is fully informed of a previous choice. 
This asymmetry can be seen as a result of a historical source of differentiation 
between domestic and foreign firms in the domestic markets. A natural source 
of historical differentiation is the sunk cost of capacity e.g. in delivery and 
marketing channels. Thus, asymmetry is regarded as the result of dominance by 
the domestic group. Alternatively, Stackelberg seems a plausible solution to a 
situation where one group believes that its rival expects and is able to win a 
price war (DowRicK 1986). In such a situation, this group expects that its rival 
will act strongly against tighter competition, in which case the group will prefer 
to comply by accepting the weak role. In this case, it is also possible that the 
foreign group takes the leadership position, because it can be seen to have 
greater capacity to endure short-term losses in many cases. 
As in the previous chapter, homogenous products and constant retums to 
scale are assumed. Competition inside the groups can vary from perfect compe-
tition to full collusion. A general conjectural variations model is used in model-
ling this game. Let ci stand for the marginal costs of the ith firm. QD and Qm are 
the total quantities of domestic production and imports, respectively. Industry 
demand is downward sloping and wealdy concave. Profits for a firm i in each 
country are given by 
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im  
71. iD = "Q D Q M ( Q D ))q iD (C  iD 8)q iD 
	 (4.18) 
where t is unit import levy for foreign production, s is a subsidy of home 
production, and subscripts D as well as M represent the domestic group and 
imports (foreign group), respectively. Firms reactions to one another in the 
country in question are treated as conjectural variation elasticities. The domestic 
group is, however, assumed to have a Stackelberg leadership position against 
the foreign group. The leader (domestic group) will be able to infer the follow-
er' s (foreign group' s) choice and take this into account in its decision. Thus, the 
aggregates of the first order conditions for profit maximization of the respective 
profit functions are 
P(Q, + Qm )+ P' Qm [fi m +.11,(1— m )i—cm —t = 0; 
P(QD +Qm (QD ))+P' Q,[13 „ +14(1— fi D )j—c D +s= 0, 
	 (4.19) 
where cm and ei) denote the averages of cim and CiD weighted by the market 
shares inside the respective groups. Further, 13m and PD represent the conjectural 
elasticities. The demand function is not specified to any particular form. 
Let us assume that demand is linear. Combining the optimality conditions 
with the inverse linear demand function (P=a-bQ), an explicit solution for the 
quantities can be obtained to be 
1 
Q130= 	 {(a c D + s)(1 + V m ) — (a — c m t)] ; 
bVm (1+ VD ) 
1 Qmo _ 	 [(a cm —t)(1+VDV,(1+V,) 1 )—(a—c p +s)], 
bVm (1+ VD ) 
(4.20) 
where index o indicates oligopoly equilibrium as before, VD = PD-1-HD(1-E3D), 
and Vm = pm+Hm(1-PM), i.e. VD as well as Vm collect parameters that character-
ize competition and structure among domestic firms and importers respectively. 
Combining domestic production and imports, the total oligopoly output is 
1 Qo _ 	  [(a 	c D + s)(1+17„)+(a— c — t)V 
b(1+ VD )(1+ Vm ) (4.21) 
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Table 4.3. Comparative static effects in the Stackelberg equilibrium. 
Of an increase in 
Effect on 	CD 	Cm 	VD 	Vm 
QD 
Qm 
The equilibrium price can he solved by substituting the total output of Equation 
4.21 to the linear inverse demand function, i.e. po = a_b(r.  
The comparative static effects of changes in costs, market conduct, and 
import levy or domestic support (Table 4.3) differ to some extent from DIXIT' s 
(1988) homogenous products model, in which competition between domestic 
and foreign firms is modelled through conjectural variations. The leadership 
position of the domestic group causes that more aggressive competition be-
tween importers (lower Vm) can result in greater output of the domestic group. 
However, unequal costs and very low VD or Vm can yield solutions where either 
QD or Qm falls to zero. The effect of a decrease in VM  on QD is positive, if 
cD- s < cm+t, and this does not necessarily yield a corner solution where Qm is 
zero. However, dQm/dVD<0 is negative only if cD-s > (aVm+cm+t)/(1+Vm), but 
this condition yields a corner solution where QD falls to zero. Thus, the effect of 
VD on Qm is always positive. 
So far, the levels of the import levy or domestic subsidy have not been 
determined. Let us assume that the government imposes an import levy, tariff, 
import tax, or/and a subsidy such that the C.I.F. cost of imports equals domestic 
costs. This corresponded to the earlier practice in Finland to set an excise on 
imports that corresponds to the price difference of agricultural raw materials 
between Finland and the world markets. In cases where Finnish food manufac-
turers exported their products and bought their agricultural raw materials from 
Finland at prices which were higher than the world market prices, so-called 
internal measures to compensate for the price differences of agricultural raw 
materials were applied. In the policy of the EU, it can be observed that this 
assumption corresponds to the import levy on pigmeat, eggs, and poultry meat 
sectors, where the import levy is fixed at a level which ensures that EU produc-
ers are not adversely affected when importers' production costs are below EU 
costs. 
The determination of total supply, when t=cD-cm (s=0), is presented in Fig-
ure 4.2. Foreign firms' aggregate reaction curves (RFml and RFm2 are drawn for 
illustrative purposes) show their profit-maximizing output given the output of 
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Figure 4.2. Determination of supply in the Stackelberg model. 
domestic firms. By moving first, the domestic group can pick the point on 
foreign group' s reaction curve that yields it the highest profits. If the domestic 
group produces the competitive market-clearing output QD=(a-cD)/b, foreign 
firms always maximize profit by exporting nothing. The reaction curve RFml 
corresponds to perfect competition between foreign firms, i.e. it leads to the 
same situation as a price leadership model with no cost differentials between the 
groups. Total supply is always at the competitive level, and the result is socially 
optimal along the upper line. Another extreme case is shown by the reaction 
curve RFm2, where foreign firms produce monopoly output with regard to the 
production of the domestic group, i.e. the foreign group consists of only one 
firm or firms that collude. For example in the case of two firms (1 domestic and 
1 foreign), the domestic firm produces QD= (a-cD)/2b and foreign firm 
Qm=(a-cD)/4b. Because this is the minimum of domestic output, the relevant 
range of output for both groups is the shaded area. The nonlinear and decreasing 
reaction curve inside the shaded area corresponds to a situation in which the 
degrees of competition and concentration are similar for both groups (VD=Vm). 
Derivation of welfare losses due to oligopolistic competition follows the 
method of the previous chapter. The starting point is Equation 4.7. The domes-
tic deadweight loss compared to the competitive output P=cD can be solved 
(Appendix 3) to be 
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DWL= —1 (a—c p )2 (0-1)2 1-7r m , 
2b 
where 
1+V + 0 	D 17  M  
(1±VD )(1+Vm ) 
(4.22) 
The first term is the loss of consumer surplus minus the sum of domestic and 
foreign firms' profits. Because the target is to evaluate domestic losses, foreign 
firms' profits (the second term) are added in Equation 4.22. Furthermore, it can 
be seen that (1:, characterizes the degree of competition. It varies between 3/4 
(both VD and Vm are 1) and 1 (VD or VM  is 0). The first corresponds to the case 
in which both groups consist of one firm, and the second is a perfectly competi-
tive situation. 
The model to evaluate deadweight losses can be written in a more manage-
able form. Let Irj 1 again denote the absolute value of the demand elasticity at the 
point P°. Observing that ftll = P/(a-P) under linear demand, the deadweight loss 
per total sales in an industry can be written as follows (Appendix 3): 
DWL 	1 [1 	1 11 	(1— 0)VD 
+ + • 0Q0 P 	 2 2,0 0 2 I11l0(1+17,-1-Vm ) 
(4.23) 
The procedure for finding out welfare losses requires only the estimate of 
demand elasticity, the concentration indices, and the measures of the degree of 
competition. In this model the relative loss of output due to oligopolistic 
competition is simply (14)/. The share of imports is 1-CD=VD/(1+VD+Vm). 
Utilizing this result yields an indirect measure of the degree of foreign competi-
tion to be Vm=[CDVD/(1-CD)]-1, and the parameter (1) to be •1) = 1/[CD(1+VD)]. 
Thus, for example, the share of domestic production may obtain `too high' 
values, indicating possible differences in consumer preferences and transporta-
tion cost, or the existence of trade barriers. This indirectly extends the range of 
the model from the assumption of equal costs between domestic and foreign 
groups. 
Despite the possible historical sources of differentiation, i.e. the domestic 
group has a history of market dominance, it is not necessarily the case that the 
foreign group will accept to be a follower in the long run. As extreme cases, 
DOWRICK (1986) shows that in the Stackelberg duopoly each firm will prefer to 
be the leader or, possibly, each firm will prefer that the other be the leader. He 
argues that, if both firms take the preferred role, they cause mutual damage. In 
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this case, firms may accept some nonpreferred role to minimize damages. This 
would mean the Cournot solution or some more profitable solution through 
implicit collusion. In the Cournot competition between the groups, the equilib-
rium total quantity is (Appendix 3) 
_ 	1 c p +s)11,+(a—c,,,,-017,1, 
(1— 0' )V, 
(4.24) 
(4.25) 
b[(1+ V, 
and the relative deadweight 
DWE 	1 
)( I + VM  ) 
loss 
1 	1 	1 	1 
I--+—+ 
1171 20' 2 	(// 	2 	17710' (V, + V?, ) 
where = (VD+Vm)/[(1+VD)(1+Vm)-11, the relative loss of output is (1-')/', 
and the share of imports 1-C = VD/(VD+Vm). In this case, the equilibrium price 
would be higher and output lower compared to the Stackelberg case. This would 
yield a lower consumer surplus and lower domestic profits. Therefore, market 
dominance of domestic firms relative to the imperfectly competitive foreign 
group is beneficial from the domestic society' s viewpoint. 
4.3. Potential extensions of the models 
There are some potential limitations to using models presented in the above 
chapter to compute welfare loss estimates. First, the approach is one of partial 
equilibrium such that the state in the rest of the economy is given. Second, 
product differentiation associated with special brands and spatial differentiation 
is ignored. Studying the structure-performance relationship of the differentiated 
products markets may involve many problems in the determination and limitation 
of real markets. However, product differentiatiation is mainly related to the 
determination of the market structure and, when the structure-performance 
relationship is analyzed, it is possible that product differentiation is implicitly 
accounted for by variation in the elasticity of demand. Furthermore, even if 
products are assumed to he differentiated, it is possible to derive almost similar 
results as compared to the homogenous goods case when price is used as the 
decision variable of firms and the conjectural variations parameters are 
reformulated as e.g. CUBBIN (1983) formulates. Third, the models do not consider 
the effects of vertical relationships, for instance between food manufacturing 
and retailing, in the food chain. Fourth, a special feature of many Finnish food 
industries is the dominant role of cooperative finins, and the cooperative principles 
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may lead to differences in conduct and performance between cooperatives and 
investor-owned firms. The last two aspects are analyzed more in depth in the 
following. 
First, the food chain consists of many vertically related markets. Vertical 
control refers to the relationships between upstream firms, usually the manufac-
turers, and downstream firms, usually the dealers or retailers. The downstream 
firms could equally well be wholesalers or industrial users, but, for simplicity, 
they are called retailers. Food processing and retailing sectors are usually char-
acterized by a high degree of concentration such that they have potential market 
power, and their vertical behaviour may have implications for economic per-
formance. SHELDON (1995) argues that policy analysis in agricultural econom-
ics typically ignores the existence of the food retailing sector and, thus, the 
vertical contractual relations between stages of the food chain, the main excep-
tion being the analysis of vertical integration. He notes that vertical arrange-
ments ought to be accounted for in the analysis of the food sector, although 
theories provide no unambiguous predictions about their welfare effects. 
A common method to model vertical relationships is a linear price mecha-
nism in which a retailer chooses the quantity and pays a manufacturer an 
amount proportional to the quantity bought. Vertical relationships, however, 
often involve vertical restraints such as resale price maintenance, exclusive 
territories, franchise fees, and exclusive dealing (TiRoLE 1990). The manufac-
turer can observe and control some decision variables, e.g. prices, of each 
retailer, but cannot control some other variables, such as the number of retailers, 
their locations, or their selling efforts (REY and TIROLE 1986). This lack of 
control may cause undesirable externalities like double marginalization that 
leads to both lower profits and lower consumer surplus compared to total 
vertical integration. Externalities may be eliminated if manufacturers can use 
the tools of vertical restraints to control retailers' actions. Of course, the situa-
tion is more complex when there exist informational problems or transaction 
costs in the food chain. 
Second, an important characteristic of many agricultural markets in Finland 
is the large market share of cooperatives. The role of cooperatives is based on 
the characteristics of many agricultural markets where a large number of farm-
ers produce the raw products, which are then processed by relatively few firms 
having oligopsony power over farmers. Cooperatives are a way to exercise 
market power, exploitate size economies, and spread risk (SExToN 1995). A 
cooperative maximizes its members' profit from producing and marketing their 
product jointly. For example, if the number of members of the cooperative is 
exogenously given and the quantity of the raw product produced by an indi-
vidual member is also exogenous, the problem of the cooperative is to decide 
how to use other inputs so that the price of the raw product is maximized with 
respect to the given amount of the raw product (VOLK 1993). If other inputs of 
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the processing cooperative are treated to be fixed, the cooperative is only a link 
between its members and final markets. 
A cooperative that can restrict the number of members and purchases may 
use its potential market power effectively over the downstream stages of the 
food chain and consumers. Open membership cooperatives are, however, usu-
ally seen as procompetitive forces in the economic literature and in the imple-
mentation of public policy, despite the criticism that cooperatives may be 
productively less efficient than other organization forms (see SEXTON 1990). 
One explanation follows from the cooperative principles of the Rochdale tradi-
tion, which state that it is not possible to prevent a farmer from becoming a 
member and the cooperative is obliged to accept members' supplies. These 
principles lead to the situation in which it is difficult for the cooperative to 
maximize the joint profits of its members. Even if it would be optimal for the 
cooperative to restrict its domestic market sales, the problem is that the mem-
bers may produce too much because of free riding among themselves, i.e. each 
member takes the price of the raw materia' as given and will produce more than 
the cooperative' s optimal quantity as long as the price of raw materia' exceeds 
the marginal costs of production. The cooperative can maximize joint profits 
only if it is able to control the supply of raw materials. The strategy of the 
cooperative would be to introduce contractural arrangements, such as quantity 
fixing. Thus, it can be assumed that the production control programmes applied 
in agricultural production (their quantitative and economic efficiency is studied 
by KOLA 1991) may have increased the market power of producers' coopera-
tives. 
To conclude, it is possible that the open membership cooperative has to 
operate at its maximum capacity determined by supplies of its members. This 
may eliminate a large share of the cooperative' s market power. However, the 
situation becomes different when the public sector sets a quaranteed minimum 
price system for processed food items. This can be realized, for example, 
through intervention mechanisms or export subsidies. Hence, the processing 
cooperative can allocate its production between domestic sales and exports or 
intervention stores. In this study the strategies and welfare implications of 
cooperatives are not modelled formally. The special features of cooperative 
behaviour should be taken into account when the results of the next chapter are 
interpreted. The predictions of welfare losses are more likely to be overesti-
mated in the case of industries dominated by the cooperative firms when 
compared to the investor-owned industries. 
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5. Welfare losses of oligopolies in the Finnish food 
manufacturing 
The magnitude of the static partial equilibrium welfare losses of oligopolistic 
competition in the Finnish food manufacturing is evaluated in this chapter. The 
analysis is based on the measures derived in the previous sections of this study. 
Consumer surplus is defined as the area between the inverse demand curve and 
the equilibrium price level. The existence of oligopolistic market power reduces 
consumer surplus, but from the society' s viewpoint a portion of this loss is 
compensated by additional profits that producers obtain. The net loss to society, 
the deadweight loss, is evaluated first at the aggregate level of food manufactur-
ing (Chapter 5.2), and then it is estimated for different Finnish food manufactur-
ing industries based on 1993 data (Chapter 5.3). The deadweight losses are 
measured as a ratio to total sales. The estimates can be interpreted as potential 
losses, if the firms utilize their possibilities to use market power. Chapter 5.4 
presents a brief analysis of how these possibilities are observed in the profitabil-
ity of industries. 
As presented earlier in this study, there are many possible models that can he 
applied in evaluating welfare losses due to the oligopolistic market power. The 
magnitude of losses for an industry depends greatly on the model selection. 
Important decision variables are the form of competition (the degree of the 
conjectural variations elasticity) and the existence of possible asymmetry in 
competition. Furthermore, the price elasticity of demand, seller concentration, 
and the share of imports on the domestic markets have a decisive effect on the 
magnitude of deadweight loss. Comparison of the estimates under different model 
assumptions constitutes an important part of this chapter. 
5.1. Data and classification of industries 
In order to calculate estimates of deadweight losses to the society, numerical 
values have to he determined for parameters describing concentration, the share 
of domestic production, and the degree of competition. The estimates begin with 
the national industry sales concentration data collected by the Statistics Finland. 
The concentration statistics are based on the data of the Statistics Finland' s 
Business Register, which covers, in terms of personnel, 99 percent of the non-
agricultural enterprise sector. Enterprises are natural persons (self-employed 
persons), legal persons (e.g. limited companies), public financial institutions, or 
un-incorporated central govemment enterprises. Data sources of the Business 
Register are the files of the National Board of Taxation, which provide information 
on economic activity, and enquiries addressed to ali new registered employers 
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and enterprises subject to tumover tax, to ali multi-establishment enterprises, and 
to single-establishment enterprises with more than 20 employees. Because the 
Statistics Finland publish only 3, 5 and 10 firms' concentration ratios at the two-
digit level of the SIC system, the data at the four-digit level were collected and 
the Herfindahl indices were calculated from the unpublished basic statistics of the 
Business Register. 
Data on the total sales of goods produced by food, beverages, and tobacco 
industries in 1993 were collected from the Industrial Statistics. These statistics 
were supplemented by the Foreign Trade Statistics published by the National 
Board of Customs. Furthermore, some profitability measures are computed for 
industries including a sufficient number of firms to he reported. These accounting 
measures were collected from the Financial Staments Statistics. 
Sensitiveness of the estimates to the different forms of competition is analyzed 
by employing different oligopoly models. Because the deadweight loss estimates 
are also very sensitive to the own-price elasticity of demand, a value of price 
elasticity is allowed to vary within a large range. Some precise point elasticity 
estimates obtained by previous studies are presented for different industries. The 
study mainly referred to is the demand analysis of LAURILA (1994), in which the 
Almost Ideal Demand System was employed to estimate price and expenditure 
elasticites of food products in Finland. The estimates of some other studies which 
employ single equation models are also used (e.g. LAURILA 1985 and MELLIN 
1985). 
For model selection between the restricted imports model and the international 
oligopoly model, food industries are divided into two groups. At the four-digit 
level of the SIC system, the following industries are classified as industries 
characterized by quantitative import restrictions: 
slaughtering 
meat processing 
fruit and vegetable processing 
margarine manufacture and manufacture of other vegetable and 
animal oils and fats 
dairy products manufacture 
grain mill products manufacture 
beet sugar manufacture and sugar refining 
malt manufacture 
starch manufacture 
feed manufacture. 
The industries above produce mainly commodities that were subject to import 
licensing in 1993. Decisions conceming imports were made by the Agricultural 
Marketing Council. Imports have a very minor role within industries with 
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quantitative import restrictions. The most important exception is fruit and vegetable 
processing, in which a considerable amount of processed fruit products were 
imported without licensing. Thus, the maun part of total food imports consisted of 
agricultural raw materials and processed free trade products. The industries 
classified to the free trade group are the following: 
fish processing 
fresh bread and pastries manufacture 
crispbread manufacture 
biscuits manufacture 
chocolate and confectionary manufacture 
coffee roasting 
manufacture of malt beverages and soft drinks 
tobacco products manufacture. 
Although the SIC group 1159 `other food manufacture' includes the produc-
tion of many important free trade commodities, such as baby foods, soups, 
sauces, and flavourings, it is excluded from our investigation because of the low 
rate of substitution of these products in the consumption. It can be assumed that 
the SIC classification does not correspond to the real product markets in this 
case. Furthermore, the lists of industries do not involve the manufacture of spirits 
and fermented alcoholic beverages due to the public sector monopoly ownership 
and strict regulation of prices. 
5.2. Estimates at the aggregate level 
Before the industry-level analysis, the effects of the elasticity of demand and the 
degree of competition are illustrated by considering an industry with the Herfindahl 
index of concentration corresponding to the weighted average of Finnish food 
manufacturing (0.25). According to Industrial Statictics, shipments of own prod-
ucts of food industry amounted to FIM 46.77 billion in 1993, of which FIM 4.47 
billion were exported. Because imports of processed food accounted for FIM 3.80 
billion (ELINTARVIKETEOLLISUUS 1995), the average share of domestic produc-
tion on Finnish markets is roughly estimated to be 91.7 percent. 
Table 5.1 illustrates the properties of the quantitative import restriction model. 
Welfare losses are computed for different combinations of the elasticity of de-
mand (from -0.2 to -2.2), and the degree of competition (from Coumot competi-
tion to full collusion) is first based on the assumption that demand can be 
modelled by using a constant-elasticity demand function. Then, losses for the 
same values of the point elasticities are computed assuming that a linear demand 
function is an accurate approximation of industry demand. 
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As it can be seen from Table 5.1, even the Cournot-Nash oligopoly produces 
deadweight losses amounting to more than 2 percent of the sales, although the 
demand elasticity is relatively high. It is obvious that quite low but still realistic 
values of demand elasticity (see e.g. LAURILA 1994) may yield losses larger than 
4 percent in the Cournot competition. The full collusion results in deadweight 
losses to be dramatically larger. In the intermediate case, the conjectural varia-
tions elasticity parameter PD is set equal to the Herfindahl index. This is based on 
the assumption that coordination among sellers is easier the more concentrated 
the market is. The intermediate case yields losses that are about 3 times larger 
compared to the Cournot equilibrium, if demand is linear. Assuming a constant-
elasticity demand yields considerably higher deadweight losses compared to 
linear demand. In the case of constant-elasticity demand, competitive quantity is 
likely to be overestimated for very low elasticities, resulting in deadweight losses 
that are probably unrealistically high. 
In the model of quantitative import restrictions with the assumption of con-
stant-elasticity demand, the equilibrium is nonexistent if the value of demand 
elasticity is too low compared to the value of the combination of the structural 
parameters of the model, i.e. if 1111 < CD[13d+HD(1-13d)] (see Equation 4.10). This 
corresponds, for example, to the monopoly situation in which the optimal output 
of the monopoly is always at a point of the demand curve at which 1111> 1. 
Furthermore, note that at 1111= 1 there is no equilibrium solution, as can be seen 
from Equation 4.10. 
Assuming that markets are characterized by the model of international oligopoly, 
so that domestic firms have the Stackelberg leadership position against foreign 
Table 5.1. The percentage deadweight loss in the model of quantitative import 
restrictions. 
Constant-elasticity demand 	Linear demand 
Cournot Interm. Collusion 	Cournot Interm. Collusion 
Demand elasticity') The percentage deadweight loss 
0.20 * * * 13.2 40.3 210 
0.60 5.59 22.4 * 4.38 13.4 70.1 
1.00 3.08 2) 11.0 2) 1512) 2.63 8.06 42.1 
1.40 2.17 7.51 67.3 1.88 5.75 30.1 
1.80 1.66 5.66 45.1 1.46 4.48 23.4 
2.20 1.35 4.54 34.2 1.20 3.66 19.1 
The absolute value. 
The elasticity used is 1.01. 
*) The condition 1111 > C,[13d+1-1,(1-13d)] is violated. 
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Table 5.2. The percentage deadweight loss in the model of intemational oligopoly 
(Stackelberg competition between the groups). 
Imports1) 	Cournot competition 	Intermediate competition 	Collusion 
Domestic Cournot Interm. Collusion Cournot Interm. Collusion Cournot Interm. Collusion 
production2) 
Demand 	The percentage deadweight loss 
e1asticity3) 
0.20 1.13 2.64 7.28 2.06 4.88 13.7 9.26 24.2 83.3 
0.60 0.38 0.88 2.43 0.69 1.63 4.58 3.09 8.05 27.8 
1.00 0.22 0.53 1.46 0.41 0.98 2.75 1.85 4.83 16.7 
1.40 0.16 0.38 1.04 0.29 0.70 1.96 1.32 3.45 11.9 
1.80 0.12 0.29 0.81 0.23 0.54 1.53 1.03 2.68 9.26 
2.20 0.10 0.24 0.66 0.18 0.44 1.25 0.84 2.20 7.58 
Domestic 
share4) 80.9 70.8 51.5 81.7 71.8 52.8 88.9 82.1 66.7 
Competition between importing firms. 
Competition between domestic firms. 
The absolute value. 
The percentage share of domestic production in domestic consumption predicted by the 
model. 
competitors, yields the percentage deadweight losses presented in Table 5.2. In 
this case the a.verage concentration of importing firms is approximated using the 
concentration of imports statistics based on the goods classification by use of 
goods, which is published by the National Board of Customs. Within imports of 
food, beverages, and tobacco products for consumption, the share of five largest 
importers (CR5) accounted for 53.1 percent in 1993 (CR/0 = 63.8%, CR20 = 
733%, 	CR2o0 = 98.1%), and the approximated Herfindahl index of concen- 
tration is 0.06. This measure is very rough, but it is used in this context to 
illustrate the features of the model. A numerical example considers three alterna-
tive forms of oligopolistic competition within the groups resulting in nine differ-
ent combinations of the Stackelberg game. 
The percentage losses of Cournot competition between domestic and foreign 
groups are shown in Table 5.3. The Stackelberg model yields the percentage 
deadweight loss that is always lower compared to Cournot model. For example, 
assuming that competition within the groups follows the Cournot model results in 
about 18 times smaller relative deadweight losses than the inter-group Stackelberg 
competition. The difference becomes lower, if there exists some degree of collu-
sive behaviour within domestic producers. In the extreme case, considering a 
situation in which both groups are characterized by full collusion yields about 
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Table 5.3. The percentage deadweight loss in the model of international oligopoly 
(Cournot competition between the groups). 
Imports1) 	Cournot competition 	Intermediate competition 	Collusion 
Domestic Cournot Interm. Collusion Cournot Interm. Collusion Cournot Interm. Collusion 
production2) 
Demand 	The percentage deadweight loss 
elasticity3) 
0.20 20.0 23.9 27.5 28.7 38.4 49.4 30.0 69.5 187 
0.60 6.70 7.95 9.17 9.56 12.8 16.5 10.0 23.2 62.5 
1.00 4.02 4.78 5.50 5.73 7.68 9.88 6.00 13.9 37.5 
1.40 2.87 3.41 3.93 4.10 5.49 7.06 4.29 9.92 26.8 
1.80 2.23 2.66 3.06 3.19 4.27 5.49 3.33 7.71 20.8 
2.20 1.83 2.17 2.50 2.61 3.49 4.49 2.73 6.32 17.1 
Domestic 
share4) 19.4 12.1 5.7 31.8 21.0 10.4 80.0 69.6 50.0 
Competition between importing firms. 
Competition between domestic firms. 
The absolute value. 
The percentage share of domestic production in domestic consumption predicted by the 
model. 
two times higher percentage deadweight loss in the Cournot model. This Cournot 
case leads to a higher equilibrium price and lower output, and results in a lower 
consumer surplus and lower domestic profits. Correspondingly, as shown in the 
last rows of Tables 5.2 and 5.3, the models yield the share of imports to be higher 
in the Cournot case. 
According to the industrial and foreign trade statistics, the share of domestic 
production can be computed to be about 82.5 percent on the average within the 
free trade sector of food industry. Thus, the predicted market shares of the 
previous models based on very aggregate data support the assumption that 
domestic firms are in the Stackelberg leadership position against importing firms. 
In another case, the existence of non-tariff or non-quota trade barriers, imperfect 
substitution between domestic and foreign products in consumption, higher pro-
duction costs of foreign firms, or tighter competition (than Cournot) between 
domestic firms may lead to these `too low' shares of imports. 
However, the model of international oligopoly includes a possibility for indirect 
measurement of the degree of foreign competition. This implication is utilized in 
the estimates presented in Table 5.4, in which the average Herfindahl index 
(0.25) and the share of domestic production (82.5 %) are used in order to 
estimate the deadweight loss. This yields the percentage deadweight loss estimates 
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Table 5.4. The percentage deadweight loss in the model of international oligopoly 
and the observed share of domestic production. 
Moder) 	 Stackelberg competition 	Cournot competition 
Domestic production Cournot Interm. Collusion 	Cournot Interm. Collusion 
Demand e1asticity2) The percentage deadweight loss 
0.20 3.01 24.9 163 28.7 64.1 242 
0.60 1.00 8.32 54.2 9.56 21.4 80.8 
1.00 0.60 4.99 32.5 5.73 12.8 48.5 
1.40 0.43 3.56 23.2 4.10 9.16 34.6 
1.80 0.33 2.77 18.1 3.19 7.13 26.9 
2.20 0.27 2.27 14.8 2.61 5.83 22.0 
Competition between the groups. 
The absolute value. 
that usually exceed the levels of Tables 5.2 and 5.3. Assuming that domestic 
firms act independently, i.e. they follow the Cournot mode of behaviour, the 
deadweight loss is 3.01 percent of the value of total sales for III I = 0.2, and only 
0.27 percent for ftI = 2.2, if the domestic firms have the Stackelberg leadership 
position. The inter-group Cournot competition yields the estimates of 28.7 and 
2.61 percent, respectively. Because of the unavailabily of the relevant industry 
specific concentration data on imports, this indirect approach to measure the 
degree of foreign competition within free trade industries is used in the following 
industry-level analysis. 
5.3. Estimates for different industries 
The industry-level welfare losses are estimated on the basis of the level of 
concentration and the shares of domestic production estimated on the basis of 
1993 data. Sensitivity analyses are made with respect to the elasticities of de-
mand and the conjectural variations parameters. In the majority of cases, the 
Cournot model and the partially collusive mode of competition, i.e. the intermedi-
ate case in which the conjectural variation elasticity parameter equals the Herfindahl 
index of concentration, are assumed to be the limits of the degree of oligopoly. 
The assumption that full collusion is a reasonable approximation of the industry 
behaviour would lead to remarkably higherlosses. For the magnitude of losses in 
this case, see Tables 5.1-5.4 above. The assumption of linear demand curve will 
he used for ali industries. 
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5.3.1. Industries with quantitative import restrictions 
The slaughtering and meat processing industries are considered first. They pro-
duce articles that were subject to very tight quantitative import restrictions 
resulting in only marginal volumes of imports in 1993. According to the statistics 
on imports in terms of the HS Nomenclature, imports of the headings 0201-0209 
(fresh, chilled or frozen meat) accounted for about FIM 39 million (incl. import 
levies) and the headings 0210, 1601, and 1602 (dried, salted or smoked meat, 
sausages and other meat products) only FLM 3.3 million of which FIM 1.3 
million are different import taxes. Because the value of shipments of own prod-
ucts minus exports was FIM 8,239 million in the first group and 4,413 in the 
second group, the shares of domestic production are approximated to be 99.5 in 
slaugtering and 99.9 percent in meat processing, respectively. Thus, the model in 
practice follows industry-wide oligopoly pricing. 
The deadweight loss estimates for slaughtering (Figure 5.1) for different com-
binations of the demand elasticity and the degree of oligopoly are very tentative 
because of the large share of industrial demand and many vertical contracts 
between slaughtering and meat processing. Only a third of domestic shipments is 
directed to consumption and two thirds to further processing. Furthermore, the 
range of the estimated price elasticity of demand is very wide. LAURILA (1994) 
estimated a small own-price elasticity (-0.11) in the demand of carcass meat, 
while an estimate of -1.27 was obtained by LAURILA (1985). The former leads to 
the percentage deadweight loss amounting to 24 percent and the latter only to two 
percent of the sales in the case of Cournot oligopoly. The assumption that 
domestic competition follows intermediate collusion yields more than three times 
larger relative losses. 
In the case of meat processing, more than two thirds of the production consist 
of consumer goods and, therefore, the demand elasticities based on consumer 
behaviour are more usable indicators of producers' ability to use their potential 
market power than in slaughtering. Due to the less concentrated market structure, 
the models result in considerably lower deadweight losses compared to slaughter- 
ing (Figure 5.2). However, since demand for meat products has been found to be 
insensitive to price changes, the elasticity estimates yield the relative deadweight 
losses that are from 2 to 10 percent in the Cournot model. 
In fruits and vegetables, the estimated own-price elasticities vary from -0.32 
(LAURILA 1994) to -0.61 (for fruits by LAURILA 1985). VIRå\1 (1983) has esti- 
mated an elasticity of the same magnitude as LAURILA (1994). The data sets of 
these studies include mainly unprocessed fruits and vegetables. However, let us 
assume that these estimates apply to demand responses of processed commodi-
ties, too. The value of total sales, i.e. what Finnish firms together with importing 
firms sold on the domestic markets, was FIM 2,174 million in 1993. The share of 
domestic production was 67 percent. Imports classified into fruit and vegetable 
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processing consist of the HS headings 0710-0713 (frozen, dried, or in other 
forms conserved vegetables), 0811-0814 (conserved fruits), 1105 (flours and 
flakes of potatoes), and 2001-2009 (prepared fruit and vegetable products). In 
fruit and vegetable processing, the quite low level of concentration (H=0.128) 
yields the deadweight loss profiles for different elasticities of demand presented 
in Figure 5.3. The Cournot model suggests that the deadweight loss is less than 
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Figure 5.1. Deadweight loss profiles for slaughtering. 
a) LAURILA (1994), b) LATVALA and LAURILA (1995), c) LAURILA (1985). 
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Figure 5.2. Deadweight loss profiles for meat processing. 
a) LAURILA (1994), b) ROUHIAINEN (1979). 
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Figure 5.3. Deadweight loss profiles for fruit and vegetable processing. 
a) LAURILA (1994), b) LAURILA (1985). 
one percent of the sales, if the absolute value of the demand elasticity exceeds the 
value 0.4. At the same limit, the intermediate collusion model predicts the 
deadweight loss close to 3.2 percent, and losses are larger than one percent until 
the absolute value of the demand elasticity attains the value 1.3. Generally, the 
fruit and vegetable processing industry can be classified into the group with the 
smallest welfare losses within the Finnish food processing industries. 
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Figure 5.4. Deadweight loss profiles for margarine and other oils and fats 
manufacture. 
a) LAURILA (1994). 
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The calculations of margarine manufacture and manufacture of other vegeta-
ble and animal oils and fats show considerably higher deadweight losses for 
different elasticity measures than fruit and vegetable processing (Figure 5.4). 
LAURILA (1994) obtained the own-price elasticity of -0.52 for margarine, which 
results in the relative deadweight loss to he 8 percent and 22 percent in the 
Cournot model and in the intermediate case, respectively. The share of domestic 
producers on the domestic market is estimated to he 86 percent (according to the 
HS heading 15). The market classification of this group of industries includes in 
fact two four-digit SIC groups (1115 and 1116) and, thus, it may underestimate 
the real degree of concentration of real product markets. Despite this, the manu-
facture of margarine, oils, and fats is characterized by high concentration (H=0.33). 
On the one hand, considering only margarine manufacturing would yield a stand-
ard duopoly situation (Van den Bergh Foods and Raisio), but, on the other hand, 
the production of some very close substitutes, such as butter, is included in the 
dairy products manufacture. Therefore, the value of 0.33 for the Herfindahl 
index of concentration is seen as an acceptable approximation of concentration in 
real markets. 
The procedure of deadweight loss estimates for dairy products manufacture is 
problematic for many reasons. First, products liike fresh milk, cheese, and butter 
are not very close substitutes with each other. Second, the cooperatives owned by 
farmers did not in practice compete with each other in 1993, but markets were 
vertically and horisontally coordinated by Valio. According to a market survey of 
FAKTA (1995), the market shares of Valio group were, for example, 94 percent 
in fresh milk, 77 percent in cheese, 64 percent in yoghurt, and 53 percent in ice-
cream. Third, the theory of cooperative firms shows that open membership 
cooperatives are not able to use their potential market power effectively despite 
the high market shares. Especially in fresh milk and cheese production, consider-
able welfare improvements can he achieved if the principles of open membership 
cooperatives are realized, i.e. the oligopsony power of manufactures over the 
producers of raw materials disappears. 
The deadweight loss estimates for dairy products manufacture based on the 
SIC classification are presented in Figure 5.5. The share of domestic production 
was about 98 percent in 1993. Imports (the HS heading 04) included mainly 
cheeses. The CIF value of imports was FIM 97 million, the import levies ac-
counted for FIM 14 million, and the excises of processed food slightly more than 
FIM 1 million. Due to large variations of the estimated price elasticities for 
different dairy products, the range of deadweight loss estimates remains very 
large for the both type of competition. 
In the manufacture of grain mill products, sugar, malt, and starch, products 
are mainly directed to industrial use. The existence and the forms of vertical 
contracts will largely determine the magnitude of welfare losses associated with 
concentration and market power. Therefore, more detailed analysis of these 
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industries is omitted, but it can be mentioned that they are characterized by 
higher than average concentration and thus they are candidates for high potential 
welfare losses. The deadweight loss profiles of these industries would show a 
higher level of losses than feed manufacture in Figure 5.6. In feed manufacture 
the CIF value of imports (HS 2309) accounted for FIM 226 million, import 
levies were FIM 33 million, and tariffs FIM 16 million in 1993. The share of 
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Figure 5.5. Deadweight loss profiles for dairy products manufacture. 
al-a3) LAURILA (1994) for cheese, fresh milk, and butter, bl-b2) LATVALA and 
LAURILA (1995) for fresh milk and sour milk. 
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Figure 5.6. The deadweight loss profiles for feed manufacture. 
a) RYHÄNEN (1994). 
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domestic production is estimated to be 90.8 percent on the domestic market. 
Feeds are mainly consumed as inputs of livestock farms, and the demand is based 
on the optimizing behaviour of farm enterprises. The estimates show, for exam-
ple, that the own price elasticity of purchased feed for dairy farms (-0.54) 
obtained by RYHÄNEN (1994) yields the relative deadweight loss close to three 
percent of the sales in the Cournot model and about eight percent in the interme-
diate case of competition. 
5.3.2. Free trade industries 
The estimation of welfare losses due to oligopolies is based on the indirect 
method in which the observed market shares are used as indicators of the degree 
of foreign competition. Usually, large market shares of domestic production 
support the use of the Stackelberg model of competition between the domestic 
and foreign group. However, fish processing industry is an exception, in which 
the deadweight loss estimates are based on the inter-group Cournot model. The 
share of domestic production on the domestic markets was only 34 percent in 
1993. This has been obtained by employing the production, exports, and imports 
values of the HS headings 0303-0305 (frozen, salted, dried, or smoked fish, fish 
fillets), 1604 (prepared or preserved fish), and 1605 (prepared or preserved 
crustaceans and molluscs). Although the Cournot model tends to yield higher 
deadweight losses compared to the Stackelberg model, the curves of Figure 5.7 
show a relatively low level of welfare losses due to the fragmented market 
structure of domestic production. For example, using the own-price elasticity 
estimate of -0.69 for fish obtained by LAURILA (1994) accounts for 1.6 percent 
of the loss, if competition between domestic firms follows the Cournot model, 
and 3.1 percent of the loss, if some degree of collusion is assumed (PD=HD in the 
intermediate case). The parameter VM  derived in Chapter 4.2 measures the de-
gree of competition among importers. Using the observed market shares, the 
value of VM  is approximated to he 0.02 in the Cournot and 0.05 in the intermedi-
ate case. Thus, it seems that these international markets are close to the competi-
tive ideal. 
According to the four-digit SIC system, the manufacture of bakery products is 
divided into fresh bread and pastries, crispbread, biscuits, and macaroni (which 
is omitted in this analysis) manufacture. Because firms classified into different 
industries may produce close substitutes and firms are classified as belonging to 
a particular industry on the basis of their main activity, the four-digit level data is 
aggregated to include ali bakery products manufacture in this study. The Herfindahl 
indices of concentration are weighted by the value of shipments. This yields the 
value of index to he 0.13 for bakery products manufacture. The domestic share 
of production is 95 percent. This is computed on the basis of the HS heading 
1905 (breads, cakes, biscuits, etc.). The value of domestic production minus 
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ntermediate collusion 2.172/1 Til 
ot 1.116/1 ri 1 
exports was FIM 3,990 million, the CIF value of imports was FIM 167 million, 
and collected excises amounted to FIM 53 million. 
The estimated deadweight loss profiles for bakery products are presented in 
Figure 5.8. If domestic competition follows the Cournot behaviour, the price 
elasticity of bread and cake obtained in the study of VIRtI\T (1985) results in the 
relative deadweight loss of 3.9 percent, while the elasticity estimated by LAURILA 
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Figure 5.7. Deadweight loss profiles for fish processing. 
a) MELLIN (1985), b) LAURILA (1994), c) LAURILA (1985). 
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Figure 5.8. Deadweight loss profiles for bakery products industries. 
a) VIREN (1983), b) LAURILA (1994). 
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(1994) yields the deadweight loss that is only one percent of the total sales. In the 
intermediate case, the model predicts losses that are 15.7 and 4.1 percent, respec- 
tively. However, the observed share of domestic production is so high that even 
the Cournot competition between domestic firms leads to values of parameter Vm 
that are considerable higher than one. Thus, if one accepts that domestic and 
imported bakery products are perfect substitutes and there exist no trade barriers, 
domestic competition has to be tighter than the Cournot model supposes. How-
ever, it can also he claimed that the demand for freshness of products limits 
foreign trade and, thus, makes Cournot or more collusive behaviour of domestic 
firms possible. Furthermore, it should he noted that the models are unable to 
evaluate the market power due to the locally or regionally more concentrated 
markets. This kind of situations are likely to exist in the markets of fresh 
products. 
Chocolate and confectionary processing industry is clearly more concentrated 
than bakery products manufacture. The value of the Herfindahl index obtained is 
0.28. Domestic production faces, however, a higher level of foreign competition. 
The value of domestic production of sugar confectionaries and chocolate prod-
ucts (HS 1704 and 1806) was FIM 1,921 million in 1993. Exports were FIM 608 
million and imports FIM 341 million, i.e. the share of domestic production on the 
domestic markets was about 79 percent. For this reason, the Cournot competition 
among domestic firms leads to relatively low deadweight losses, but the change in 
the game towards the intermediate collusion results in a sharp rise in the losses 
due to the high level of concentration (Figure 5.9). It is obvious that realistic 
values of demand elasticity yield deadweight losses amounting to less than one 
percent of the sales in the Cournot oligopoly. However, the upper limit of 
Figure 5.9 shows relative losses that exceed 5 percent, even if the elasticity of 
demand is more than unitary elastic. If domestic competition follows the Cournot 
model, behaviour within the group of importers is very competitive (Vm=0.07). If 
we accept some degree of collusive behaviour among domestic producers (inter-
mediate case), the value of parameter Vm obtained is 0.845, which is very close 
to the situation of one following firm. Although imports of chocolate and confec-
tionary products by countries of origin are relatively concentrated, e.g. Sweden 
accounted for 33 percent in 1993, the intermediate case is likely to underestimate 
the pressure of foreign competition on the Finnish markets and, therefore, overes-
timates the level of percentage deadweight losses. 
The rest of the free trade industries, i.e. coffee roasting, manufacture of malt 
beverages and soft drinks, as well as tobacco products manufacture, are charac-
terized by very high degree of market concentration and low import competition 
on the domestic markets. Thus, setting the conjectural elasticity parameter to he 
equal to the Herfindahl index of concentration would yield unrealistically high 
welfare losses, taking account that import competition is at least potentially 
possible. Furthermore, these industries are more than the average export oriented, 
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and exports may have a negative influence on the degree of implicit collusion on 
the domestic markets. The reason is that exporting firms have to work with a 
relatively large excess capacity in order to be able to satisfy demand throughout 
the business cycles. Large excess capacity is an obstacle to output restricting 
decisions on the home markets. When foreign demand is low, it will be tempting 
for the firms to increase domestic supply. 
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Figure 5.9. Deadweight loss profiles for chocolate and confectionaiy manufac- 
ture. 
a) LAURILA (1994), b) LAURILA (1985). 
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Figure 5.10. Deadweight loss profile for coffee roasting industry. 
a) LAURILA (1994), b) VIldINI (1983). 
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Therefore, the profile of the deadweight loss estimates is derived only on the 
basis of the Cournot model of competition among domestic producers. Even in 
this case, the parameter Vm  predicted to imports receives high values that indi-
cate the existence of considerable trade barriers, such as transportation costs. It 
is also possible that domestic and foreign products are imperfect substitutes, 
which would explain the low shares of imports on the domestic markets. Further- 
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Figure 5.11. Deadweight loss profile for manufacture of malt beverages and 
soft drinks. 
a) and b) LAURILA (1994) for alcoholic drinks and soft drinks, respectively. 
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Figure 5.12. Deadweight loss profile for tobacco products manufacture. 
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more, although the Cournot model does not allow collusive behaviour between 
the firms, actual behaviour of firms can be more competitive than Cournot. 
In coffee roasting, the Herfindahl index of concentration was 0.37 and the 
share of domestic production of roasted coffee as well as extracts, essences, and 
concentrates of coffee (HS 090121 and 21011020) amounted to 97 percent in 
1993. The deadweight loss profile of the Cournot model of competition in Figure 
5.10 shows welfare losses that account for more than 10 percent of the total sales 
for obtained price elasticities of demand. 
The manufacture of malt beverages and soft drinks is to a gr_eat extent 
dominated by the two largest companies. According to the estimates of FAKTA 
(1995), Hartwall had the market share of 58 percent and Sinebrychoff 32 percent 
in the production of beer (class 3) in 1993. In soft drinks they both accounted for 
the market shares of 45 percent. Using the classification of the SIC system and 
the data of the Statistics Finland' s Business Register, the Herfindahl index of 
concentration was computed to be 0.40. Imports of soft drinks amounted to about 
FIM 32 million and those of beer about FIM 34 million The domestic share of 
the sales was as large as 97 percent in 1993. Thus, employing the Cournot model 
of competition between domestic producers yields relatively high welfare losses 
for different levels of demand elasticity (Figure 5.11). For example, the own-
price demand elasticity of -0.40 for alcoholic drinks obtained by LAURILA (1994) 
results in the relative deadweight loss to be 18.4 percent of the total sales. 
Laurila' s elasticity estimate of -1.28 for soft drinks yields a deadweigth loss of 
5.8 percent in the Cournot model. 
In tobacco products manufacture, domestic production consisted of three 
manufacturers and thus the Herfindahl index of concentration was 0.49 in 1993. 
The share of domestic producers on the domestic market was 91 percent. The 
most popular products are international brands produced in Finland under licences 
bought from multinational companies. This kind of international contracts are 
likely to restrict the degree of international competition and may lead to the 
relevance of the Cournot assumption in Figure 5.12. In this case, domestic 
welfare losses would be even higher, because a portion of oligopoly profits is 
directed to the multinational companies. However, due to the decrease of 
consumption (overcapacity) and the strict public price regulation by means of 
taxation, the ability of producers to regulate prices with respect to consumer 
demand can be assumed to be quite limited. Therefore, the deadweight loss 
profile of Figure 5.12 should be taken with reservations. Comparing tobacco 
products manufacture to food and beverages industries is difficult due to the 
differences in the market environment. 
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5.4. Evaluating the range of welfare loss estimates 
The range of welfare loss estimates for different industries was obtained to be 
very large. It can be seen from the previous results that welfare losses decrease as 
the value of demand elasticity increases, ceteris paribus. Welfare losses also 
decrease when the value of conjectural variations elasticity becomes smaller, i.e. 
which of the values of the estimated losses are reflections of reality depends on 
which model of behaviour is relevant in the real markets. The following analysis 
aims at specifying the combinations of the demand elasticity and the conjectural 
variations elasticity on the basis of the profitability statistics of Finnish food 
processing industries. 
The first step of the analysis is to solve the ratio of price minus marginal cost 
to price, i.e. the Lerner index, for different models of competition. In the model of 
quantitative import restrictions with the linear demand curve, using the equilib-
rium price of Equation 4.14 yields the industry-average Lerner index as follows: 
L_ CD [/3 D ±HD(1  fiD)] .  
1771 
In the international oligopoly model, the equilibrium price can be obtained by 
inserting the quantity of Equation 4.21 to the linear demand function and assum-
ing that the average costs after tariffs and subsidies are equal between domestic 
and foreign producers. Using the result that the degree of competition within 
importing firms, VM,  can be evaluated through the observed market shares results 
in the industry Lerner index: 
L_ CD[1+fiD +HD (1—fi D )]-1.  
1171 (5.2) 
The Lerner index is a theoretical measure of industry profitability. If returns 
to scale are constant, the Lerner index is the same as the price-average cost 
margin. The problem is how to find a real world' s counterpart to the Lerner 
index. The studies of structure-performance relationships offer a large spectrum 
of different methods used as a measure of profitability (see e.g. MARTIN 1988 
and 1993). Accounting data contains many candidates which can be used as 
indicators of the Lerner index, even if the accounting concepts of, for example, 
income, expense, assets, and liabilities do not necessarily match the correspond-
ing economic concepts. An example of criticism against accounting data is 
suggested by FISHER and McGOwAN (1983). They argue that the only measure 
of profitability which is suitable for economic analysis is the internal rate of 
return of an investment project, i.e. the discount rate that equates the present 
(5.1) 
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value of the expected net revenue stream to the initial outlay. Despite the criti-
cism, tests of the determinants of market power in the empirical studies are 
usually based on accounting data. It can he assumed that the lack of detailed 
information makes it impossible to use the internal rate of return as a measure of 
performance. In addition to the profitability measures of accounting, data on 
financial markets, such as the ratio of equity to assets or the ratio of the market 
value of a firm to the replacement value of its assets (Tobin's q ratio), are used as 
a source of measures of risk (e.g. NGUYEN and BERNIER 1988). Not only market 
structure and firm conduct, but also different risk positions lead to the differences 
in the market performance. 
To analyze some combinations of the point elasticity of demand ft I and the 
parameter of conjectural variations elasticity I3D, the value of ftil is approximated 
by using a procedure that links 1111 and I3D. Assuming, for example, the Cournot 
model of competition, the approximated point elasticity of demand (Ii I*) can he 
solved by rearranging Equations 5.1 and 5.2 so that they solve I* for different 
values of approximated Lerner index (L*). The procedure along the same Iines is 
presented by DICKSON and Yu (1989), but the method of determination of the 
Lerner index is different. To approximate the price-cost margin for seven indus-
tries of which detailed data of unpublished Financial Statements Statistics are 
available, three alternative performance indicators will he used: 
return on investment (L1*) 
ratio of operating profit after depreciation to turnover (L2*) 
ratio of total value added minus wages minus return on capital to 
total vaille of sales (L3*). 
These profitability measures are computed for seven industries including a 
sufficient number of firms to be reported by employing the statistics from 1993 
as well as the average of the time period from 1990 to 1993. The first two are 
standard accounting measures from the financial statements statistics, but in the 
third the data for value added, wages, and value of sales are from industrial 
statistics. The ratio of the capital stock to the value of sales refers to the ratio of 
total fixed assets to turnover obtained from the financial statements statistics. 
This is done because the net capital stock of the National Accounts is computed 
only at the two digit level of the SIC. The rate of return on capital is calculated as 
the opportunity cost by using the percentage yield on government bonds calcu-
lated by the Bank of Finland. 
These three methods yield the estimated demand elasticities and deadweight 
losses for the Cournot model presented in Table 5.5. Note that the demand 
elasticities and the conjectural variations elasticities are positively related, i.e. 
some degree of collusive behaviour would imply higher values of the demand 
elasticity compared to the Cournot model, for given values of L*. 
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The received elasticities of demand tend to get very high values in Table 5.5 
compared to the elasticity estimates presented in Chapter 5.3 that are based on 
consumer behaviour. These indirect measures of demand elasticity would result 
in relative deadweight losses that are usually under one percent of sales. 
Supposing that the return on investment measures the degree of profitability 
and gives a real world counterpart to the theoretical price-cost margins within an 
Table 5.5. Estimated deadweight losses based on industry profitability in the 
Cournot competition for selected industries. 
1993 
L* 
(%) 
I* DWL 
(%) 
1990-1993 
on the average 
L* 	1111* 
(%) 
DWL 
(%) 
L1* = Return on investment 
Slaughtering 8.01 2.88 0.92 5.78 3.99 0.66 
Meat processing 6.42 2.10 0.43 7.24 1.86 0.49 
Fruit and vegetable processing' ) 8.34 1.02 0.36 
Dairy products manufacture 8.95 2.58 1.04 8.85 2.61 1.02 
Bakery products manufacture 2.20 3.24 0.19 5.91 1.21 0.52 
Malt beverages and soft drinks 9.71 3.70 1.99 7.89 4.55 1.62 
Feed manufacture 11.19 1.48 0.92 7.84 2.11 0.65 
L2* = Ratio of operating profit after depreciation to turnover 
Slaughtering 	 2.23 	10.35 	0.26 1.26 18.32 0.14 
Meat processing 6.35 2.12 0.43 2.50 5.39 0.17 
Fruit and vegetable processing' ) 7.03 1.21 0.30 
Dairy products manufacture 2.41 9.60 0.28 2.04 11.34 0.24 
Bakery products manufacture 0.43 16.57 0.04 1.78 4.00 0.16 
Malt beverages and soft drinks 5.67 6.34 1.16 4.18 8.60 0.86 
Feed manufacture 4.95 3.34 0.41 4.28 3.86 0.35 
L3*= Ratio of total value added minus wages minus retum on capital to total value 
of sales 
Slaughtering 5.31 4.44 0.59 5.98 3.86 0.68 
Meat processing 4.75 2.84 0.32 3.83 3.52 0.26 
Fruit and vegetable processing2) 11.79 0.72 0.51 12.52 0.68 0.54 
Dairy products manufacture 4.67 4.96 0.54 2.87 8.06 0.33 
Bakery products manufacture 13.56 0.53 1.18 12.12 0.59 1.06 
Malt beverages and soft drinks 34.59 1.04 7.09 29.57 1.21 6.09 
Feed manufacture 9.10 1.82 0.75 1.07 15.44 0.09 
Only in 1990. 
The ratio of capital to value of sales is based on 1990 data. 
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industry would mean that the deadweight losses due to the Cournot competition 
are between 0.19 percent in bakery products manufacture and 1.99 percent of 
total sales in malt beverages and soft drinks, using the 1993 data. Employing the 
averages between 1990 and 1993 yields deadweight losses from 0.36 percent in 
fruit and vegetable processing to 1.62 percent in malt beverages and soft drinks. 
Comparisons of the estimates of Table 5.5 show, however, that alternative 
performance measures result in very different magnitudes of welfare losses. 
Employing the ratio of operating profit after depreciation to turnover as a meas-
ure of industry profitability usually yields the highest values of the demand 
elasticity and, thus, the lowest relative deadweight losses. Losses higher than one 
percent are obtained only in the case of malt beverages and soft drinks in 1993. 
The third ratio measure of profitability differs from the method presented by 
DICKSON and Yu (1989) only in the determination of the opportunity cost of 
capital. In this case, the deadweight losses are estimated to be between 0.32 
percent in meat processing and 7.09 percent in the production of malt beverages 
and soft drinks when the data from 1993 is employed. Using the averages of 
1990-1993 results in relative deadweight losses that vary from 0.09 percent in 
feed manufacture to 6.09 percent in malt beverages and soft drinks. 
It can be observed that the levels of deadweight losses based on industry 
profitability differ considerably from those estimated in Chapter 5.3 by using the 
previously obtained point elasticities of demand. Assuming that the estimates of 
the price elasticity of demand obtained from consumer behaviour are relevant 
measures of price elasticity also at the level of food manufacturing results in 
relative deadweight losses that are usually considerably higher compared to the 
results of Table 5.5. Because the profitability indicators correspond to very 
elastic demand in most the cases, it can be argued that the food manufacturers are 
not able to utilize consumers' inelastic demand for food items. It seems possible 
that manufacturers face a higher demand elasticity than food retailers and the 
vertical relationships may lead to a situation in which profitability at the manu-
facturing stage remains low. Bargaining power of the retailers and the further 
processing of intermediate goods in the food chain limits the possibilities of 
manufacturers to use their potential market power. Taking into account the 
vertical relationships would cause demand to be more elastic at the manufactur-
ing level, compared to final consumption. Especially if production is mainly 
directed to industrial use, the effects of vertical relationships can be assumed to 
be considerable. 
However, it should be noted that the results involve a high degree of uncer-
tainty. The use of estimates of actual profits does not separate the proportion of 
profits that is due to the oligopolistic competition from the proportion that is, for 
example, due to favourable demand conditions or technical efficiency. Therefore, 
these short-run profitability measures do not make it possible to draw conclu-
sions about the relationships between market concentration and overall perform- 
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ance. Barriers to entry, excess capacity, and many non-structural sources of 
variation in the profitability, like market growth, sales diversification, and prod-
uct quality differences, should he taken into account in that kind of analysis. 
Despite the limitations in the measurement of profitability, it can be observed 
that the results do not offer any support for the claim that welfare losses due to 
allocative inefficiency are necessarily the largest in the industries with quantita-
tive import restrictions. For example, in slaughtering and dairy products manu-
facture the estimated Lerner indices correspond to the point elasticities of demand 
that are very high, yielding relatively low deadweight loss estimates in regard to 
the concentrated market structure. However, it must he noted that price-cost 
margins indicate only one of several dimensions of market efficiency, i.e. allocative 
efficiency. The estimates of welfare losses in Chapter 5.3 were based on the 
assumption that firms are able to use their potential market power effectively. 
The low average profit rates, especially in the case of quantitative import restric-
tions, support the view (e.g. RASIMUS and KORHONEN 1992) that technical 
efficiency of these industries is low. Thus, the relative effects of low technical 
efficiency on welfare are probably greater than the market power effects. Indus-
tries that may he less profitable due to inefficiency are likely to receive low 
deadweight loss estimates in Table 5.5, even if low profits are not socially 
beneficial because they are generated by higher costs. In these cases, low profit-
ability corresponds to consumer welfare by no means. Correspondingly, Ta-
ble 5.5 shows low profitability and, therefore, high demand elasticities as well as 
low deadweight losses for slaughtering, meat processing, and dairy products 
manufacture. These are the industries that are the most clearly dominated by 
farmer-owned cooperatives. Figures may indicate that part of the possible oligopoly 
profits has been directed to the owners in the price of raw materials, or that the 
principles of open-membership cooperatives restrict the possibilities of manufac-
turers to maximize the joint profits of their members. 
In some cases, employing the profitability measures with the models of quan-
titative import restrictions and international oligopoly yields, however, demand 
elasticities that are relatively close to the previously obtained consumers' 
elasticities. In fruit and vegetable processing and bakery products manufacture, 
the third ratio measure, L3*, shows relatively high profitability despite the low 
level of concentration. Therefore, the evaluated absolute values of the demand 
elasticity remain smaller than one. If these industries are not technically more 
effective than others or if their negotiation power against retailers is not stronger 
than the average, there is some evidence that competition between domestic 
producers is more collusive than the Cournot model. Furthermore, the results of 
the manufacture of malt beverages and soft drinks, in which relatively high level 
of profitability was observed, offer support for the hypothesis that product 
differentiation is posively asSociated with profitability (CONNOR 1990). The 
effects of product differentiation on the relationship between profitability and 
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concentration are not formally explained in terms of the models used in this 
chapter. 
It must also be noted that the estimates are based on the models derived in a 
strictly partial equilibrium framework. Thus, the assumed demand curve for each 
industry is independent of the prices of goods in other industries. It is obvious 
that ignoring the relationships between food manufacturing industries on the one 
hand, and the rest of the economy on the other, might bias the estimates of 
potential welfare losses due to oligopolistic competition. Because the observed 
profit rates for different industries have been realized in a more complex general 
equilibrium environment, direct comparisons between the potential deadweight 
loss estimates and the estimates roughly derived from industry profitability are 
not reasonable. The main idea was to show that many of the very low estimates 
of consumers' demand elasticities are different when considering the concen-
trated food manufacturing stage of the food chain. If highly concentrated markets 
are analyzed, assuming that the demand for food at the manufacturing stage is 
very inelastic may require the assumption that Cournot or more competitive 
pricing represents firm behaviour. Similarly, assuming elastic demand may re-
quire that some degree of collusive behaviour does exist. 
As it has been shown, the welfare loss estimates for Finnish food manufactur-
ing involve a considerable number of possible reservations. This is, however, a 
general problem of the industrial organization literature. The earlier parts of this 
study have presented how the outcomes of different oligopoly models tend to 
depend decisively on the method of modelling the game. This chapter combined 
some of the features of the domestic market structure, degree of foreing competi-
tion, and the public regulation of foreign trade as the determinants of social 
welfare in the oligopolistic framework. The deadweight loss estimates based on 
the 1993 data show that welfare losses due to oligopolistic competition are 
potentially high in the Finnish food manufacturing, but the level of losses is very 
sensitive to the specific form of oligopolistic competition and the demand condi-
tions. In applying competition and anti-trust policies, influencing the process of 
competition is likely to be more efficient than operating with the aspects of 
market concentration. Finally, it has to be noted that the results do not justify the 
claim that deconcentration would yield socially more efficient outcomes than the 
current concentrated market structure in the Finnish food manufacturing. It is 
possible that a less concentrated market structure would yield a higher level of 
average and marginal costs. Ali the results of this chapter were compared to 
marginal cost pricing with the cost level of the current oligopolistic structure. 
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6. The welfare effects of the EU membership 
Finland' s membership in the EU liberalized the trade of processed food between 
Finland and the other union countries, which increases the international compe-
tition in the food manufacturing sector in Finland. As a member of the EU 
Finland no longer applies tariffs and quantitative restrictions against imports 
from the single market of the EU. Furthermore, Finnish agriculture is adjusted 
to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the EU. This means that producer 
prices of agricultural products are reduced to the EU levels. 
The effects of the application of the CAP on Finnish agriculture have been 
studied widely. E.g. KUHMONEN (1994) presents a survey of the literature on 
this. Farmers' incomes have been estimated to decrease considerably as a result 
of the accession to the EU and, therefore, different forms of support are directed 
to agriculture for ensuring the incomes of existing farms in Finland (see 
KETTUNEN and NIEMI 1994). 
In the field of food manufacturing, the potential effects of market integration 
are usually linked to the cost efficiency and competitiveness of Finnish indus-
tries (e.g. RASIMUS and KORHONEN 1992, HERNESNIEMI et al. 1995). HYVÖNEN 
and KOLA (1995) analyzed how the linkages between the policy environment 
and business strategies of the Finnish food industries may change due to inte-
gration. The largest food manufacturers need not only to reduce production 
costs, but also to develop stronger brands and marketing orientation based on 
consumer preferences Small- and medium-sized firms will concentrate on na-
tional and regional markets, but their success is dependent on the access to the 
retailing channels. 
TÖRMÄ and RUTHERFORD (1993) have evaluated the economic effects of the 
EU membership for agriculture and food processing industries by using an 
applied general equilibrium model. Even if the volume of agricultural produc-
tion is predicted to decrease considerably, they found out that most food process-
ing industries are able to maintain their production volumes. 
The competitive effects of the reduction of the potential market power due to 
the concentration on the nationally segmented markets have usually not been 
considered in the previous studies. The study of ISOSAARI (1993), in which the 
effects of the EU membership on the Finnish sugar market are considered, 
forms an exception to this. The adoption of the CAP and removal of the 
domestic monopoly power are found to lead to welfare improvements compared 
to the earlier policy in Finland. Furthermore, the partial equilibrium analysis of 
HOLM (1994) shows, assuming a monopoly in the domestic food manufacturing 
industry, that the reduction of the input price level due to the EU membership 
increases unambiguously domestic welfare. 
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The purpose of this chapter is to derive and use a model to evaluate the 
economic effects of three different policy experiments linked to the process of 
integrating Finnish food sector to the internal markets of the EU. The first is a 
reduction of the average domestic costs as a result of the lower price level of 
agricultural raw materials. In the second, the effects of the removal of trade 
barriers are evaluated. The third examines the effects of the decrease in the 
market power of domestic firms on the national markets. The last experiment is 
supposed to be essential, because the findings of Chapter 5 showed that the 
welfare losses due to oligopolistic behaviour have been at least potentially high 
in the Finnish food manufacturing. The study is a predictive, ex ante, analysis 
of the potential effects on welfare. 
First, a brief methodological introduction to different approaches for analyzing 
the economic effects of market integration is presented. In Chapter 6.2 a partial 
equilibrium model is derived to be used in the evaluation of the effects of these 
three policy experiments. The model of differentiated oligopoly in which do-
mestic firms have the Stackelberg leadership position against imports is used in 
this context. Domestic and foreign products are assumed to be imperfect substi-
tutes. This assumption differs from the previous models of this study. This 
change in modelling consumer behaviour is based on the results of Chapter 5. 
Under the assumption of product homogeneity, the usually low market shares of 
imports even in the case of so-called free trade industries had to be due to 
transportation costs, higher production costs of foreign producers, or some 
artificial trade barriers. A similar explanation may arise from consumer prefer-
ences and, therefore, the effects of imperfect substitution are added to the 
model. This leads to the model structure, which differs from that of Chapter 4. 
The assumption of Stackelberg competition between the domestic and foreign 
group of producers is still maintained. Finally, in Chapter 6.3 the model is 
calibrated for 1993 data for some specific product markets and the effects of 
policy experiments on consumer surplus and domestic firms' profits are simu-
lated. 
The method used in this part of the study is very similar to that employed 
with computable general equilibrium models. First, a theoretical model, which 
captures certain features of imperfectly competitive markets, is specified. It 
contains a number of parameters and endogenous variables. Some of the param-
eters are taken from external estimates and the rest are calibrated to the model. 
Second, the model is used to simulate changes in policy and the welfare effects 
are calculated. A limitation of this technique is that calibration exercises do not 
allow the data used to reject the theoretical model, i.e. no statistical significance 
can be attributed to the results. Therefore, sensitivity analyses are needed to 
investigate the direction and ‘magnitude of the welfare changes. 
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6.1. Approaches for analyzing the effects of integration 
Studying the effects of integration requires, first, the construction of a model of 
trade in the absence of integration and, secondly, evaluating the changes in the 
model to permit conclusions to he drawn about the consequences of integration 
for economic welfare. The best method is that ali changes are measured not just 
through time, but relative to what trade would be in the absence of integration 
(WINTERs 1987). 
The traditional tools for analyzing the effects of market integration are the 
concepts of trade creation and trade diversion. In the former case, new imports 
replace sales previously intemal to the newly associated country, for example, 
due to the decline in tariffs, which stimulates consumption. In the latter case, 
new imports displace imports previously bought from third, non-partner, coun-
tries. 
An example of the basic framework of trade creation and trade diversion in 
the partial equilibrium analysis is presented in Figure 6.1. For simplicity, con-
sider a case in which a portion of domestic consumption is imported. Before 
union, Finland (F) buys from the world market (W) at Pw levying a tariff at 
rate t. Domestic consumption is QD°, output Qs°, imports QD°-Qs°, and tariff 
revenue area C1+C2. After the EU membership, intemal prices become equal to 
the price level of the EU (PE). Domestic consumption increases to QD1, increas-
ing consumer surplus by A+B+Ci+D. Domestic production falls to Q51, reduc-
ing producer surplus by D. Imports grow to QD1-Qs1, but now no tariff revenue 
is collected. The net effect on welfare is (A+B)-C2, i.e. the gains from trade 
creation less trade diversion, which is equivalent to part of the tariff revenue 
Figure 6.1. The welfare effects of trade creation and diversion in the partial 
equilibrium framework. 
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lost. Naturally, a corresponding procedure can be presented for the exporting 
country. If internal prices exceed the price levels of the world market as well as 
the union and exports of domestic surpluses are subsidized, the net effect on 
welfare is greater compared to the case of the importing country. 
Further changes may result from integration if the increase in the market size 
induces economies of scale, or if there are changes in the macro-economic 
policy. Dynamic welfare gains from integration may arise if liberalization in-
duces capital formation and raises output more than static effects alone would 
predict (BALDwiN 1992). In this context, analyses need to operate at the level of 
general equilibrium. Some industries are expanding and some are declining, so 
that additive effects result from new allocation of recources between industries. 
Similar dynamic gains may arise, for example, from increased spendings on 
R&D or other factors of productivity growth due to increased competition. 
At the micro level, the effects of market integration are visible as lower trade 
costs, more aggressive competition, and lower unit production costs (EMERSON 
et al. 1988). In addition to the abolition of national tariffs and import quotas, 
lower trade costs will result from the reduction of border controls and the 
harmonization of product standards. Lower trade costs will promote exports and 
automatically lead to more aggressive competition. The effect can be signifi-
cantly greater if the dominant firms no longer have the possibility to exploit 
their large market shares in pricing on the domestic markets. If markets become 
fully integrated, these firms will no longer be able to capitalize on a dominant 
position on their home markets. Finally, average production costs will be 
reduced, for example, if high-cost producers lose market shares due to increased 
competition, if reduced market power leads to larger output and exploitation of 
scale economies, or if increased competition reduces X-inefficiency. Further-
more, as in the case of Finnish food manufacturing, integration may change the 
policy environment by reducing production costs also through the decrease of 
the administratively regulated prices of agricultural raw materials. 
An essential feature of the current tradition to model integration is to use a 
modelling framework with imperfectly competitive markets. For example, the 
general equilibrium model of HAALAND and NORMAN (1992) is based on the 
Coumot competition with differentiated products and pre-integration segmented 
markets, in which firms can charge higher prices at home than abroad due to the 
larger market shares in the domestic markets. Within the partial equilibrium 
framework, SMITH and VENABLES (1988) found out that removing the mo-
nopoly power that firms have in the segmented markets will result in more 
substantial welfare improvements than a reduction in the existing trade barriers 
in intra-EU trade. However, the predictions of integration effects are usually 
highly sensitive to the way in which imperfect competition, e.g. modelling 
oligopolistic interactions, is captured. 
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6.2. The simulation model 
The model applied is a conjectural variations model of heterogenous oligopoly. 
Heterogeneity is limited to two products: the production of domestic food 
manufacturing and imports of processed food are considered imperfect substi-
tutes for each other. Hence, domestic products are assumed to be perfect substi-
tutes, and so are imports within their group. 
The formulation of the demand system and the process of calibrating the 
demand parameters are based on DIXIT s (1988) and SHELDON' s (1992) studies. 
With the subscripts D and M denoting domestic products and imports respec-
tively, the direct demand functions are written as: 
Q, = A, —BD PD +KPm , 
Qm = Am +KPD —Bm Pm , 
	 (6.1) 
where PD and Pm are the prices and QD and Qm the aggregate quantities. Ali the 
parameters AD, Am, BD, Bm, and K are positive and BDBm-K2>0 if the products 
are imperfect substitutes. The inverse demand functions are 
PD =aD —bD QD —kQm , 
Pm =am —kQD —bm Qm , 
	 (6.2) 
with aD' aM' bD' bm, k >0 and bDbM-k2 >0. The five parameters of the inverse 
demand functions can be derived from those of the direct demand functions as: 
aD = 	 am = 	 
AD B, + KAm 	Am B, + KA, 
BD Bm —K 2 ' B,Bm — K 2 ' 
(6.3) Bm 	 BD 	 K 
bD = 	 , bm = 	, k= 	. 
B,Bm —K2 	BD BM —K2 	BD BM —K2 
Other sectors of the economy are regarded as a competitive numeraire. The 
demand system is assumed to be generated by a representative consumer whose 
utility function is both separable and linear in the numeraire. Let CS be the 
consumer surplus from the consumption of the QD and Qm. In the partial 
equilibrium analysis CS is 
cs=u(QD ,Qm )- PDQD PmQm • 
	 (6.4) 
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The aggregate utility function U(QD,Qm) is in the following form: 
U(QD ,Qm )= aDQD +amQm —(bDQ2D +bmQ 2m +2kQDQm )12, 	(6.5) 
where the inverse demand functions are PD=SU/SQD and Pm=s5U/5Qm. 
In order to calibrate the demand system to the actual data, which means 
calculating the parameters of Equations 6.1-6.3, supplementary equations are 
needed to determine the parameters AD, Am, BD, Bm, and K. This will be done, 
like in SHELDON (1992), by deriving equations for the elasticities of demand 
and substitution. The total price elasticity of demand is treated as the effect of 
an equiproportionate change in the price of the two products on the correspond-
ing quantity aggregate. The total price elasticity is defined as: 
	
D (71DD +7 1.)+ m ( 71. +71.), 	 (6.6) 
where E is the total expenditure, ED is the expenditure of domestic products, 
EM, the expenditure of foreign products, and 	the demand elasticity of i with 
respect to the price of j for i=D,M and j=D,M. By using Equation 6.1, the total 
price elasticity is 
-(13D PD2 + Bm Pm2 -2KPD Pm ) 
= 	  (6.7) 
Furthermore, let us define the elasticity of substitution between domestic prod- 
ucts and imports, 	as follows: r = -(d log(QD/Qm) / d log(PD/Pm)). Because 
the demand functions determine QD/Qm as a function of the vector (PD,Pm), a 
further condition is needed to define QD/Qm as a function of the ratio PD/Pm at 
least locally at the initial point. Therefore, let us assume that the utility function 
is homothetic. This implies that multiplying both QD and Qm at the initial 
utility-maximizing bundle by a constant, say r, yields the new optimum in 
which dQm/dQD. is equal to the initial price ratio -(PD/Pm). Multiplying QD and 
Qm by r and totally differentiating the utility function at the given level yields 
dU(QD ,Qm )= r[(aD -19 D rQD —krQm )dQ D +(am —bm rQm —krQD )dQm1= 0. (6.8) 
According to the property of homotheticity of the utility function, the following 
condition can be written: 
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(6.12) 
PD (BD Bm —K 2 ) 
\ • 
BD —• K B —K 	D  
PM M PM 
= 
Pm  
P, aD —bDrQD —krQm  
PA, 	am —bm rQm —krQD . 
	 (6.9) 
Using the inverse demand functions and the definitions of aD and am from 
Equation 6.3, we can write 
PD  
PD 
( 	lj 
1 
r 
AD Bm + KAm  
B,Bm —K 2  _ 
Pm Am BD +KAD  (6.10) Pm  
lj 
r BD Bm —K 2  
After rearranging the terms, it is observed that the parameters have to satisfy the 
following condition: 
PD (AD K+ Am BD )= pm (Am K+AD Bm ). 	 (6.11) 
Given the definition of a and the homotheticity of the utility function, after 
solving (QD/Qm) and multiplying by 1/Pm , the expression for the elasticity of 
substitution can be derived as 
The simultaneous equation system of Equations 6.1, 6.7, 6.11, and 6.12 deter-
mines estimates of AD A BD' BM' and K. Values for aD' aM' bD' bm, and k 
can be derived from Equation 6.3. Base-line values of prices and quantities and 
the estimates of the elasticities can be obtained from outside sources. The 
solution calibrates the demand system such that the parameters are consistent 
with equilibrium in any given period. 
On the supply side, it is assumed that importing firms are in the Stackelberg 
follower position against domestic producers on the domestic markets. This 
situation correspond to the model of international oligopoly in Chapter 4.2. 
Domestic producers are able to maximize profits along a residual demand curve 
that takes importers actual behaviour into account. Using the first order condi- 
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k(a 	— t — c
m
) 
+ 	 = a„  Q (1+1(,), 
bm (l+Vm ) 	bm (l+Vm ) 
k 2 
(6.15) 
tions of Chapter 4.2 for profit maximization produces the reaction function of 
imports as 
a
m 	
—kQD —t—cm  
Qm =  
I), (1 + Vm ) (6.13) 
where t is an import tariff, cm constant marginal cost that includes e.g. transpor-
tation costs, and Vm is the competition parameter for the group of Importers. 
Vm is equal to the Herfindahl index of concentration in the Cournot case, one in 
the perfect collusion, and zero in the case of perfect competition. 
Due to the Stackelberg leadership position of domestic producers, the mar-
ginal revenue function perceived by domestic firm i is given by 
-k(am —t—c ) 	 dQ„_, 
MR =a,,     b„ Q, +q + 	q, 
- bm (l+Vm ) bm (l+Vm ) 	 dq 
, (6.14) 
 
where q  is output produced by firm i and QD_I is output of the domestic group 
excluding firm i. Aggregating over domestic firms yields the perceived mar-
ginal revenue of the domestic group as 
where VD describes competition between domestic firms and depends on mar-
ket concentration and firm conduct. In the equilibrium, the marginal revenue of 
each domestic firm is equal to the marginal cost. The explicit solutions for the 
equilibrium quantities and prices are 
b (1+Vm ) 	k 
Q,„
- 
 m 	(a, cD )--(am —t — cm ), 
1 	k 2 
Qm = 	 1+— (am  — t — cm )--(a, — cD ), 
b„,,(1+Vm ) 	A 
(6.16) 
and 
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where A = (1+VD)(bDbm(1 +Vm)-k2). From bp, bm, k >0, bpbm-k2 > 0 and VD' 
VM 	0, it follows that A> 0. 
However, as it has been established earlier, quantitative import restrictions 
in terms of the system of import licensing have formed the most important 
measure of agricultural trade protection in Finland. The review presented in 
Chapter 3.4.2 of this study demonstrated that tariffs and import quotas are not 
necessarily equivalent instruments of trade policy if markets are imperfectly 
competitive. For example, MAJ and HWANG (1989) have presented a general 
conjectural variations duopoly model of homogenous goods, in which the quota 
can have either pro- or anti-competitive effects. As a result of the quota, the 
home firm knows that changing its output does not affect imports, which is 
identical to Cournot behaviour. In this case, the quota has anti- (pro) competi-
tive effects, if the home firm was initially playing more (less) competitively 
than Cournot against the foreign firm. MCCORRISTON et al. (1993) have ex-
tended this model to the framework of differentiated oligopoly. They found 
corresponding conditions for nonequivalence but, in addition, the degree of 
nonequivalence is sensitive to the degree of product differentiation. 
In order to analyze the effects of quantitative import restrictions in the 
Stackelberg model, let us suppose that the government imposes a quota on 
imports, which is set at the equilibrium quantity of imports under a tariff (Qm 
from Equation 6.16). In this case, the reaction function of imports is simply 
Qm = Qmq. A domestic firm i takes imports as given and the marginal revenue 
function of firm i is 
Aggregating and setting marginal revenue to equal marginal cost yields the 
equilibrium quantity of domestic production in the case of import quota as: 
A+k 2 
QD q = 
bp (1+ V,» 
[aD cD 	  b,(1+Vm ) 
—t—cm (6.19) 
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If the domestic output under the quota is compared to the domestic output 
under the tariff, these two alternative trade restrictions result in nonequivalence 
as follows: 
k 2V,  
IQD' 
12 Dbm (1+VD )(1+Vm ) 
(6.20) 
Because k2 < bDbm, the domestic output under the quota is lower than under the 
tariff, which results in the same volume of imports. These two are equivalent 
only if behaviour within the domestic group is perfectly competitive (VD=0) or 
if domestic production and imported products are not substitutes in consump-
tion (k=0). If we denote QD`I = (1 - iv)QD, where xif implicates the effects of 
import quota on domestic output as in Equation 6.20, equilibrium prices under 
the quota compared to the prices under the tariff can be written as: 
PD g = + b DT [bm (1+ Vm )(a D — c D )—k(am —t —c„,,)]; 
kg' r 
= Pm + —Lb m (1+ VM)(a, — c D )—k(am —t —cm )]. 
(6.21) 
Evaluation of the effects of reductions in the domestic costs and trade barriers as 
well as the change in the degree of domestic competition on consumer surplus 
can be carried out using the model outlined above. The demand system can be 
solved by using base-line values of QD,Qm,PD, and Pm, and external estimates 
of r and 6. Furthermore, in order to simulate the equilibrium conditions for 
prices and quantities, values of cD, cm, t, VD, and VM  are required. By using the 
expression for the initial quantities given in 6.16 and 6.20, two of these can be 
obtained if data on the other three variables are available. Due to limited 
information about domestic and foreign costs, the model is allowed to solve cD 
and cm for given levels of competition (VD and VM)  and the magnitude of tariff 
or import levy (t). 
6.3. Certain product market estimates 
In this chapter the model of differentiated oligopoly is applied to investigate the 
level of welfare changes on the Finnish food markets caused by the EU mem-
bership. Three different effects are considered. Two are directly due to the 
institutional arrangements of the CAP: (1) Prices of agricultural raw materials 
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are reduced to the EU level, i.e. the average costs of domestic production 
decrease, and (2) import restrictions, such as quotas, tariffs, and import levies, 
are abolished. They are the most immediate impacts of the membership. The 
abolition of trade barriers will promote exports, lead to more severe competi-
tion, and reduce the aggregate market power of domestic firms. The domestic 
firms' market share decreases since part of their competitive advantage, due to 
the trade barriers, is lost. This may lead to excess capacity of the domestic 
firms. As a result, the third potentially important effect of integration stems 
from the increased competition: (3) pricing and output decisions within the 
domestic group of producers will be more competitive than before Finland 
joined the EU. 
It is assumed that competition between the domestic firms follows the 
Cournot model before integration into the EU. This means that the parameter 
VD, which determines the degree of competition between domestic firms, is 
equal to the Herfindahl index of concentration. The potential effects of increas-
ing competition are then simulated by lowering the initial value of VD. In 
addition to the oligopolistic competition within the domestic group of produc-
ers, markets are assumed to be oligopolistic at the EU level. The parameter Vm 
determines the degree of competition between firms that are exporting to the 
Finnish markets. In the following, VM  is presented in terms of the Cournot-
equivalent number of firms (N). For example, if there are N symmetrically sized 
firms and firms act in the Cournot fashion, VM  = 1/N, and as N increases, the 
more competitive the Cournot equilibrium becomes. If the conduct of firms is 
more competitive than the Cournot model presumes, the Cournot-equivalent 
number of firms is greater than the actual number of firms. The welfare effects 
are evaluted by employing different values of the Cournot-equivalent number of 
firms. 
Calibrating the model to actual data requires information about sales quanti-
ties and unit prices at a stage preceding the distribution of the product. At the 
industry level, the statistics of production and foreign trade combine different 
products, the unit prices and product characteristics of which differ signifi-
cantly. Therefore, the analysis concentrates on relatively specific product mar-
kets. The model is calibrated to actual data of two product groups: bovine meat 
and cheeses for the year 1993. In that way, the comparison between the three 
different impacts of integration is naturally very product specific. However, it 
can be assumed that the relative changes can be generalized to the industry 
level, at least for slaughtering and dairy products manufacture. In the case of 
other industries with quantitative import restrictions, the relative changes are 
also likely to occur along the same Iines. The impacts of the third scenario, 
increasing domestic competition, will differ between industries according to the 
level of pre-integration deadweight losses associated with oligopolistic compe-
tition. 
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The model is applied first to the Finnish bovine meat market. Data for the 
model calibration is from 1993. According to the statistics on foreign trade in 
terms of the HS Nomenclature, 99.8 percent of total imports of bovine meat 
consisted of boneless meat (HS 02013000 and 02023000). ]imports consisted 
mainly of fillets and pieces of beef for roast. Furthermore, because a large share 
of domestic carcasses is shipped to industrial use, the model is applied for 
boneless meat only. In 1993, the volume of licensed imports (Qm) was 835 
tonnes and the corresponding import price was FIM 5.47/kg. It is obvious that 
this price did not correspond to the marginal cost of production, and the imports 
were highly subsidized. The average import levy was FIM 36.89/kg and, thus, 
Pm is set to FIM 42.36/kg. Domestic sales figures are obtained from Industrial 
Statistics, which contain quantity and value data by commodity on shipments 
based on the HS Nomenclature (QD= 41,632 tonnes and PD= FIM 30.95/kg). 
The price elasticity of demand (9) is assumed to be -0.67. This is based on the 
average of estimates obtffined by LAURILA (1985) and LAURILA (1994). No 
estimates of the elasticity of substitution (a) are available for the Finnish meat 
market. In the study of TÖRMÄ and RUTHERFORD (1993) the elasticity range 
from 1 to 8, and the average value 4 is assumed in the basic scenario of this 
analysis. 
The welfare consequences of the three different impacts of integration are 
presented in Table 6.1. The Cournot-equivalent number of importing firms is 
allowed to range from 1 to 10. Reduction of domestic average costs is assumed 
to be 20 percent from the level that existed before the integration into the EU. 
Althought the farm level producer prices are assumed to decrease considerably 
more (45%), the actual input prices of slaughterhouses decrease about 25 per-
cent due to the tax subsidy applied before joining the EU (deduction of sales 
tax). Taking into consideration the other costs of processing reported by 
RASIMUS (1993), a 20 percent reduction of costs is estimated. 
The new prices and quantities are solved for the lower cost level, and the 
difference between the initial and the new level of consumer welfare and 
domestic firms' profits is reported. The model solves cost reduction to be FIM 
4.20/kg, which yields a FIM 3.30/kg decrease in PD, when N=10. In the Cournot 
competition between domestic firms, the degree of transrnission from cost 
change to product price is about 80 percent. Naturally, the efficiency of trans-
mission will be higher, the lower the market concentration. Because of the 
decreased prices, 	is about one percent lower than before, consumer welfare 
is estimated to increase by FIM 143-145 million, depending on the Cournot-
equivalent number of importing firms. The degree of price transmission is 
higher, the higher the degree of foreign competition. Domestic profits will also 
be higher and, thus, the net effect will be clearly positive. 
The welfare improvements through the abolition of trade barriers (import 
levies and quotas) will be considerably smaller than those resulting from the 
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cost reduction. This result is based, first, on the assumption that the demand 
curve for foreign products does not shift after the removal of the quota and 
import levies and, therefore, the market share of imports remains low (4 per-
cent). Second, it is assumed that domestic and foreign average costs become 
equal in the new situation. This means that the cost level of importers becomes 
higher compared to the calibrated initial level, in which the subsidized low 
import price naturally leads to low average costs. 
Although the net gain arising from the abolition of trade barriers is only 
FIM 4.4 - 21.6 million, the effects on the distribution of income between con-
sumers and domestic firms are more notable (Table 6.1). The impacts on the 
government' s revenue are not taken into consideration in this analysis. The 
abolition of import levies would reduce the goverment' s revenue, but as a 
counterbalance, the government is able to reduce the expenditure on national 
export subsidies. The net effect on the state budget would be slightly positive. 
However, including the state budget in the formal model would require the 
modelling of many other political variables, like the determination of export 
subsidies and payments to the EU budget, or directing of support to food 
processing and agriculture. 
The third potential impact of the integration, increasing domestic competi-
tion, leads to an improvement of the total welfare by about FIM 17-18 million 
over the level corresponding to trade without quota and import levies. This 
result is based on the assumption of a decrease of 20 percent in VD, i.e. in the 
degree of competition between domestic firms. Sensitivity analysis for different 
values of VD is presented in Table 6.3. Despite the relatively small net change, 
increasing competition leads to a considerable redistribution of welfare between 
consumers and domestic firms. Consumer welfare increases by FIM 81 million, 
while the loss in the firms' profits is about 64 million (N=10). If, as it has been 
previously noted, a great part of potential oligopoly profits of Finnish food 
manufacturers has possible been lost due to technically inefficient production, 
the net gain will be higher in the long-run. This requires that increased competi-
tion results in additional cost savings and higher productivity in the processing. 
In the last column of Table 6.1, it can be seen that the total improvement of 
welfare is FIM 235-251 million, i.e. an increase of 15-17 percent over the 
situation before the integration. The gain in consumer surplus is many times 
larger than the loss in the firms' profits. However, 85-90 percent of the total 
improvement is due to the decrease of the domestic cost level. If this decrease is 
linked to corresponding national support to livestock production, the total wel-
fare gain becomes quite marginal and mainly involves a redistribution from the 
government and manufacturers to consumers. Considering consumer welfare, 
the results show, however, that the consequences of the abolition of trade 
barriers and, especially, increasing competition are considerable. 
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Table 6.1. Welfare effects on the bovine meat market (HS 02013000 and 02023000), 
FIM mill. 
Cost 
reduction 
Abolition of 
trade barriers 
Increasing 
competition 
Total 
effect 
N=11) 
Consumer welfare 144.86 17.12 85.06 247.04 
Domestic firms' profits 67.90 -12.70 -66.77 -11.57 
Net change 212.76 4.42 18.29 235.47 
N.=.51) 
Consumer welfare 143.49 48.90 81.60 273.99 
Domestic firms' profits 69.01 -31.53 -64.35 -26.87 
Net change 212.50 17.37 17.25 247.12 
N=10') 
Consumer welfare 143.17 57.39 80.71 281.27 
Domestic firms' profits 69.27 -35.80 -63.78 -30.31 
Net change 212.44 21.59 16.93 250.96 
1) The Cournot-equivalent number of importing firms. 
Table 6.2. Sensitivity analysis (N=10): Changes in elasticities, FIM mill. 
Cost 	Abolition of 
reduction 	trade barriers 
Increasing 
competition 
Total 
effect 
Low price elasticity (n = -0.4), heterogenous products (o" = 1.5) 
Consumer welfare 	 91.40 	25.51 	132.92 
Domestic firms' profits 	 42.18 	-5.35 	-105.36 
Net change 	 133.58 	20.16 	27.56 
High price elasticity 	= -1.2), heterogenous products (o- = 1.5) 
249.83 
-68.53 
181.30 
Consumer welfare 183.29 	22.44 56.10 261.83 
Domestic firms' profits 84.58 -3.95 -44.46 36.17 
Net change 267.87 	18.49 11.64 298.00 
Low price elasticity = -0.4), close substitutes (o- = 8) 
Consumer welfare 91.02 	142.13 114.47 347.62 
Domestic firms' profits 47.93 	-110.73 -90.28 -153.08 
Net change 138.95 	31.40 24.19 194.54 
High price elasticity = -1.2), close substitutes (0- = 8) 
Consumer welfare 180.93 	87.95 46.68 315.56 
Domestic firms' profits 95.35 	-67.76 -36.72 -9.13 
Net change 276.28 	20.19 9.96 306.43 
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Table 6.3. Sensitivity analysis (N=10, n=-0.67, a=4): Changes in domestic 
competition, FIM mill. 
Change of VD -5% -10% -15% -25% -30% 
Consumer welfare 19.33 39.20 59.66 102.38 124.69 
Domestic firms' profits -14.93 -30.52 -46.80 -81.54 -100.07 
Net change 4.40 8.68 12.86 20.84 24.62 
In order to analyze how sensitive the results are to changes in elasticities, the 
welfare changes for different values of and are presented in Table 6.2. As the 
absolute value of the price elasticity of demand increases, the total improvement 
of welfare increases because of the high impact of the cost reduction. The 
effects of the abolition of trade barriers and increasing competition become 
lower as the price elasticity increases. Closer substitution between imports and 
domestic production induces higher improvements of total welfare. Especially 
in the case of low price elasticity and high elasticity of substitution, the effects 
of the abolition of trade barriers and increasing competition on consumer wel-
fare both exceed the magnitude of the improvement resulting from cost reduc-
tion. Correspondingly, Table 6.3 presents the sensitivity of the results with 
respect to the assumed level of changes in domestic competition. These welfare 
changes are closely associated with the re-distribution of oligopoly rents. 
The second application of the model concerns the cheese markets. Imports of 
cheeses have mainly been realized within the framework of the cheese agree-
ment with the EU, which allowed an import quota with reduced import levies. 
In 1993 99.97 percent of the value of imports consisted of other cheeses than 
emmenthal and edam. Although emmenthal and edam cheeses accounted for the 
greatest part of domestic production, the model is calibrated for other cheeses to 
make the parameters of the demand system more reliable in analyzing the 
demand changes without the quota. A rough exercise representing the total 
cheese market can be developed by extrapolating the following welfare effects 
over the entire market. 
Import prices and quantities are obtained from the Foreign Trade Statistics. 
The average import price adjusted for the import levy was FIM 40.13/kg and 
the quantity imported was 2,634 tonnes. The domestic price and production 
figures are from the Industrial Statistics. The average domestic price at the 
manufacturing stage was FIM 24.63/kg and the quantity produced minus ex-
ports accounted for 33,261 tonnes. The elasticity of demand (-0.52) is based on 
the average of the estimates of LAURILA (1985) and LAURILA (1994). The 
elasticity of substitution is assumed to he 4 in the basic scenario. 
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Table 6.4. Welfare effects on the cheese markets, FIM mill. 
Cost 
reduction 
Abolition of 
trade barriers 
Increasing 
competition 
Total 
effect 
N=11) 
Consumer welfare 15.82 29.00 59.71 104.53 
Domestic firms' profits 7.98 -20.57 -44.73 -57.32 
Net change 23.80 8.43 14.98 47.21 
N=51) 
Consumer welfare 15.05 123.51 50.20 188.76 
Domestic firms' profits 8.46 -69.61 -38.21 -99.36 
Net change 23.51 53.90 11.99 89.40 
N=101) 
Consumer welfare 14.87 150.22 47.73 212.82 
Domestic firms' profits 8.58 -80.60 -36.75 -108.77 
Net change 23.45 69.62 10.98 104.05 
1) The Cournot-equivalent number of importing firms. 
Table 6.5. Sensitivity analysis (N=10): Changes in elasticities, FIM mill. 
Cost 	Abolition of 	Increasing 
reduction 	trade barriers 	competition 
Total 
effect 
Low price elasticity (77 = -0.4), heterogenous products (a= 1.5) 
Consumer welfare 11.21 	73.59 79.93 164.73 
Domestic firms' profits 5.45 	-13.41 -62.42 -70.38 
Net change 16.66 	60.18 17.51 94.35 
High price elasticity 	= -1.2), heterogenous products (o- = 1.5) 
Consumer welfare 21.70 	66.12 27.41 115.23 
Domestic firms' profits 10.54 	- 8.98 -21.37 -19.81 
Net change 32.24 	57.14 6.04 95.42 
Low price elasticity (17 = -0.4), close substitutes (a = 8) 
Consumer welfare 11.00 	267.50 47.43 325.93 
Domestic firms' profits 8.38 	-182.70 -35.99 -210.31 
Net change 19.38 	84.80 11.44 115.62 
High price elasticity (17 = -/.2), close substitutes (0- = 8) 
Consumer welfare 20.00 	182.72 12.02 214.74 
Domestic firms' profits 15.25 	-97.19 -8.80 -90.74 
Net change 35.25 	85.53 3.22 124.00 
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Table 6.6. Sensitivity analysis (N=10, 71=-0.52, a=4): Changes in domestic 
competition, FIM mill. 
Change of VD -5% -10% -15% -25% -30% 
Consumer welfare 11.42 23.17 35.27 60.58 73.81 
Domestic firms' profits -8.58 -17.55 -26.93 -47.01 -57.76 
Net change 2.84 5.62 8.34 13.57 16.05 
Table 6.4 presents the effects of the domestic cost reduction, abolition of 
trade barriers, and increasing competition on consumer welfare and domestic 
firms' profits. First, the cost reduction alone yields an improvement of overall 
welfare by 2 percent (FIM 23 million) over the previous level, when N=10. The 
effects are relatively independent of the number of importing firms. The reduc-
tion of the average cost is 4 percent, following an estimated decrease of about 
5 percent in the price of milk. In the Cournot competition between domestic 
firms, the degree of transmission from cost change to product price change is 78 
percent, i.e. increase in consumer welfare is lower than what it would be under 
perfectly competitive conditions. Second, the elimination of the quota and 
import levies leads to an additional increase of FIM 69.6 million in the total 
welfare. However, the degree of competition between importers is a decisive 
determinant of the magnitude of this effect. For example, if only one foreign 
firm is entering Finnish markets, the net improvement of welfare remains 
FIM 8 million Similarly, in the third case the effects of increasing domestic 
competition, when VD is decreased by 20 percent, depend greatly on the Cournot-
equivalent number of importing firms. The less competitive the foreign group, 
the higher will be the potential gains from re-allocating the domestic oligopoly 
rents. In consumer welfare, the improvement resulting from increasing competi-
tion is about 3-4 times higher compared to the effects of cost reduction. The net 
effect remains relatively low due to the remarkable decrease in the domestic 
profits. Considering the obtained total effect shows that the gain in consumer 
welfare is almost two times larger than the loss in the firms' profits. 
Sensitivity analyses of Tables 6.5 and 6.6 show the effects of changes in 
price and substitution elasticities as well as in the degree of domestic oligopoly. 
The tendency away from marginal cost pricing at the initial equilibrium is 
linked to the price elasticity and the degree of substitution between domestic 
and foreign products. Therefore, inelastic demand makes the initial equilibrium 
less competitive and leads to higher welfare improvements resulting from in-
creasing competition. The closer substitutes products are, the lower the relative 
importance of increasing competition. In the latter case, the abolition of trade 
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Table 6.7. The percentage welfare changes from the pre-integration level. (N=10, 
cy=4, and 71=-0.67 and -0.52 for bovine meat and cheese, respectively). 
Cost 
reduction 
Abolition of 
trade barriers 
Increasing 
competition 
Total 
effect 
Bovine meat 
Consumer welfare 14.49 5.81 8.17 28.47 
Domestic firms' profits 15.98 -8.26 -14.71 -6.99 
Net change 14.95 1.52 1.19 17.66 
Cheese 
Consumer welfare 1.67 16.89 5.37 23.93 
Domestic firms' profits 2.48 -23.32 -10.63 -31.47 
Net change 1.90 5.64 0.89 8.43 
barriers leads to considerably higher welfare improvement compared to the 
situation in which products are heterogenous. Cost reduction yields gains that 
are positively related both to the absolute value of the price elasticity and the 
degree of substitutability between domestic products and imports. 
Taking the limitation of the analysis into account, i.e. concentrating on very 
concise product markets, the percentage changes in welfare (Table 6.7) can be 
assumed to provide information about welfare effects on the larger aggregated 
markets and in the industries. In the static partial equilibrium framework, the 
unweighted average of the total improvement of welfare is obtained to he 
13 percent over the level corresponding to the situation before the integration. 
Consumers would gain an increase of 26 percent, but manufacturers would lose 
19 percent from the previous margin over average variable costs. Because of the 
existence of fixed costs, which are in fact treated as sunk costs of capacity in the 
model, this reduction leads to a need for dynamic long-run consequences by 
means of further cost savings and higher productivity. Because the model 
considers only a single stage of the food chain, the actual spread of gains and 
losses will he more complicated. From the consumers' viewpoint, a portion of 
gains is likely to remain at the stage of food retailing. At the manufacturing 
stage, it may he possible to compensate for the losses by means of lower 
producer prices paid for agricultural raw materials. Attempts to quantify the 
effects on resource allocation along the whole food chain would need to capture 
many vertically related and imperfectly competitive market stages. Further-
more, analysis of the effects of resource allocation on the rest of the economy 
would require the application of the general equilibrium framework. 
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7. Examination of the results and conclusions 
This study analyzed the structure, conduct, and perfomance of the Finnish food 
manufacturing industries. Some methods to evaluate welfare losses of oligopolies 
were presented and applied to the Finnish food manufacturing. The results 
support the `losses are high' view of economic literature. The analysis showed 
that a concentrated market structure may lead to considerable welfare losses 
even in the absence of collusive practices in the food manufacturing. If firms 
are able to collude, national or regional monopoly power is a substantial prob-
lem in the economy. In addition to the competition policy, one way to influence 
the degree of implicit collusion and increase competition is to stimulate foreign 
trade and increase the openness to the world market. Thus, membership in the 
EU affects competition within the food industry and leads to redistribution of 
welfare. However, the effects of the EU membership on the food economy 
depend heavily on the nature of strategic interactions between firms and the 
structural features of the specific market. The results presented in this study 
imply some important conclusions regarding competition, public policies, and 
economic research in Finland. 
The framework to analyze welfare effects of agricultural trade liberalization 
and other public policies has traditionally been based on an analysis between 
consumers, taxpayers, and farmers. This kind of analysis ignores the effects of 
other stages of the food chain. The downstream markets of agricultural produc-
tion between food processing (including food, drink, and tobacco industries) 
and consumption have been analyzed in this study. Studying the food manufac-
turing is necessary, because the importance of food manufacturing in the food 
chain has increased steadily. About 30 years ago, the share of the Finnish food 
manufacturing of the total value added was only half of that of agriculture. By 
the end of the 1980s, the value added in the two sectors was about the same, and 
now the food manufacturing accounts for a larger share than farming. 
Compared with the other manufacturing industries in Finland, the food manu-
facturing has a low ratio of value added to sales. In 1993 the ratio was 25.6 per-
cent in the food manufacturing and 34.6 percent in manufacturing on the aver-
age. The lowest ratios are achieved in dairy products manufacture (12.9%), 
slaughtering (13.3%), manufacture of margarine and other vegetable and animal 
oils and fats (17.6%), grain mill products manufacture (18%), and feed manu-
facture (18.2%). They are industries operating at the first stage of transforma-
tion. Industries operating at the second stage typically have a higher ratio of 
value added to sales. The highest ratios can be found in the manufacture of malt 
beverages and soft drinks (56.2%), tobacco products manufacture (52.3%), 
manufacture of alcohol (50%), and fresh bread and pastries manufacture (48.7%). 
Compared with the EU ratios reported by VIAENE and GELLYNCK (1995), the 
ratio of value added to sales in the Finnish food manufacturing industry exceeds 
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clearly the EU average of 20.7 percent. At the first stage of transformation, 
Finnish ratios are along the same.lines with the EU, but at the second stage they 
clearly exceed the EU level. 
The low ratio of value added to sales at the first stage of transformation 
corresponds to the high share of raw materials in the acquisition costs of inputs. 
In slaughtering, grain mill products and feed manufacture, sugar manufacture 
and refining, dairy products manufacture, and meat processing, the acquisition 
costs of raw materials account for more than 60 percent of total shipments. This 
share remains below 30 percent in the manufacture of malt beverages and soft 
drinks as well as in fresh bread and pastries manufacture. Industries character-
ized by high costs of raw materials typically account for low margins over 
purchases of intermediate goods and services as well as wages. Since the S-C-P 
models to estimate welfare losses due to oligopolistic competition traditionally 
employ price-cost margins as a measure of market power, Finnish statistics 
present industries at the second or higher stage of processing as candidates for 
high market power. However, determination of the competitive margin that 
covers fixed costs and the assessment of X-inefficiency are problems associated 
with these studies. Furthermore, firms in these industries are likely to have 
more strategic options, like product differentiation or R&D, available in compe-
tition, compared to the firms at the first stage of transformation. 
Price-cost margin adjusted by the changes in demand conditions can be 
treated as an indicator of the existence of market power, while the domestic 
market structure and the ease of foreign market entry are potential explanatory 
variables of market power. Market concentration has been treated as the main 
dimension of market structure in this study. It is known from the theory that 
price-cost margins may be directly related to different measures of concentra-
tion, depending on the prevailing conduct of firms within the industry. Within 
this framework, the Herfindahl index of concentration is related to the industry-
wide oligopoly model, while the concentration ratio is consistent with the 
collusive price leadership oligopoly. In terms of the Herfindahl index and 
different concentration ratios, most of the Finnish food manufacturing indus-
tries are found to be very concentrated. Different concentration measures have 
been computed on the basis of the four-digit SIC system, which is quite an 
aggregated classification ignoring, for example, the aspects of regional concen-
tration as well as horizontal and vertical coordination. In 17 out of the 20 
industries for which data is available, the three-firm concentration ratio was 
50 percent or greater in 1993. The Herfindahl index was 0.2 or greater in 14 
industries. Although combining firm behaviour with the industry structure is 
not without risk, the high level of concentration suggests that a considerable 
portion of firms has opportunities for strategic production and pricing decisions. 
The model of perfectly competitive markets does not provide a reasonable 
framework for analyzing Finnish food processing industries. According to the 
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description of market structure and conduct presented in this study, these indus-
tries have to be analyzed by means of the oligopoly models. 
Although this study does not aim at evaluating market power and the degree 
of competition on the basis of industry profitability, it includes a brief descrip-
tion of industry performance that calls for some comments. First, the price of 
food products has followed approximately the same rate as the wholesale price 
index during the period 1980 to 1993. This implies that processed food products 
have low inflationary effects. Second, the economic recession at the beginning 
of the 1990s affected the profitability of food industry less than manufacturing 
on the average. In fact, operating margin as a percentage of tumover increased 
in the food manufacturing at the beginning of the 1990s. According to the 
models of collusive behaviour with imperfect monitoring, it is not clear a priori 
whether firms with market power tend to increase or decrease their margins in a 
recession. A potential explanation for the Finnish phenomenon is that firms 
operating in concentrated industries have chances to increase margins during 
recession, because the existence of excess capacity may tend to maintain collu-
sion by making the threat of retaliation more credible. Testing the different 
hypotheses of collusive behaviour over the business cycles remains a question 
for further research. 
Most of the Finnish food processing industries are highly home-market 
oriented. One factor in the background of the home-market orientation is agri-
cultural policy with objectives relating, for example, to self-sufficiency in food 
commodities and safeguarding the income level of farmers. Foreign trade has 
been regulated in order to keep the domestic farm prices at the set level. 
Carrying out the policy objectives has relied on border protection, taking the 
form of import licences, quotas, and variable import levies. When competitive 
pressure from potential imports is weak, domestic producers have wider possi-
bilities to use their market power associated with the high level of concentra-
tion. Even in the case with no collusive behaviour between the domestic firms, 
high concentration may lead to socially inefficient equilibrium prices. Further-
more, the central hypothesis common to almost ali oligopoly models is that high 
concentration induces collusive behaviour. As a result of the theoretical analy-
sis of implicit collusion (Chapter 3.2), the pressure from potential imports may 
reduce the stability of collusion due to the increasing number of competing 
firms and greater uncertainty. Small and closed food markets lead to the conclu-
sion that high concentration is potentially a problem for the Finnish food economy 
in the sense of giving market power to some firms. 
The purpose of the theoretical part of this study was to analyze the effects of 
market structure and conduct on the allocative efficiency of the economy at the 
partial equilibrium framework. The analyses operated at the simple framework 
in which structure was considered exogenous, i.e. the strategic behaviour affect-
ing industry structure was ignored. Even in this case the problem of the S-C-P 
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paradigm, i.e. that concentration measures possibly provide quite limited infor-
mation about welfare or the degree of market power, was revealed. Several 
conclusions can be drawn from the analysis. First, concentration indices can be 
useful in evaluating the competitiveness in markets, but this requires exact 
formulation of the form of competition. Second, actions that reduce the number 
of firms or increase concentration can improve welfare. This benefit does not 
depend upon scale economies, but it may be achieved if increased concentration 
leads to asymmetry in firms' behaviour (Stackelberg form of competition). 
Thus, the possibility of asymmetric competition within an industry offers a 
reason for competition agencies to avoid too straightforward policy against 
industry concentration. Analyses of asymmetric competition are still quite lim-
ited in the economic literature, and more attention should be paid to these 
aspects. Third, the analysis shows the importance of taking into account the 
special market characteristics when modelling the causation from structure to 
performance. 
Studies in the field of the strategic trade theory have shown that, under 
certain circumstances, a government can increase national welfare by using 
export subsidies and import restrictions. Because international food markets are 
imperfectly competitive, it may be possible to shift monopoly rents from for-
eign to home firms. This is not the only motive for protectionism in the food 
markets, but the application of the strategic trade theory may deepen our under-
standing, for example, of the agricultural trade problems of the GATT Uruguay 
round and the challenges of the WTO process. 
This study presented an example of how to measure welfare losses of imper-
fect competition in markets where foreign competition is restricted by means of 
various kinds of import restrictions. Methodology adopted follows the stand-
ards of the new I.O. literature in the sense that a behavioural model is formally 
derived from a theoretical model of profit maximization. One problem involved 
is the necessity of choosing the form of conduct and the set of strategic instru-
ments of firms when many potential candidates are possible. The solution of 
this study was to model competition between domestic firms by using firms' 
conjectural variations, i.e. firms' expectations about the reactions of rival firms 
to a change in the quantity of output. It can be said that capturing the different 
dimensions of imperfect competition to conjectural variations does not reveal 
much about strategies employed by firms. Many of the policy-relevant factors, 
such as the impacts of product differentiation, entry conditions, and strategic 
entry deterrence, are not included in the firms' conjectural variations. Using 
conjectural variations may be an unsatisfactory modelling choice with respect 
to the models of the formal game theory, but at this moment the formal game 
theory offers mainly empirically useless sets of firm strategies or multiple 
equilibria as alternatives. 
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In this framework, the derivation justified the use of the Herfindahl index as 
a measure of concentration and the elasticity of demand with respect to own 
price as a measure of demand conditions. A problem is that the income effects 
on demand, e.g. the annual growth rate of industry demand, which is a central 
explanatory variable of the S-C-P tradition to investigate profit margins, were 
not included in the models to evaluate welfare losses. Furthermore, due to the 
assumed asymmetry in the competition between domestic firms and importers, 
the derivation justified the use of the market share of domestic producers as a 
measure of the degree of foreign competition. The institutional background was 
taken into account by deriving separate models for industries with quantitative 
import restrictions and for so-called free trade industries. 
As an exception to the mainstream tradition, profit margins and marginal 
costs were treated as unobservable. Difficulties associated with the observed 
profits and costs exist because, for example, fixed costs are often high in 
imperfectly competitive industries and it is impossible to distinguish between 
production costs, expenditures of gaining market power, or X-inefficiency caused 
by imperfect competition. This leads, however, to the situation in which it is 
impossible to estimate specific values for the conjectural vadations parameters 
or, in other words, to specify the form of competition. Analysis has to operate 
with different assumptions about firm conduct. On the one hand this can dimin-
ish the chances that the results will be of direct policy usability but, on the 
other, information about the sensibility of the results to the different assump-
tions of conduct can be useful from the viewpoint of practical policy experi-
ments. 
The assumptions and potential limitations of the models are important to 
note when considering the estimated industry specific deadweight losses of 
oligopolistic competition in the Finnish food manufacturing. Analysis of the 
Finnish food manufacturing industries reveals that the magnitude of deadweight 
losses depends decisively on the form of competition. Therefore, considerable 
welfare gains could be expected from the public policies that are able to restrict 
collusive practices. Implicit collusion is, however, a problematic question from 
the viewpoint of competition agencies, because it can be a result of individual 
rationality and does not need any explicit commitments of price setting between 
firms. For example, the Finnish competition legislation (480/1992) does not 
prohibit very clearly the forms of collusive activities that are less tangible than 
agreements and decisions of the firms at the same production or distribution 
stage to set prices, limit production, or segment markets. Similarly, Articles 85 
and 86 of the EC' s Treaty of Rome prohibit explicit cartels. Because the 
incentives of maintaining implicit collusion are positively related to market 
concentration, public policies can be directed against concentration. However, 
the preceeding analysis shows that the effects of increased concentration on 
welfare are not unambiguous. 
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The demand for food with respect to own-price has generally been esti-
mated to be quite inelastic. Employing the obtained elasticity estimates resulted 
in relatively high deadweight losses for a substantial part of the food manufac-
turing industries, even if firms were assumed to be Cournot-Nash competitiors. 
The results suggest that, in the Cournot competition, the industries with the best 
possibilities for welfare reducing margins were coffee roasting, tobacco prod-
ucts manufacture, margarine manufacture, manufacture of malt beverages and 
soft drinks, slaughtering, and dairy products manufacture. The averages of 
obtained price elasticity estimates yielded losses that are 5-15 percent of total 
sales. The manufacture of grain mill products, malt and starch as well as beet 
sugar manufacture, and sugar refining are also candidates for high potential 
welfare losses. Although cardinal estimates of the magnitude of deadweight 
losses vary substantially, the method used can identify industries that should 
arouse the interest of competition authorities and further research. Comparing 
the estimates of this study with the cross-industry rankings for the U.S. food 
manufacturing obtained by PETERSON and CONNOR (1995) reveals that there is 
considerable overlap in the lists of industries with the largest potential for high 
deadweight losses between Finland and the U.S. For example, the manufacture 
of malt beverages and soft drinks, coffee roasting, and margarine manufacture 
are candidates for high welfare losses in both countries. The existence of such 
uniformity may reflect the fact that technology and other market characteristcs 
are quite similar across countries. However, the magnitude of deadweight losses 
is higher in Finland, corresponding to the view that industries are less concen-
trated in countries where the size of the market is larger. 
In contrast, the group with the lowest estimated losses in the Cournot com-
petition consisted of chocolate and confectionary manufacture, fish processing, 
fruit and vegetable processing, and bakery products manufacture. In this group, 
the welfare losses were estimated to amount to 0.5-3 percent of total sales, 
depending on the obtained elasticity estimates. Especially in the case of choco-
late and confectionaries, the level of estimated losses is likely to be sensitive to 
the assumption of product homogeneity. The intensive introduction of new 
products and heavy advertising are determinants of product differentiation in 
chocolate and confectionary manufacture and, because market power that fol-
lows from product differentiation was not considered, the analysis probably 
underestimated the level of welfare losses. Furthermore, it must be noted that 
the models were unable to evaluate market power due to local concentration or 
due the fact that several firms may have the same owner. These two features are 
particularly important in bakery products manufacture. 
Because Finnish food manufacturing industries appeared to have consider-
able welfare losses even under Cournot behaviour, public policies directed to 
lower entry barriers can be excepted to be efficient even in the absence of 
collusive behaviour between the firms. Public policies can be expected to be 
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quite inefficient against entry barriers like large capital requirements for en-
trants, incumbents' absolute cost advantages, or product differentiation. How-
ever, policies can act against many strategic entry barriers manipulated by 
incumbents. For example, the Finnish competition legislation prohibits the use 
of exclusive sales and purchase rights. Since the market structure is quite stable 
over time and entries occur gradually, public policies need to consider the 
problem of market power in a dynamic context. Further industry-specific re-
search is needed to determine the potential existence and nature of entry barriers 
in the Finnish food manufacturing. 
The deadweight loss estimates were based on the assumption that firms are 
able to use their potential market power effectively. In this case, the deadweight 
losses correspond to allocative inefficiency of industries. Employing different 
short-run profitability measures as indicators of price-cost margins revealed, 
however, that industry profitability had usually not reached the level predicted 
by the structuralistic model. A potential explanation is that the conduct of firms 
was more competitive than the Cournot outcome. However, this conclusion 
alone is too straightforward, because profitability measures cannot separate the 
potential effects of X-inefficiency from the minimum level of production costs. 
The low average profit rates, especially in the case of quantitative import 
restrictions, may be a result of low technical efficiency supported by weak 
competition. Furthermore, it is likely that the bargaining power of the concen-
trated retailing sector and the further processing of intermediate goods limit the 
possibilities of food manufacturers to use their potential market power. 
The deadweight loss estimates are highly sensitive to the choice of the 
equilibrium concept and to the level of demand elasticity obtained from the 
previous studies. Therefore, the conclusions are more qualitative than quantita-
tive. The analysis showed that welfare losses due to the oligopolistic competi-
tion are at least potentially a matter of concern in the Finnish food manufactur-
ing. 
In addition to the potential static welfare losses associated with oligopoly 
market power, the welfare effects of public policies depend on the degree of 
market imperfections. This study presented a procedure to analyze the effects of 
the EU membership on consumer welfare and on the domestic food manufactur-
ers' profits. The first policy experiment was a reduction of the domestic prices 
of agricultural products to the EU level. In this case, the degree of transmission 
from manufacturers' cost changes to product prices depends on the degree of 
oligopolistic competition. Assuming perfect competition would overestimate 
the improvements in consumer welfare. The second experiment considered the 
abolition of institutional trade barriers. Because tariffs and quotas are not equiva-
lent instruments of the trade policy if markets are imperfectly competitive, the 
abolition of an import quota yields higher ex-ante welfare improvements than 
the abolition of a tariff which has led to the corresponding volume of imports 
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before the accession. In the third experiment it was assumed that, for example, 
lowered entry barriers of importers and excess capacity of the domestic firms 
lead to increased competition within the domestic food manufacturers. In this 
case, assuming perfect competition would ignore the considerable redistribution 
of welfare between consumers and domestic manufacturers resulting from the 
integration. 
The effects of different policy experiments are highly sensitive to the way in 
which imperfect competition and demand characteristics are captured. This is a 
common problem of oligopoly models. The overall lesson is that one should he 
cautious when making generalizations regarding the effects of different public 
policies. Nevertheless, the concequences of market imperfections in the food 
chain should he taken into account when studying the effects of trade interven-
tions, taxation, and different farm policies. For example, the value added tax on 
food, production quotas of agricultural production, price support of farm prod-
ucts, or direct agricultural support may lead to price and welfare effects depend-
ing a great deal on the stucture and conduct in the different stages of the food 
chain. 
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8. Summary 
The objectives of the study were (1) to study the effects of market structure on 
performance by using the game theoretical model formulations, (2) to derive 
measures of welfare losses associated with oligopolistic market power for a 
number of equilibrium types, (3) to estimate welfare losses of oligopolies for 
the Finnish food manufacturing by employing alternative oligopoly solutions, 
and (4) to predict how the membership in the EU affects the oligopoly 
equilibriums, consumer surplus, and firms' profits in the Finnish food manufac-
turing. 
The study began with a description of the market structure, firm behaviour, 
and performance in the Finnish food manufacturing. The sector is important in 
the national economy. In 1993 it accounted for 13 percent of the value added 
and total employment in ali manufacturing. Foreign trade was, however, of little 
importance due to the close relationship between agricultural policy and food 
manufacturing. In terms of different concentration measures, most of the Finn-
ish food manufacturing industries were found to he very concentrated. One 
explanation is the often empirically observed negative relationship between 
market size and concentration. The high level of concentration suggests that 
markets are oligopolistic. The actions of firms are interdependent, i.e. firms 
take into account how the rival firms are likely to react. 
The theoretical analysis in Chapter 3 formulated the framework for the model 
constructions and empirical analyses of the latter parts of the study. The strate-
gic behaviour of firms was modelled as noncooperative games. In modelling 
such games, there is considerable scope for designing the structure of moves or 
the degree of competition. Conjectural variations models presented the positive 
relationship between concentration and market power, the theoretical basis of 
the Herfindahl index of concentration, and the principles of reaction function 
analysis. Because an individual firm is likely to have an incentive to deviate 
from the collusive output, collusion must he supported by punishment strate-
gies. It was shown that higher concentration is likely to lead to higher industry 
profits because it supports the stability of collusion, and concentration indices 
may he useful in assessing the state of competitiveness in markets. Comparison 
between the Cournot model and the hierarchical Stackelberg model revealed, 
however, that the form of competition is decisive in the analysis of structure-
performance relationships. The studies reviewed showed that it may he benefi-
cial, from the point of view of a single country, to impose trade-distorting 
policies in imperfectly competitive markets. Optimal policies under different 
forms of oligopolistic competition can he different, and different trade barriers 
are not equivalent from the society' s viewpoint. 
Different formulations of strategic competition lead to a wide range of 
possible equilibriums. In Chapter 4 the models to evaluate welfare losses due to 
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oligopoly were based on the data on market features in the food manufacturing. 
The first model corresponded to the situation in which quantitative import re-
striction, more precisely volume quotas, are used. Competition within the do-
mestic firms was demonstrated by employing conjectural variations elasticities. 
Imports were treated as a price-taking fringe restricted to the level of the 
administrative quota. The second model considered the case in which quantita-
tive import restrictions do not exist. However, it was assumed that the govern-
ment imposes an import levy, tariff, or tax, which equals to the difference 
between domestic and foreign costs. In this context, the Stackelberg model, in 
which domestic firms are assumed to be in the leadership position, was derived. 
In the model domestic and foreign groups compete against each other, and 
competition within the groups was modelled using conjectural elasticities. 
The models were applied to Finnish food manufacturing industries in Chap-
ter 5. The results showed relatively high deadweight losses for a substantial part 
of the food manufacturing, even if firms were assumed to be Cournot-Nash 
competitors. Although the estimates of the magnitude of losses varied substan-
tially with respect to the price elasticities of demand, the analysis identified 
industries in which the room for welfare reducing margins is the largest. In the 
Cournot competition, the models yielded losses that are 5-15 percent of total 
sales in coffee roasting, tobacco, and margarine manufacture, manufacture of 
malt beverages and soft drinks, slaughtering, as well as dairy products manufac- 
ture. The manufacture of grain mill products, malt and starch as well as beet 
sugar manufacture, and sugar refining are also candidates for high welfare 
losses. Welfare losses were obtained to be 0.5-3 percent of total sales in choco- 
late and confectionary manufacture, fish processing, fruit and vegetable process-
ing, and bakery products manufacture. However, product differentiation and 
local concentration may increase firms' market power in this group of indus- 
tries. The analysis revealed that the magnitude of deadweight losses depends 
decisively on the form of competition. Welfare losses due to the oligopolistic 
competition are a matter of concern in the Finnish food manufacturing. Consid-
erable welfare gains could be expected from the public policies that are able to 
restrict collusive practices and to lower entry barriers. 
Chapter 6 presented a procedure to analyze the effects of the EU membership 
on consumer welfare and domestic food manufacturers' profits. Three different 
policy experiments linked to the process of integrating the Finnish food sector 
to the internal markets of the EU were analyzed. The reduction of the average 
domestic costs due to lower price level of agricultural raw materials increases 
both consumer welfare and domestic profits. The degree of transmission from 
manufacturers' cost changes to product prices depend on the degree of 
oligopolistic competition. The abolition of institutional trade barriers increases 
consumer welfare, but reduces manufacturers' profits. The net effect on welfare 
was found to be positive. Furthermore, it was assumed that, for example, 
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lowered entry barriers of importers and excess capacity of the domestic producers 
lead to increased competition in the Finnish food manufacturing. The analysis 
showed that this leads to considerable redistribution of welfare between 
consumers and domestic food manufacturers. The net effect is welfare improving. 
Increasing competition leads to a need for further cost savings and higher 
productivity in the food manufacturing. 
The need for further study is evident. The approaches of industrial econom-
ics are quite unexplored in the research on agricultural economics in Finland. 
For example, strategic behaviour of food manufacturers in the input markets is 
not analyzed in this study. If food manufacturers can influence farm prices 
through strategic behaviour, the analyses of welfare implications of agricultural 
policies for farmers need to take into account this oligopsony power. Since this 
study used the conjectural variations approach in modelling competition, one 
way to deepen the analysis would be to use a larger spectrum of oligopolistic 
strategies. In the future research, more attention should he paid to the effects of 
product differentiation associated with special brands and spatial differentia-
tion, advertising, research and development strategies, and vertical relationships 
in the food chain. The application made in this study can he extended by 
considering technical factors and firm strategies that influence industry struc-
ture. 
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APPENDIX 1. Concentration of the Finnish food manufacturing1). 
1986 
112) CR33) CR53) CR103) H54) H5) 
Slaughtering 26 74.7 84.7 94.4 0.31 0.22 
Meat processing 110 54.7 69.7 82.9 0.23 0.12 
Fruit and vegetable processing 84 71.3 81.2 89.8 0.38 0.25 
Fish processing 70 25.0 37.6 58.5 0.20 0.04 
Manufacture of margarine, oils and fats 8 86.7 96.2 100 0.27 0.25 
Dairy products manufacture 99 47.9 53.2 63.3 0.59 0.14 
Ice-cream manufacture 5 99.5 100 100 0.88 0.88 
Grain mill products manufacture 101 63.8 77.1 88.3 0.26 0.16 
Fresh bread and pastries manufacture 786 38.1 40.8 45.6 0.58 0.10 
Crispbread manufacture 4 94.7 100 100 0.45 0.45 
Biscuits manufacture 12 90.1 94.1 99.1 0.42 0.37 
Beet sugar manufacture and sugar refining 2 100 100 100 0.72 0.72 
Chocolate and confectionary manufacture 25 98.5 99.3 99.7 0.90 0.89 
Coffee roasting 2 100 100 100 0.99 0.99 
Manufacture of other food products 44 72.0 88.4 95.5 0.26 0.20 
Malt manufacture 5 99.9 100 100 0.97 0.97 
Manufacture of malt beverages and soft drinks 15 91.4 99.7 99.9 0.30 0.30 
Tobacco products manufacture 3 100 100 100 0.45 0.45 
Starch manufacture 3 100 100 100 0.58 0.58 
Feed manufacture 65 81.4 85.1 90.4 0.43 0.31 
1989 
n2) CR33) CR531 CR103) H54) H5) 
Slaughtering 24 51.6 69.6 91.7 0.23 0.12 
Meat processing 120 49.4 66.9 84.0 0.22 0.11 
Fruit and vegetable processing 122 79.5 86.6 92.8 0.43 0.32 
Fish processing 79 31.3 45.3 65.4 0.21 0.05 
Manufacture of margarine, oils and fats 8 92.6 98.4 100 0.39 0.38 
Dairy products manufacture 87 48.2 54.3 65.4 0.56 0.17 
Ice-cream manufacture 3 100 100 100 0.89 0.89 
Grain mill products manufacture 92 63.6 71.7 83.0 0.21 0.11 
Fresh bread and pastries manufacture 858 44.0 47.0 51.5 0.41 0.09 
Crispbread manufacture 2 100 100 100 0.68 0.68 
Biscuits manufacture 17 84.4 91.8 97.9 0.31 0.26 
Beet sugar manufacture and sugar refining 2 100 100 100 0.71 0.71 
Chocolate and confectionary manufacture 28 96.3 98.8 99.7 0.54 0.53 
Coffee roasting 2 100 100 100 0.99 0.99 
Manufacture of other food products 62 57.7 73.8 86.1 0.23 0.13 
Malt manufacture 4 99.9 100 100 0.97 0.97 
Manufacture of malt beverages and soft drinks 16 94.7 99.8 99.9 0.31 0.31 
Tobacco products manufacture 3 100 100 100 0.42 0.42 
Starch manufacture 6 82.8 96.2 100 0.28 0.26 
Feed manufacture 73 77.6 85.6 91.3 0.31 0.23 
1) Concentration in 1993 is presented in Chapter 2. 2) Number of firms. 	3) The concentration ratio of 3, 5 
and 10 largest firms. 4) The Herfindahl index of concentration for 5 largest firms. 5) The Herfindahl index 
of concentration for the industry. 
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APPENDIX 2. Profitability measures for some Finnish food manufacturing 
industries. 
1990 
Industry 1111 1112 1113 1121 1141 1164 1190 
Frequence 5 15 8 35 37 4 9 
Turnover, FIM mill. 1019.58 10889.68 769.86 16133.03 2578.23 2189.44 2761.81 
Operating margin 38.71 538.01 81.66 593.21 185.53 253.05 172.55 
Operating profit after depreciation -10.40 234.13 54.12 254.57 104.03 69.93 59.33 
Profit after financial items -43.96 94.43 24.95 62.07 70.01 79.94 -121.96 
Net profit for accounting period -6.27 45.04 37.75 78.53 95.50 72.02 82.94 
Fixed assets, FIM mill. 277.15 2073.73 448.57 2172.12 716.99 1405.50 3589.72 
Key ratios: 
Operating margin -% 3.80 4.94 10.61 3.68 7.20 11.56 6.25 
Financial result -% 0.31 3.30 5.29 2.18 2.71 11.26 -1.68 
Net result -% -4.51 0.51 1.72 0.08 -0.45 2.89 -5.78 
Total result -% 1.24 0.47 4.44 0.51 1.17 2.88 4.22 
Return on investment -% 0.55 8.70 8.34 7.15 9.95 8.20 3.23 
Total liabilities -% 50.89 32.66 62.74 28.60 49.87 83.38 126.12 
Debt:capital ratio 4.02 2.70 1.26 2.21 1.93 1.62 1.99 
Equity ratio 19.92 27.01 44.15 31.19 34.10 38.10 33.39 
Current ratio 1.69 1.64 1.69 1.50 1.79 1.38 0.98 
1991 
Industry 1111 1112 1121 1141 1164 1190 
Frequence 8 14 30 46 4 10 
Turnover, FIM mill. 1307.47 10372.28 14906.31 2414.37 2340.45 2806.25 
Operating margin 57.32 453.57 488.24 164.56 301.99 216.29 
Operating profit after depreciation 24.47 192.27 151.17 40.76 127.04 128.54 
Profit after financial items -14.52 -75.86 -39.08 2.41 66.02 -168.35 
Net profit for accounting period 4.89 5.94 100.16 3.88 13.71 20.68 
Fixed assets, FIM mill. 288.29 2285.99 2381.00 1031.87 1661.14 3692.32 
Key ratios: 
Operating margin -% 4.38 4.37 3.28 6.82 12.90 7.71 
Financial result -% 1.21 1.56 1.73 4.64 9.87 -3.54 
Net result -% -1.30 -0.96 -0.54 -0.49 2.40 -6.67 
Total result -% -1.17 -0.89 -0.54 -0.83 2.54 -0.85 
Retum on investment -% 7.76 5.57 5.36 6.72 8.40 4.49 
Total liabilities -% 45.47 39.76 30.79 58.91 89.72 135.07 
Debt:capital ratio 4.36 3.46 1.90 2.18 1.90 2.25 
Equity ratio 18.65 22.41 34.48 31.49 34.43 30.74 
Current ratio 1.66 1.58 1.49 1.37 1.27 1.12 
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1992 
Industry 1111 1112 1121 1141 1164 1190 
Frequence 6 19 20 40 5 4 
Turnover, FIM mill. 790.58 10371.99 17966.98 2062.20 2614.16 2313.87 
Operating margin 33.53 601.43 934.03 154.47 211.92 165.77 
Operating profit after depreciation 15.59 327.60 567.54 19.91 63.44 125.88 
Profit after financial items -14.62 -16.13 212.68 -21.23 -47.99 121.36 
Net profit for accounting period -12.35 37.49 118.02 -43.06 -34.69 7.35 
Fixed assets, FIM mill. 232.17 2285.99 2945.61 953.25 1924.40 735.60 
Key ratios: 
Operating margin -% 4.24 5.80 5.20 7.49 8.11 7.16 
Financial result -% 0.07 2.28 2.84 5.09 3.49 6.73 
Net result -% -2.20 -0.36 0.80 -1.44 -2.19 5.00 
Total result -% 0.39 0.69 0.10 0.11 -0.30 3.27 
Return on investment -% 6.81 8.26 13.95 4.75 5.26 12.44 
Total liabilities -% 51.34 41.49 26.95 55.55 139.50 41.53 
Debt:capital ratio 4.14 2.79 2.05 1.93 3.71 1.07 
Equity ratio 19.45 26.39 32.78 34.10 21.23 48.29 
Current ratio 1.73 1.49 1.53 1.23 1.06 1.55 
1993 
Industry 1111 1112 121 1141 1164 1190 
Frequence 7 18 15 38 4 7 
Turnover, FIM mill. 2136.01 7085.41 16096.63 2142.13 2536.61 2857.88 
Operating margin 92.54 449.93 761.80 143.16 264.21 222.31 
Operating profit after depreciation 47.55 201.23 387.55 9.15 143.73 141.35 
Profit after financial items 11.61 -33.11 151.81 -36.70 51.43 133.44 
Net profit for accounting period 6.16 -3.26 191.64 64.67 0.32 55.62 
Fixed assets, FIM mill. 442.80 2150.06 3942.84 995.70 1384.47 988.74 
Key ratios: 
Operating margin -% 4.33 6.35 4.73 6.68 10.42 7.78 
Financial result -% 2.39 2.89 2.78 3.54 6.66 6.80 
Net result -% 0.29 -0.62 0.46 -2.72 1.91 3.96 
Total result -% 0.59 -1.20 0.76 2.06 1.87 -1.57 
Return on investment -% 8.01 6.42 8.95 2.20 9.71 11.19 
Total liabilities -% 32.44 39.36 31.12 52.94 88.45 34.10 
Debt:capital ratio 2.34 2.12 1.42 1.53 2.45 0.85 
Equity ratio 29.92 32.08 41.33 39.46 28.98 53.98 
Current ratio 1.67 1.64 1.45 1.45 1.11 1.51 
1111 Slaughtering 1112 Meat processing 
1113 Fruit and vegetable processing 1121 Dairy products manufacture 
1141 Fresh bread and pastries manufacture 1164 Manufacture of malt beverages and soft drinks 
1190 Feed manufacture 
Source: Financial Statements Statisties 
157 
APPENDIX 3. Some mathematical derivations. 
Equations 3.6 and 3.7 
Let an n-firm homogenous product industry face an inverse demand curve P(Q), 
where Q is industry output. Firm i's output is qi and the cost function ci(qi,w), 
where the input price vector w is exogenously given. Firm i maximizes its 
profits 7Ci = P(Q) q1 - ci(qi,w) by choosing q  so that, for i=1,...,n, 
dIr 
d(1 	q ; ) i 	=0.  
	
= p(o+ P' (Q)q, + P (Q) 	q dci(q,w) i aqi 	 dqi 	da, 
This can be rewritten as: 
P(Q)+ P' (Q)q 1+ d(1, 
	j ) 	q1 	q; 	(q,,w) 
i  	' 
dqi 	q 	qi 	dqi 
and using the definition 13 = 	qj / dqi)(qi/Zji qj) yields Equation 3.6, in which 
[3=13i=13j for ali i,j. If MCi is marginal cost for firm i, it can be written 
 
 
r v 
P(0+ P (Q) 
Q 
 P(Q) qi 	qi  13+-qi  — fi 
P(Q) 	Q 	q 	qi 
  
= MC, , (A.3) 
  
and thus 
1 	r P(Q)+— P(Q)[/3 + si (1— )3)]= MC, , 
11  
where i is the price elasticity of demand and si = qi/Q. Taking the absolute 
value of price elasticity and rearranging the terms leads to Equation 3.7. 
Equation 3.15 
The immediate one-period gain from cheating is 
Ch 	* (n+1)2 (a— c)2 (a— c)2 	(n-1)2 (a— c)2 r. —7r i = 
16bn 2 	4bn 	16bn2 
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Future losses discounted to the first period are 
pDviCh 
t=1 
Losses dominate 
= 6(7c: 	 82 (71. 	z 	83 (7c*.  
(n-1)2 (a—c)2 
)... 
 
 
1 
and no firm 
(n-1)2 (a— c)2 
[ 	
4bn(n +1)2 	) 
will cheat if 
(n —1)2 (a— c)2 
1-8 4bn(n+ 1)2 	) 16bn 2 
which leads to 3.15. 
Equation 3.19 
In the Cournot behaviour context the equilibrium price is a solution of the 
maximizing programmes of individual profits of the k firms. Firm i maximizes its 
profits (Equation 3.18) when 
dP(Q D ) p(QD 	 dci(q z
,w) 
= o. 
dQ
D 
 q1 	
dq 
 
Defining -[dQ(P)/dP][P/Q(P)] = lii and [dQc(P)/dP][P/Qc(P)] = E, as respec-
tively, the absolute value of elasticity of the global demand function and the 
elasticity of supply function of the competitive fringe (positive by assumption) 
and after using Equation 3.17, the following expression is obtained: 
p(nr) 	Q D  p(nD q, 
/ 	rii+Q Ce 	Q D 
dc, (qi , w) =0 
dq, 
(A.9) 
This can be rewritten: 
n d c.(q.,w) p(Q D 	  P(Q- ) 	= 0, 
ni+Eo. - cp 	dq 
where si=qi/Q and CD=QD/Q. Because Li=(P-MCi)/P, this leads to 3.19. 
(A.10) 
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Equations 3.26-3.28 
Maximizing the profit function ni=(a-bAi-bqi)qi-cqi in the quantity setting con-
text yields q1=(a-bA1-c)/2b for ali i=1,...,n. The first firm in the hierarchy pro-
duces q1=(a-c)/2b, the second firm q2=(a-c)/4b, the third firm q3.(a-c)/8b, and 
so on. Thus, qi=(a-c)/2' b for ali i=1„n Summing each firm's optimal quan-
tity, i.e. 
Hs 	a— c 	1 	1 	1 
Q 	=+ + + .+ —j, 
b 2 2 23 	2" ) 
(A.11) 
leads to 3.27, in which PHs is obtained by substituting QHs in the demand 
function P=a-bQ. The Cournot price is higher than PHs if (a+nc)/(n+1) > 
(a+c(211-1)) / 2, i.e. if 2'1-n> 1. A firm that produces the Cournot quantity can 
be found by setting (a-c) / 2 b = (a-c) / b(n+1), i.e. 2'=n+1, and it is ranked by 
i=ln(n+1)/1n2 in the hierarchy. Profit for firm i, i=1,...,n, is QHs(pHS-c)  which 
yields Equation 3.28. 
Equation 3.30 
The Herfindahl index of concentration is the sum of the squares of the market 
shares of firms in the industry: 
2 
2 1 1 1 H= 	= 	j  
,•=1 	1— 2 " 	22 	24 	26 	2 2" 
After multiplying H by 1/4 and solving (1-1/4) H, this can be written 
 
—
3 
H = 	
1 	2 1 	1 
4 	1-2" 4 44+1  
  
 
 
  
Multiplying by 4/3  leads to Equation 3.30. 
 
Equation 4.8 
  
Substituting the equilibrium values of the competitive and oligopoly quantitites 
yields the deadweight loss to be 
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ja 	aCDII3D+H o(1— D)1+cf, 
b b(l+CD[PD+HD(1-130)]) 
a—ci, a + aC DU D + 11D( 1— fi D)i+cp  — bOdQ — D { 	 b 	b 	b(l+C D LS D +11D (1-- 13 D )l) 
DWL= 
a-eD 
  
1 —1711 
I 111 C D 
1 1/I —CD [13 D H D (1 — f3 D )] . 
 
r
{D
-0 
D = 	 dQ— WL 
Ir11 
D 
/3  
frii-CDISD+HD(1-PDW 
G{ 
(A.14) 
  
  
Hence, the deadweight loss is 
1,11-1 1 
DWL = 	11111-1  G c, "	1111 	 Inicp  
1111-1 	 1111-1 ini-cD[fi D +HD (1-fiD )] 
{ 
1 
I 	 I C D 
— CD{Gc,-1111 G ini-c„[fiD +H D(1-fipmj 
 
 
(A.15) 
Rearranging terms leads to 4.8. 
Equation 4.15 
The deadweight loss is 
b a—C D 12 {a  aCD[PD+ 11D(1-13 DM -Ecp}  =a 	 
b ) 	
a
b 	) 	b b(l+C D [fi D + H D (1—  fi D )1) 
b C D  {a aC
D U3 D +14(1— fiD)l+cD}2 	{a—c p 	aCD [fi D -1-11D( 1 	D)] -Ecp  
b 	b(1+ C0 [/3 D + H 00— 13 0 )]) 	 b 	b
+ b(1+ C D [13 D + H D(1—  13 D)]) 
(A.16) 
Equation 4.15 is obtained by rearranging the terms. 
Equation 4.16 
The starting point is 
a—c,  {1 (a c )a aC,[fi + H,(1— „)]+c,} „ { 
b 	2 	 1+CD [13 D +HD (1—/3,)] 
1 { 	aC DU D+ HaG 	c  +—a 
2b 	1+ CM; + H D (1 13 D )] 
{ aC,[fi,+H D(1—)3,1+cp a aCD[PD+11D(1— fia)l+cD} .  
1+C D [P1  +H,(1—fi,)] 	b b(l+CD[fiD+HDO-- flaM 
DWL 
p0 Q0 
(A.17) 
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Using the fact that Iril=13/(a-P) under linear demand, it can he observed that 
DWL 	1 	 a—c D 
p0 Q0 	21 771 
1 nt aC D [fi D +H D (1-- 	D)J+cD} 
1+CD[f3D+ 11D(1— fiD)] 
(a—c D ) 2 
2 
aC D [f 3 D +H D (1 — fiD)]+c: (A.18) aCD[f3D+HD(1-13D)]+cD} 
+ CD[fi„ + H D (1- fiD 1+CD[S,+H D ( 1-- 
which leads to 4.16. 
Equation 4.22 
When t=cD-cm and s=0, the total oligopoly output is Q°=[(a-cD)(1+VD+Vm)] / 
[b(l+VD)(1+Vm)]. Let us denote (I)=[1+VD+Vm] / [(1+VD)(1+Vm)]. Thus, the 
deadweight loss can he find out from 
a-cD  
f
b 	 C D)(1- 0) j -1-  7C m • (a-cD) 	
bodQ_
I,  
Equation 4.23 
The deadweight loss per total sales in an industry is 
DVIL 	b(a — c D ) 2 (0 —1) 2 	b(a — c D )VD [b(l+VD )(1+ V m 	(a C D)(1- 
p° Q° 2b(a — (a —c D )0)(a D )0 	 (a — (a — D )0)(a — D )0 
Observing that 
P 
1771= 	
= a—(a—cD)0 
a—P (a—c D )0 
under linear demand leads directly to 4.23. 
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Equations 4.24 and 4.25 
Let QD and Qm stand for the total quantities of domestic production and im-
ports, respectively. The inverse linear demand function is P=a-b(QD+Qm). Prof-
its for firm i are given by 
7r iD  = (a—b(QD +Qm ))q, 	— s)q„; 
7C 	= (a—b(QD +Qm ))qim — (c + t)qim. 
	 (A.22) 
A conjectural variations model is used in modelling competition within the 
groups. Firm i maximizes its profits by choosing q  so that 
a—b(QD +Qm )—bQD [13,+-17- ) (1—/3)]= C ID  +s; 
QD 
a—b(Q0 +Qm )—bQm [fim +521—(1— fi,)]=cim —t. 
Qm  
 
After summing across the industries, a solution for the quantities can be ob-
tained to be 
QD = 	
1 
Ra— c + s)(1+17,)—(a— c m —t)]; 
b[(1+ VD )(1+17m ) —1] 
Qm = 	
1 
[(a c m —t)(1+VD )—(a— c + s], 
b[(1 + D )(1+ V)-1] 
 
where VD4D+HD(1-PD) and Vm=i3m+Hm(1-[3m). Combining domestic produc-
tion and imports leads to 4.24. If s=0 and t=cp-cm, the derivation of 4.25 
follows the methods presented in Equations A.19-A.21. 
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